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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis has two aims: First, to demonstrate that there is in the current medical model 
of transsexuality conceptual incoherence.  Second, to establish an alternative model for 
understanding transsexuality: the model of authenticity. 
 
The current medical model is based on an assumption that the sexed body and gender 
identity are distinct, so that gender is different to sex, which forms the basis of 
transsexuality. The tension in transsexuality between sex and gender gives rise to 
suffering. Surgery unifies sex and gender and is offered as the humane response. 
 
It is this move from separation to unification of sex and gender that constitutes the 
conceptual incoherence in the current medical model. 
 
Suffering is then explored as a potential justification for surgery.  It is argued that it is not 
obvious that suffering must be alleviated. Indeed, suffering may be valuable, and where 
this is the case there is no moral imperative to remove it. So, whilst there is a serious 
moral duty to respond to suffering there is no absolute duty to alleviate it. 
 
An alternative model is then explored.  A model of authenticity, which can replace the 
medical model, better enables the freely chosen identity and goals of the transsexual to be 
respected, without compromising the ends of medicine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Problem 
 
In the current medical model of Transsexuality (TS), (also known as Gender Dysphoria 
(GD) or Gender Identity Disorder (GID)), a distinction is made between sex and gender.  
This is necessary for the condition to be a rational possibility.  At the same time TS is 
resolved by means of sex and gender alignment.  This is seen as the proper end of 
treatment by both the medical and transsexual communities.   
 
The first aim of this thesis is to argue that a model founded on a sex/gender distinction 
and terminating in sex/gender alignment is conceptually incoherent.  The second aim is to 
demonstrate an alternative model, the model of authenticity, and to work out its 
implications.  In order to establish both aims the thesis will be laid out in the following 
way.   
 
This Introduction will provide both an outline of the condition, focussing on the current 
classification of TS and on its clinical history, and provide a list of the current guidelines, 
codes of conduct and practices as defined by The World Professional Association for 
Transgender Health Inc (WPATH), formerly known as The Harry Benjamin International 
Gender Dysphoria Association (HBGDA). WPATH has formal responsibility both for the 
current medical understanding of TS and for professional regulation.  A sixth version of 
their Standards of Care (SOC) was produced in 1998 and replaced all previous standards.  
The Association’s philosophy of care aims: 
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      to provide flexible directions for the treatment of gender identity  
      disorders.1 
 
 
Chapter One will locate TS within current models of sex/sexuality and gender before 
discussing in greater detail the problem with that model as outlined above. Chapter Two 
will apply those models to TS ending with an interim conclusion that they are an 
inadequate justification for the current therapeutic management of TS.  In Chapter Three 
an alternative justification for the existing treatment regime will be sought, that focuses 
on the suffering of the transsexual individual.  It will address whether suffering alone can 
be thought to justify the current medical management of transsexual people.  It is argued 
that suffering cannot be regarded as sufficient justification.  An alternative model of 
Authenticity will be proposed in Chapter Four, which seeks both to meet the objections 
raised in the discussion of existing models and to provide a coherent justification for 
treatment, principally that it respects autonomy. Chapter Five will explore some 
implications of this model, both for medicine and the person who has transitioned.  
Finally it is concluded that the authenticity model is more coherent and consistent than 
the medical model.   
 
1. The Condition of TS 
 
According to Benjamin TS has four characteristics: 
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1. A strong and persistent cross-gender identification…manifested by symptoms 
such as a stated desire to be the other sex…or that he/she has the typical feelings 
of the other sex. 
2. Persistent discomfort with his/her sex or inappropriateness in the gender role of 
that sex…the belief that he/she was born in the wrong sex. 
3. This disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition. 
4. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational or other important areas of functioning.2 
 
Benjamin distinguishes between two types or experiences of TS; Primary and Secondary.  
The former begins in early life and the individual tends to seek help whilst fairly young.  
In the latter gender identity becomes a prevailing concern later on in life, often after the 
individual has led an apparently successful life in the assigned gender both in marriage 
and parenting. 
 
He coined the term TS in 1953 following the successful Gender Reassignment Surgery 
(GReS) of Christine Jorgensen in Denmark3.  He developed the Sex Orientation Scale 
(SOS) in order to distinguish between various expressions of TS, ranging from mild to 
severe. 
 
Benjamin distinguishes TS from both transvestism and homosexuality.  In The 
Transsexual Phenomenon4, whilst acknowledging a continuum theory of sexual 
behaviour ranging from transvestism to transsexuality, he meticulously differentiates 
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between them on two accounts.  The first is related to the experience of happiness5.  In 
transvestism the male dresses up in female clothing for reasons of sexual gratification.  
This is the motivating factor and the transvestite is secure in his sense of male identity.  
The wearing of female clothing does not indicate distress over gender identity but is a 
means of sexual satisfaction.  Benjamin argued that in fact transvestism is a celebration of 
masculinity because the man involved in able to reach orgasm despite the fact that he is 
wearing female clothing and so his masculinity has triumphed over possible female 
domination.  By contrast the transsexual experiences profound gender distress.  The 
second differentiation is spatial:  transvestism is expressed of privately whereas TS leads 
the individual to seek public help, which puts the feeling into the public domain.   
 
Accordingly: 
 
      The transsexual puts all his faith and future into the hands of the doctor,  
      particularly the surgeon.  These patients want to undergo corrective  
      surgery, a so-called ‘conversion operation’ so that their bodies at least 
      resemble those of the sex which they feel they belong and to which they 
      ardently wish to belong.6 
 
 
Seeking medical attention apparently becomes a symptom of TS.  This creates something 
of a circular justification both for his model and for the treatment he prescribes and this 
circularity is one of the problems with his model to be discussed in Chapter One. 
 
Benjamin discusses homosexuality as a matter of the nature and orientation of sexual 
desire and not of gender identity.  He concludes: 
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       The transvestite has a social problem, 
       The transsexual has a gender problem, 
       The homosexual has a sex problem.7 
 
 
On his definition TS has three discrete yet related elements: (i) gender identification, (ii) 
gender desire and (iii) gender dysphoria. 
(I) GENDER IDENTIFICATION 
 
The Benjamin/medical model of TS distinguishes between the subjective sense of gender 
and the objective sexed body.  The latter is thought of as separate to and distinct from the 
former and the sexed body does not give rise to the individual’s gender identity.  The 
sexed body is that which is part of the person’s original given-ness or mode of being at 
birth, whilst gender identity is that which a person adapts as a result of personal 
development.  Stoller refers to the latter as a person’s ‘gender core’8.  
 
Whilst a distinction can be made between sex and gender it is thought that most people 
develop with a sense of harmony or concurrence between the two in so that an individual 
who has a female sexed body will develop a female gender identity and an individual 
with a male sexed body will develop a male gender identity.  Whether this development 
is either desirable or normal is challenged by the trans-gendered community.  This 
challenge will be explored in Chapter Five. 
 
In TS however this harmony or concurrence between sex and gender has not taken place.  
A transsexual develops a gender identity that is opposite to her/his sexed identity.  
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Gender identity develops early in life before the transsexual realises the reality and 
significance of her/his sexed body and it is only gradually that she/he comes to 
understand the problem that is posed by the sexed body.   
 
Throughout this thesis reference will be made to the stories of three transsexual persons: 
Christine Jorgensen9, Jan Morris10 and Mark Rees11. Jorgensen and Morris are designated 
as Male to Female (M-F) transsexuals whereas Rees is Female to Male (F-M). Their 
narratives will act as source material for both the experience of TS and for the way that 
medicine seeks to assist and treat transsexuals.  Jorgensen expresses her gender identity 
in the following way:  
 
      I have the physical characteristics of a very immature male but 
      as far back as I can remember I’ve always had the feelings… 
      the emotions of a girl.12 
 
 
Similarly Morris, in the opening words of her autobiography writes: 
 
      I was three or four years old when I realised that I had been born 
      in the wrong body, and should really be a girl.  I remember the  
      moment well and it is the earliest memory of my life.13 
 
 
Morris expresses the way that TS is most commonly understood; that of a person being 
‘trapped in the wrong body’.  Here a person is understood to be the gendered self who 
ought to have been ‘placed in’ or ‘rightly belongs to’ the correct body.  The correct body 
is the one which correlates to the gendered self and this conviction about sex/gender 
correlation remains despite the sex/gender distinction previously noted.  A mistake is 
thought to have occurred which is either the fault of nature or of God, depending upon 
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individual belief systems, but is not the responsibility of the individual concerned.  The 
transsexual is a victim who deserves a remedy from those who are in a position to help. 
 
At the 20th WPATH International Symposium in 2007 Olyslager and Conway presented 
an assessment of the prevalence of both M-F and F-M TS in the general populationi.  The 
number of M-F transsexuals in relation to F-M currently stands at 3: 1.   
 
The gendered self is regarded as the true representation of the self with the sexed body 
representing what the transsexual is not.  The body is rejected by the transsexual being, in 
any sense, a real aspect of the self.  This rejection extends to the way that the body 
represents the self to others.  That the gendered self is the real self is accepted by both the 
transsexual and the medical community. 
 
(II) GENDER DESIRE 
 
Within the Benjamin medical model, gender desire refers to the desire for the 
transsexual’s gender identity to be seen and ideally understood by others.  It is a desire 
for recognition and often great importance is attached to achieving this.  Recognition is 
thought to lead to acceptance, which in turn brings a sense of fullness or completion to 
the gendered self.  In order for others to recognise a transsexual’s gender she/he often 
                                                 
 
i M-F TS is between the ranges of 1: 1,000 – 1: 4,500 and F-M TS 1: 5, 500 – 1: 8000.  This figure puts the 
prevalence of TS at much higher in the general population than previously thought.  Olyslager and Conway 
“On the Calculation of the Prevalence of  Transsexualism” presented at the 20th Symposium of WPATH 
Chicago, Illinois September 5th -8th 2007 and submitted for publication in the International Journal of 
Transgenderism (IJT) 
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identifies with the insignia of that gender, which can function as a means of 
communication.  Jorgensen describes her attraction to items that belonged to her 
grandmother and felt that her grandmother would have been sympathetic to her had she 
known.  She regretted not having told her of her desires: 
 
      Had I told her of my childish prayer one Christmas when I was five 
      asking God for a pretty doll with long, golden hair Grandma might 
      have helped answer that prayer.14 
 
 
Jorgensen goes on to describe how her attraction to sewing lead to public ridicule by a 
class teacher.  She knew both the shame of being a boy who was attracted to an activity 
associated with girls and of having that attraction discovered by others who responded 
with ridicule.  Her own shame led her to keep her sewing hidden in her school desk but 
was not strong enough to cause her to give it up.  If, however, she had been either alone 
in the world, or in a world that viewed her desire sympathetically, then she would not 
have experienced shame.  Shame is a response to the effects upon and response of others.  
It is a significant element of gender distress. 
 
For many transsexuals recognition is achieved through surgery.  Gender Reassignment 
Surgery (GReS), otherwise known as Sex Reassignment Surgery (SReS), is standard. The 
original secondary sex characteristics of the transsexual are altered to match those that 
correspond to the gender asserted. Vaginoplasty is the procedure in which the secondary 
sex characteristics of a female are constructed and Phalloplasty is the male equivalent. 
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Surgery is performed as the final stage of treatment in a process that is known as 
‘transitioning’: beginning when the transsexual seeks medical help and moves through 
psychiatric assessment, hormone therapy and a period of time when the transsexual lives 
out the gender role in public in an activity known as ‘passing’.  The requirements for 
surgery include the presence of TS for at least two years, followed by a two year period 
of psychiatric supervision and a successful one year period of living in the chosen gender 
role. 
(III) GENDER DYSPHORIA 
 
The distress that is associated with TS can be understood both subjectively and 
relationally. 
 
Subjective distress refers to that which the transsexual feels about his/her gender, 
specifically in light of his/her sexed body.  Distress is experienced at a number of levels 
including the tension experienced between assigned and felt gender, and difficulty in 
understanding oneself as a result, and powerfully negative feelings towards the sexed 
body15.  The tension between assigned and felt gender identity can itself be experienced 
in a number of different ways.  For example a pre-operative male transsexual (M-F) may 
have desires that are apparently consistent with the assigned gender, such as playing 
football, which he rejects or views negatively because he may perceive these as 
inconsistent with his valued female gender identity.  He may fear that to express his 
interest in football may compromise his claims to a female gender identity, especially if 
he is at the early stage in the transitioning process.  Similarly a female transsexual may 
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abandon her strongly held desire to work with children in order to train as a car mechanic 
as this is perceived to be more consistent with a masculine gender role.  The rejection of 
that which is associated with the assigned gender may also be a cause of distress. 
 
This type of gender distress is linked to the assumption that certain activities are 
gendered.  This assumption has, on the one hand, increasingly been challenged whilst, on 
the other, traditional gender role constructions remain in place both in the general and 
transsexual communities.  This challenge has given TS its plausibility whilst traditional 
gender constructions seem to figure in the transsexual’s experience.  The latter appear to 
be rejected if they are associated with the assigned gender role but desired if associated 
with the chosen gender role.  It also seems that very traditional gender characteristics are 
both desired and exhibited if they are thought to be consistent with the valued gender 
role.  Male transsexuals’ often choose traditional feminine names for the female gender 
identity and express that identity in overtly feminine ways16.  It seems to be similar for 
female transsexuals17. 
 
Descriptions of gender distress have been well documented in recent transsexual 
autobiographical narrativesii.  Jorgensen gives a detailed account of her distress prior to 
transitioning.  She relates how she was aware at a young age that she was fundamentally 
different from other boys.  This was exacerbated by the comments to of her sister Dolly: 
 
      I remember I was about eleven or twelve years old when my sister 
      Dolly began to notice my outstanding feminine mannerisms18. 
 
                                                 
 
ii See list p 6. 
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As a result Dolly described such mannerisms as ‘silly’ and encouraged her to become 
more masculine.  This caused Jorgensen to wonder why certain activities such as carrying 
books home from school should be considered as either ‘boyish’ or ‘girlish’ and why 
because of the way that she carried them she should be considered as a ‘sissy’. 
 
Jorgensen claims that gender distress was the central feature of her life prior to 
transitioning and it lead to her considering suicide.  This was ultimately rejected and 
Jorgensen turned to friends and doctors for help. 
 
Both Morris and Rees describe similar gender distress which was expressed differently 
for them both.  Morris recalls her prayers to God to make her a girl whilst Rees describes 
his inner conflict. 
 
Gender distress is generated by being perceived and treated by others in a way that is not 
consistent with how the transsexual understands him/herself.  It can be discussed in terms 
of absence and presence.  Absence refers to the ‘hidden’ nature of the transsexual’s 
gender identity whilst presence refers to the way that others respond to how the 
transsexual presents his/her chosen gender identity.  Absence occurs when a person 
relates to the transsexual on the basis of his/her body and insists that he/she behaves in a 
way that is believed to be consistent with it and presence occurs when a transsexual seeks 
to display his/her gender identity and other people respond negatively.  Absence can lead 
to a transsexual feeling unknown by others and this in turn leads to a sense of isolation 
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and social withdrawal.  Presence can lead to open conflict with others in which the 
transsexual can face hostility, ridicule and rejection. 
 
Jorgensen describes this relational aspect to her distress in the account of her interview 
with a doctor from whom she sought support for GReS19.   The doctor challenged the 
strength of her gender identity convictions by referring her to God and the need to submit 
to His will.  She countered: 
 
      I don’t believe that God would want me to go on being unhappy, 
      unable to present the best part of my life to the world, when there is 
      the possibility of developing into a whole person. 
 
 
Here Jorgensen not only makes a claim about God, she also questions why she should 
continue to suffer when medical and surgical treatment is available. 
 
The transsexual’s distress may lead to any number of behaviours and experiences that are 
of concern, such as social withdrawal, social dysfunction, substance abuse, self harming, 
suicide attempts that are occasionally successful, and difficulty in forming meaningful 
and lasting relationship and successful employment.  The total experience of distress is 
often described as being both unbearable and intolerable.  It is such distress that leads a 
transsexual to seek medical help, most frequently specifically psychiatric help. 
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2. History of TS 
 
Although the publicity surrounding Jorgensen in 1952 brought the subject of TS to public 
attention it had already been of considerable interest to medicine for nearly fifty years 
beginning with the work of Hirschfeld and Ellis. 
 
In 1910 Hirschfeld produced his formative work on the subject of sexual identity.20He 
reviewed sixteen male, and one female, cross-dressers along with interviewing female 
impersonators.  He noticed the variety of sexual expression amongst his interviewees and 
his major conclusion was the development of the concept of ‘intermediaries’.  Here he 
argued that the then current dimorphic understanding of the sexes was too simplistic.  
Some men and women did not fit into such categories but fitted somewhere in between.  
Hence the need for a third category which he classified as ‘intermediary’  He also 
referred to such people as transvestite if they thought, felt or acted like a member of the 
opposite sex for sexual purposes. 
 
In 1913 Ellis coined the term ‘sexo-aesthetic inversion’21.  This term came to replace 
Hirschfeld’s concept of the ‘intermediary’.  Ellis distinguished sexual attraction from 
gender identity and life-style choice.  Many of his clinical subjects showed little or no 
interest in sexual activity but were concerned with gender identity and its external 
expression.  He later came to regard the word ‘inversion’ as inappropriate as it may 
suggest homosexuality in those to whom it was applied and so he replaced the whole 
designation with that of “Eonism” after the name of an eighteenth century French cross-
dresser , the Chevalier d’Eon.   
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Hirschfeld’s and Ellis’s medical interest in TS was continued by doctors specialising in 
the then new science of psychiatry, of which the most important is Freud.  His theories of 
sexual development were applied to the experience of cross-dressing and cross-sex 
identification.  His treatment of Fetishism was seen as one possible way of understanding 
the condition along with Castration Anxiety and flight from the realisation of the genital 
condition of the mother. 
 
Following on, researchers were concerned to distinguish what is now called TS from 
other conditions that had been identified and confused with it.  TS was separated from 
homosexuality, cross dressing for reasons of sexual arousal and relief, the inter-sex 
condition of Hermaphrodism, Pseudo-Hermaphrodism and conditions that were classified 
as psychosis.  Medical, psychoanalytical and sociological views competed to explain TS. 
 
Benjamin’s major contribution to the medical understanding of TS has already been 
noted in this introduction.  Later researchers sought to categorise TS in different ways.  
With regard to M-F TS Blanchard argues for two distinct categories22: 1) those who from 
a very early age are effeminate in nature and are sexually attracted to men and 2) those 
who are not overtly effeminate either as children or adults and who are either incapable of 
sexual arousal or who show little or no interest in sex.  Blanchard refers to the former as 
homosexual M-F transsexuals or Trans-homosexuals with the latter referred to as non-
homosexual M-F transsexuals.  This categorisation differs in an important sense from 
Benjamin in that he ruled out homosexuality in the experience of the transsexual.  He 
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took sexual attraction to a member of the same genetic sex to be part of the experience of 
TS itself whereas Blanchard recognised that a M-F transsexual could be sexually 
attracted to women both pre and post-operatively.  Both Blanchard and Benjamin seemed 
to concentrate on male transsexuals rather than female. 
 
Lawrence later argued that non-homosexual M-F TS has close clinical resemblance to 
Apotemnophilia23.  She was aware of the report by Dyer of the two Scottish surgeons 
who amputated the limbs of an apotemnophiliac man in 1997, the report of which 
generated renewed interest in the condition24.  She argues that both reflect issues of 
identity rather than sexuality. 
 
An example of the psychoanalytical contribution to the classification and demarcation of 
TS is found in the work of Person and Ovesey25 who offered a dual explanation for 
sexual neurosis: 1) that which inhibits pleasure and 2) that which facilitates it.  TS is an 
example of the former due to the sexual difficulties a transsexual person often 
experiences due to gender dysphoria. 
 
The sociological explanation for TS posed a major challenge to the dominance of the 
medical model.  This was largely due to the widespread adoption of Money’s concept of 
gender which will be introduced in Chapter One of this thesis and discussed along with 
both the medical and body-image model in Chapter Two. 
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3. Current Guidelines 
 
WPATH is the professional body overseeing the diagnosis and treatment of TS.  Five 
stages in the treatment process have been identified26: diagnosis, psychotherapy, the Real 
Life Experiment (RLE) otherwise known as the Real Life Test (RLT), hormonal therapy 
and surgery.  It is a mental health professional, usually a psychiatrist, who has overall 
responsibility for the management of the transsexual beginning with the initial 
assessment, continuing through transitioning with therapeutic support offered for the 
early stages of life in the chosen gender role.  The role of the psychiatrist provides a 
psychiatric framework both for the construction of TS and its treatment.  As will be seen 
in Chapter One the APA DSM 1V offers a psychiatric codification of TS.  Yet TS is not 
thought to be a mental illness.  The psychiatrist’s function seems to be to filter out other 
conditions that may give rise to the experience of gender dysphoria, such as 
schizophrenia and mania where a person may experience delusions centring on her/his 
identity and then to establish the validity of the transsexual’s claim.  Once this has been 
done then the transsexual’s eligibility for surgery has been established. 
 
The SOC covers: 1) the criteria that are required for the referral of individuals to the 
psychiatric services; 2) the different approach required for the treatment of children, 
adolescents and adults with what it refers to as GID, which therefore becomes the main 
medical designation of TS; and 3) the criteria that need to be met for the transsexual to be 
eligible for the various stages of treatment. 
 
In describing GID as a psychiatric condition WPATH offers the following justification: 
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      This designation is not a license for stigmatization nor for the  
      deprivation of gender patients civil rights.  The use of a formal  
      diagnosis is an important step in the offering of relief, providing 
      health insurance coverage and in generating research to provide  
      more effective future treatments.27 
 
This justification of a psychiatric classification of TS warrants further comment which 
will be provided in Chapter One.  However, it seems appropriate at this point to note that 
WPATH seems to be offering several pragmatic reasons for this, including the possibility 
that both insurance cover and future medical research will be threatened if the psychiatric 
classification were removed.  This could be understood to mean that it is in the best 
interests of transsexuals to have a psychiatric diagnosis which, though distressing, is far 
better than the alternative of no recognised designation and therefore no insurance cover 
or future medical advances.   
 
The SOC discuss the nature and purpose of the RLE and this will be further examined in  
Chapter Five where the implications of the model of Authenticity that is developed in 
Chapter Four are explored. 
 
In the sections dealing with reconstructive surgery the guidelines state that: 
 
      (surgery) has proven to be effective.  Such a therapeutic regimen, when 
      prescribed or recommended by qualified practitioners, is medically  
      indicated and medically necessary.28 
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The section discusses the ethical concerns of performing surgery on what it describes as 
‘anatomically normal structures’ including one of the fundamental medical principles of 
‘first do no harm’.  Many of those who oppose GReS often do so on the basis that this 
principle is breached, even if surgery is carried out at the request of a competent 
transsexual person.  It may be further argued that a person can be harmed even when 
she/he may not know that she/he is being harmed.  This issue of harm will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter Five where it will be proposed that a transsexual might be 
harmed by surgery performed at his/her request and with his/her consent. 
 
The guidelines respond to such criticism by stating that direct conversation with a 
transsexual person, especially when listening to an account of the suffering that 
transsexual has experienced, is disarming.  WPATH is particularly concerned to sway 
any clinician who may be critical of both TS and GReS: 
 
      The resistance to performing surgery on the ethical basis of ‘above 
      all do no harm’ should be respected , discussed and met with the 
      opportunity to learn from patients themselves about the  
      psychological distress of having profound GID.29 
 
 
WPATH entreats the doubting physician to reflect upon the transsexual’s life in order to 
be in a position to help.  Surgery is justified on the basis of suffering and the doctor’s 
ethical concerns should be assuaged by the prospect of alleviating suffering, understood 
better by attempting to identify with the transsexual. 
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I will call this the suffering justification for surgery. This priority to alleviate suffering 
supersedes medical ethical concerns about harming healthy organs.  The suffering 
justification will be critiqued in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
 
4. Practice of Certification 
 
The Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA) of the UK government has legal 
responsibility for transsexual people30.  It estimates that one man in every 12,000 has 
feminine gender feelings with a smaller proportion of women feeling themselves to be 
male.  It identifies a number of specialist centres that cater for GID in Englandiii.   
 
The Gender Recognition Act (2004) was introduced to provide a basis for the legal 
recognition of trans-gendered people.  The Act resulted from a ruling by the European 
Court of Human Rights (2002) which found that the UK was in breach of Article 8 and 
Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to respect for private 
life and the right to marry).iv   The Act provides for gender recognition certificates to be 
issued by a Gender Recognition Panel.  Applications are made to the Panel for legal 
status, with the aim of: 
 
       ensure(ing) that transsexual people can enjoy the rights and     
       responsibilities appropriate to their acquired gender31. 
 
                                                 
 
iii Caring Cross Gender Identity Clinic, London; The London Gender Clinic; The Tavistock Clinic, London; 
The Albany Gender Identity Clinic, Manchester; Newton Abbot Hospital, Devon with other clinics at 
Leeds, Newcastle, Nottingham, Newcastle, Sheffield and Bristol. 
iv The case of Goodwin –v- The United Kingdom and I-v-The United Kingdom.  An Interdepartmental 
Working Group reported to Minister on 1st Nov 2002 which prepared the way for the GRA 2004. 
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The Panel has eleven members, six of whom have medical expertise and three legal.  
There are three criteria to be satisfied before a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) is 
issued: 1) a diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria; 2) having lived fully in the acquired gender 
role for at least two years; and, 3) intention to live permanently in that gender role.  If a 
transsexual person is married at the time of transitioning then an interim GRC is issued 
which allows for the marriage to be dissolved.  This has to be done before a full GRC can 
be issued.  The GRC accords the full rights and responsibilities of the acquired gender 
including the right to marry or to form a civil partnership, and to retire and receive state 
pension at the age appropriate to the acquired gender.  A new birth certificate is issued 
showing the recognised legal gender. 
 
The transgender pressure group Press for Change (PFC) estimates that there are around 
6,500 post-operative transsexuals living in the UK with around 400 operations performed 
each year32. 
 
The Aggressive Research Intelligence Facility (ARIF) of the University of Birmingham 
was asked in 2004 (original request in 1997 updated in 2004) to investigate: 
 
       What are the effects of gender reassignment surgery, and does the  
       balance of positive and negative effects suggest that this procedure is  
       clinically effective overall?33 
 
 
Having identified problems with the available research literature its conclusion was: 
 
       the degree of uncertainty about any of the effects of gender  
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       reassignment is such that it is impossible to make a judgement about  
       whether the procedure is clinically effective34. 
 
ARIF recommends more rigorous research using randomly assigned control group and 
blind independent assessment of outcomes (Abramowitz SI, 1986)35v.   
 
Professor Louis Appelby, the mental health czar of the UK government, has stated that at 
present there are no NICE guidelines on transsexuality. He has considered referring the 
matter to NICE but considers that there is insufficient data at this stage to do so.  He 
appears to be satisfied with the current guidelines offered by The Royal College of 
Psychiatristsvi. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This Introduction has sought to lay the ground for the discussion of TS that will follow in 
the main body of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
                                                 
 
v When contacted ARIF were not able to disclose neither who commissioned the original research nor 
whether their recommendations were followed up.  Their policy of confidentiality would not allow them to 
do so. 
vi See Appendix 2 of personal correspondence. 
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CHAPTER ONE MODELS OF SEX/SEXUALITY AND GENDER 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold.  First (Section One) to locate TS in current 
constructions of sex/sexuality and gender which will prepare the ground for the 
discussion in Chapter Two of three models of gender, medicine and body image. Second, 
(Section Two), the conceptual incoherence and logical contradiction of the way that TS is 
currently constructed will be discussed.  This is done as preparation for a more detailed 
examination of the three models discussed in Chapter Two 
 
1. Models of Sex and Sexuality 
 
TRADITIONAL MODEL: SEX AS BODY. 
 
Traditionally ‘sex’ has been determined by the body of an individual. ‘Sex’ referred to 
physical characteristics, the social role that a person was expected to fulfil and sexual 
orientation, with heterosexuality considered to be the norm.  Men and women were 
thought to be distinct from one another because male and female bodies showed obvious 
differences.  Male bodies shared certain physical features and so the conclusion was 
drawn that men shared the characteristics that were thought to arise from the body. 
Physical strength was one feature and this give rise to the idea that men were stronger 
than women with this becoming one source of men’s dominance over women.  Likewise 
women’s bodies give rise to characteristics that were believed to be common to women.  
Because her body was the place where new human life began and was nurtured it became 
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customary to think of a woman’s role as that of nurturing and caring. This often resulted 
in her being assigned a secondary and subservient place in society. 
 
Two stages of this construction of female/male can be found.  The first, and oldest, stage 
regarded the difference as one of degree with the second positing the difference as one of 
kind.  
 
The first view expounded by among others Galen36 maintained that the human condition 
is fundamentally male and the observable physical differences a matter of spatial 
location.  The sex characteristics of men are external whereas those of women are 
internal. These sex organs were thought to be the same in terms of structure and make-up 
but different with regard to the place within the human body. The possession of ‘heat’ 
gave rise to the external location of the male sex organs, as well as providing the source 
of the energy that enables men to possess the characteristics that are usually associated 
with them.  In this construction men were thought to be more perfect than women, 
because they were further along an idea of human perfection.  This became the 
justification, or rationalization, for the social advantage and prestige that was traditionally 
enjoyed by men.  This view remained dominant until the nineteenth century with the 
arrival of both the industrial revolution and modern medicine.  In this view the body 
signifies both human unity and difference.   
 
The sexed body was the source of an individual’s identity.  There were two sexes, male 
and female, with a whole system of what was thought to be appropriate ways of behaving 
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built upon the understanding of the body.  To be masculine, therefore, was to act in 
accordance with the nature of the male body, with femininity dictated by the female 
body.  Bodies were the source of sexual desire with the male body fitted both to desire 
and experience the female body.  Its apparent design to penetrate the female body gave an 
additional justification for man’s dominance over women.  The male body was believed 
to be the origin of human seed with the female body, as a result of experiencing regular 
loss of blood due to her menstrual cycle, thought to be both weak and unstable.  Both of 
these observations fitted into the existing and emerging constructions of masculinity and 
femininity. 
 
The second view, difference of kind, was first articulated in 1803 by Moreau37 who 
claimed that the two sexes were ‘a series of opposites and contrasts’38.  The notion of the 
incommensurability of the sexes developed, which was believed to be firmly anchored in 
the ‘facts’ of science.  Laqueur describes how this view replaced the older one of Galen 
and others with what he describes as: 
 
      a new model of radical dimorphism, of biological divergence. 
      An anatomy and physiology of incommensurability replaced a 
      metaphysics of hierarchy in the representation of women in 
      relation to man.39 
 
 
This is a ‘two-sex model’ grounded in nature with the cultural and social division 
between man and women merely the outworking of a natural or God-ordained order.  
Moreau was building on the work of Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau who by 
 25 
 
appealing to nature sought a rational explanation for the difference between the sexes.  
For instance discussing Sophie as a wife for Emile Rousseau wrote: 
 
      All we know for certain is that everything in common between men 
      and women must come form their species and everything different 
      must come from their sex.  From this double point of view we find 
      so many relations and so many oppositions that perhaps one of 
      nature’s greatest marvels is to have been able to make two beings so 
      similar whilst constituting then so differently.40 
 
 
Mosher describes this modern view as dimorphic sexual essentialism41. The two sexes 
were no longer thought to be one, differing in degree, but two distinct categories with that 
distinction being located in and defined by the body.  Like the older view, in this ‘two-
sex’ model, the character of men and women centred on the body.  Proper behaviour 
reflected the nature of the body and if the body was either sick or improperly functioning 
the character of that person reflected such dysfunction.  It was primarily the sex 
characteristics of the body that both defined men and women and determined appropriate 
behaviour. 
 
A graphic example of how this theory worked in practice in the Nineteenth Century can 
be seen in the way that female ovaries were thought to influence behaviour.  Indeed, 
ovaries were thought to determine the female character.  Chereau wrote, ‘it is only 
because of the ovary that a woman is what she is’42.  If she demonstrated behaviour that 
became of concern both to herself or to others, such as hysteria, melancholia or anxiety 
then it was assumed that a woman’s ovaries were malfunctioning.  By the 1870’s 
ovariotomy was widely practiced as a cure for ‘problem’ female behaviour and, in spite 
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of the fact that it was frequently observed upon removal that the organs themselves were 
healthy, many women reported themselves to be improved.  Improvement not only 
consisted in the removal of the symptoms described earlier but also in the fact that 
women were thought to be made more ‘feminine’, in the sense of more docile and more 
malleable. 
 
In this view sex is an ontological phenomenon.  It refers to the being or to the nature of 
an individual.  Men and women are different from one another in terms of their sex and 
their individual character and mode of being is referred to as their ‘sex’ identity or role.  
Sexuality refers to the whole area of a person’s life concerned with attraction to another 
person.  Although the idea of human character being defined by the sex characteristics of 
the body is no longer a majority view in this model of sex, the ‘two-sex’ model itself 
continues to be used.  For instance Nadeau claims: 
 
      the sex specific human brain…impacts all aspects of the human 
      sensorium…and the differences in the brains of men and women 
      have behavioural consequences.43  
 
 
The bodily locus for the difference between men and women has here changed from the 
sex characteristics to brain structure and organization.  Nadeau argues that even though 
the similarities in the brains of men and women are greater then the differences, the latter 
are of significance.  The human brain is organized differently in men and women during 
foetal development as a result of the hormonal functioning of the mother.  Nurture then 
builds on these inherent differences in terms of character, expectation and role within 
society.  Nadeau calls for this basic difference between men and women to be recognized 
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in contemporary society as a means to achieving equality.  Equality is not to be achieved 
by arguing that men and women are the same but by recognizing difference in an 
atmosphere of mutual respect. 
 
Similarly Tiger and Fox44 call for recognition of the differences between the sexes along 
biological lines.  Garret discusses how they argue that differences such as menstruation, 
physical strength, reproduction, brain size and the nature of sexual desire are of 
ontological significance and constitute what they refer to as ‘biogrammers’.45  These are 
the biological programmers that set a course of action for the person concerned.  Whilst 
this may be resisted or overcome, nevertheless the biological programmers are significant 
features of a person’s life exerting an influence over the person.   
 
Garret claim’s that ‘biogrammers’ are genetically based programmes that predispose men 
and women both to develop certain characteristics and to exhibit certain patterns of 
behaviour.  The genetic codes originate in the early days of human history and Garret 
maintains that they change very slowly over time.  In fact they prove resistant to 
ideological challenges from within any particular society.  Ideologies may have an 
influence over the thinking of individuals within society but behaviour is rooted in the 
biogrammers and as such is more difficult to change.  It is for this reason that Garret is 
critical of much of the feminist movement with its critique of patriarchy.  He thinks that it 
ignores basic biological reality: different roles exist for men and women based upon 
different modes of being which are in turn based upon different biological programmers.   
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Garret argues that this is the reason why women are often thought of as possessing a 
nature that is characterized by caring and nurturing whereas a man’s nature is to provide 
and to protect for his family and to forge links between them and the outside world.  The 
origins of this lie in the early human ‘hunter-gatherer’ societies where much of the human 
genetic coding, he concludes, took place.  Changes in the ordering of human society have 
occurred over the generations but the basic genetic coding remains in place.  This may 
prove to be one of the reasons why so many human societies demonstrate similarity of 
roles for men and women and if the basis for this is genetic then our duty is to recognize 
this and to build an understanding of the sexes upon it. 
 
Anzieu46, with his concept of the ‘skin-ego’, focuses attention on the surface of the body, 
on the skin, in terms of the development of the self.  It is this that matters most in the 
development of personal identity.  It is the skin that forms an interface between the self 
and the outside world (in which there are others who are like/unlike the self) and between 
the biological and psychic self.  Individual identity is the result of the internalization of 
the experience of the surface of the body.  Anzieu draws on the work of Freud, 
specifically his concept of the unconscious as made up of actual experiences of the body, 
to offer a biological explanation for the development of the self47. 
 
Prosser48 relates the notion of embodiment to transsexuality.  He argues that for a 
transsexual, becoming a gendered self takes place at those moments when the body is 
surgically constructed: 
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     In that s/he seeks to align sex with gender identification; in that the somatic  
     progression toward these goals of sexed embodiment constitutes the 
     transsexual narrative, the transsexual does not approach the body as an immaterial 
     provisional surround but, on the contrary, as the very ‘seat’ of the self.  For if the 
     body were but a costume, consider: why the life quest to alter its contours?49 
 
 Prosser argues that the transsexual re-figuring of the sexed body is along psychic and 
symbolic as well as corporeal lines.  What happens to the body during surgery matches 
what is happening both psychically and in terms of gender signifiers.  Gender identity, 
therefore, is bound up with the body. 
MODERN MODEL: SEX AS CONSTRUCT 
 
Foucault argues that sex and sexuality should not be thought of as something fixed or 
biologically determined, nor that heterosexuality is the norm with homosexuality as 
deviation.  Rather: 
 
     (it) is the name given to a historical construct; not a furtive reality 
      that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which bodies, 
      the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the  
      formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and  
      resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few 
      strategies of knowledge and power.50 
 
 
Foucault claims that far from living in an age that has liberated sexuality, sexuality is the 
subject of control and power in human relationships.  Sexuality is a site of power in 
society, as a result of paying attention to the bodies of women as the source of emotional 
disturbance in the nineteenth century, the growth of the expert in sexuality within 
medicine and the way that so-called perverse sexualities are the subject of psychiatric 
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labelling.  He argues that alternative sexualities can be a means of resistance to power 
and thought that homosexuality was able to function to this end. 
 
He draws a distinction between sex and sexuality.  The former is fixed and biological 
with the latter constructed as something which is fluid and developmental and is relative 
to the person concerned. 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Sex, in the traditional model, is a category definition: Male and Female.  It is a matter of 
corporate identity.  Sex has referred to either one category of being in which there was a 
difference of degree or as two categories of being in which there exists a difference kind.  
This two-sex model has sought to locate the difference in different ways; secondary 
sexual characteristics, brain organisation and functioning, genetic coding or the 
differences in experiencing the surface of the body. 
 
However, at this point in the thesis it is important to note that, in spite of what is 
popularly thought, Transsexuality is not a matter of sexuality or of anatomical sex.  
Because the term ‘sexuality’ appears in the term, ideas of sexuality have been popularly 
associated with it.  This is a case of the misleading nature of the classification. 
 
2. Models of Gender 
 
THE INTERPERSONAL MODEL 
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In this model gender refers to the most obvious difference between people: some are men 
and others women.  A person is thought to belong to either the category of masculine or 
feminine on the basis of physical (sex) characteristics.  Masculinity and femininity are 
equated with maleness and femaleness and a whole series of roles, behaviours, 
characteristics and responsibilities are assigned to a person.   
 
This model of gender is closely associated with the traditional model of sex discussed 
earlier in the previous section.  This is to be expected as sex and gender are co-terminus. 
 
THE INTRA-PERSONAL MODEL 
 
 
Following what has been described as the second wave of feminismvii a concept of gender 
was developed that sought to make a distinction between the body and the subjective 
sense of identity.  The latter was thought to be distinct from both sex and sexuality.  This 
view was first articulated by Money in 195551.  He applied the idea of gender as it is used 
in linguistic discourse to designate the nouns ‘masculine’, ‘feminine’ and ‘neuter’ to 
human experience in order to distinguish between maleness and masculinity and 
femaleness and femininity.  Money was researching Hermaphrodism and sought to 
distinguish between the qualifying criteria of sex and the way that a person both 
understood him/herself and subsequently behaved.  He used the idea of gender in order to 
bring clarification to such statements as: 
 
                                                 
 
vii Second wave feminism was the result of post Second World War discontent felt by some to the pressures 
to return to social roles that were the norm before the war.  It was during the 1960’s that feminist concerns 
were expressed both politically and culturally in the USA and in Europe. 
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      John has a male sex role except that his sex organs are not male 
      and his genetic sex is female.52 
 
 
He applied the idea of gender to the sex role with the term ‘sex’ being restricted to 
biology.  Gender came to refer to a person’s social identity and this was defined by 
Money as ‘gender role’. 
 
Money’s idea of gender followed on from the anthropological work of Mead53 who had 
asked in 1950: 
 
      How are men and women to think about their maleness and their 
      femaleness in this twentieth century, in which so many of our old 
      ideas must be made new?.54 
 
 
Working with seven Pacific peoples, Mead recorded the differences she encountered in 
terms of the relationships and social functioning between men and women.  The different 
peoples had different customs, roles and responsibilities for men and women and Mead 
sought to apply her findings to contemporary American culture and the way that men and 
women were understood there.  Her major conclusion is that both masculinity and 
femininity ought to be understood as relative concepts and not as fixed identities across 
cultures. 
 
Uncoupled from sex, gender is no longer thought to be a matter of essence but as 
something that is acquired through personal development, social identification and social 
interaction.  Gender is concerned with the acquisition and social display of personal 
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characteristics.  These may still be characterised as masculine and feminine.  Gender was 
understood to be fundamental to the core of self identity, experienced subjectively, and 
existing with little or no reference to the body.  It became possible to talk about both a 
‘gendered self’ that possesses certain characteristics and traits and the body that the self 
inhabits.   
 
This construction of gender is predicated on a difference within the individual rather than 
differences between individuals.  The difference is between the body and the sense of 
self.  The former may still be thought of as male or female and the latter may or may not 
accord with the sex designation.  Both the body and the sense of self are considered to 
reveal ‘truth’ about the individual but it is the inner reality or the subjectivity that is 
considered to be the ultimate truth or the truth about the person.  This true self can 
develop without being defined by the body with its body acting as the medium through 
which the gendered self interacts with the world. 
 
This model suggests that many of the behaviours that have been traditionally associated 
with the roles of men and women may be cultural or sociological constructs and not fixed 
realities that determine the place of men and women.  The idea of fixed realities may 
have served the purpose of ‘fixing’ the relationship between men and women played out 
to the benefit of the former and dis-benefit of the latter.  The intra-personal model 
challenges the idea of ‘fixed-ness’ and by extension the traditional relationship between 
men and women.   
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Simone de Beauvoir55  asserted that ‘One is not born, but rather becomes a woman’56 and 
concludes: 
 
      woman feels- and often detests- the domination of the male; but this 
      is no reason to conclude that her ovaries condemn her to live forever 
      on her knees.57 
 
 
It is clear that de Beauvoir recognises that it is usual for a human being to be sexed as 
either male or female but that this does not cause or determine the gender of the 
individual.  Gender is a human characterisation that is acquired as a result of the 
development of traits, dispositions, attitudes and desires that all operate in both a person-
specific matrix of space and time and a context-specific cultural location.  The upshot is 
as Butler58 points out: 
 
         
      Gender ought not to be constructed as a stable identity or locus of 
      agency from which various acts follow; rather gender is an identity 
      tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through 
      a stylised repetition of acts.59 
 
 
Butler argues that gender should be understood as a matter of performance.  She places 
emphasis not upon the visibility of the body but on the visibility of action, particularly 
interaction with others.  Gender is a creation achieved by means of interaction and as 
such cannot be understood as a fixed identity. It is one that changes in relation to the 
demands and expectations of social interaction.   
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This construction emphasises human freedom and responsibility and places onus on 
human choice.  However, it is not true to say that this idea of gender allows for total 
freedom as Butler recognises that forces operating within society impacts upon a person’s 
freedom to choose.  As Weight and Beach60 point out discussing social identity in Britain 
between the years 1930-1960, identity itself: 
 
      is conceptualised as a social meaning constructed like other 
      meanings, but with the uniquely existential dimension of being 
      anchored in an individual’s body.61 
 
 
Whilst the primary reference here is to identity as a whole it includes gender in its view.  
The emphasis is upon the construction of gender by specific individuals. 
 
If the inter-personal model of gender can be understood in reference to the 
Enlightenment’s paradigm of essence preceding existence then this intra-personal model 
belongs to the existential paradigm of existence preceding essence.  Existentialism makes 
the idea of a human nature inappropriate.  All there is is human existence.  The specific 
shape of a particular human existent is a matter of personal construction.  A particular 
person or society determines how to construct identity free from any external or objective 
reference point, whether this is the body itself or a set of religious or scientific beliefs or 
laws constructed around the body.  Individual identity is established as a result of struggle 
or anguish.  The building of identity is a difficult or costly activity with individual desires 
and preferences the basic buildings blocks.  A person can choose to identify themselves 
as male/female and masculine/feminine in either absolute or relative terms as part of the 
process of self understanding and relating to others. 
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Gender is the subjective sense of self that is thought in some way to ‘inhabit’ the body 
with the result that the body is thought of both as that which ‘is’ and ‘is not’ the person. It 
‘is’ the person to the extent that it encases the body and is the vehicle through which the 
self is known and ‘is not’ the person in terms of self-definition and self-determination.  It 
may be that this view is one expression of Cartesian dualism but with the distinction not 
between the thinking self and the self of extended substances but between the gendered 
self and the self of sexed substance.  As with Cartesian dualism the ‘true’ self is the 
subjective self and, central to this view of gender, this subjective self has a gendered 
identity.  Personhood is a matter of sentience or of consciousness and as this is 
incorporeal then corporality is not defining of human existence.  Merleau-Ponty states: 
 
     I am the absolute source, my existence does not stem from my 
     antecedents, from my physical and social environment; instead it 
     moves outwards towards them and sustains them, for I alone bring 
     into being for myself the tradition which I elect to carry on.62 
 
 
Gender is a matter of individual identity or ontology.  Emphasis has shifted from the idea 
of group or category identity to the individual who constructs an identity within a social 
context. 
THE PAN-PERSONAL MODEL OF GENDER 
 
 
This third model combines the previous two.  Here gender incorporates bodily reality 
whilst maintaining that it does not determine it but can, if chosen, significantly contribute 
to it.  The contribution a body makes to gender identity may be, for example, a matter of 
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physical strength in relation to masculinity or female reproductivity in relation to 
femininity. It may also serve as a means of self expression in relation to others. It is 
through the body that a self comes to learn of the world it inhabits and then is in turn 
known by others.  Differences between selves can also be experienced by means of the 
body.  Such differences can exist as much between members of the same sex as between 
those of different sexes. 
 
A person therefore consists of her/his gender identity plus body.  The latter is an 
extension of the gendered self with the subjective experience at the centre of identity.  In 
turn identity is an ongoing creative dynamic and is a unique personal construction which 
can consist of any combination of, or none of, the characterisations known historically as 
‘male’ or ‘female’.  Persons are able to group together not as a result of biological 
fundamental nature but as a result of preference or of lifestyle choice.  Gender is here 
thought of as ‘a multidimensional category of personhood’63.  It is this understanding of 
gender that will be incorporated into the model of authenticity. 
 
This presentation of the self is done with a view to recognition.  The self seeks 
recognition from those who stand in significant relation to it.  This seems to reflect the 
social nature of human existenceviii and consists in the desire to be ‘seen’ by another.  
What is desired is a sympathetic ‘seeing’ as this would be indicative of positive qualities 
within the one who sees towards the one being observed.  A critical seeing would be 
                                                 
 
viii As examples of authors who have treated this subject the following can be thought of as representative: 
Tim Ingold “The Appropriation of Nature: Essays on Human Ecology and Social Relations” 1986, 
Reinhold Neibuhr “Man’s Nature and his Communities: essays on the dynamics and enigmas of Man” 
1966, Paul Heyer, “Nature, Human Nature and Society: Marx, Darwin, biology and the human sciences” 
1982 and John Lofland, “Doing Social Life: the qualitative study of human interaction” 1976. 
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considered negative and much has been written on this subject but it is not within the 
purposes if this thesis to pursue thisix.  A sympathetic seeing may be the result of the 
recognition of similarity or of the ability of the one doing to seeing to empathise with the 
other.  It is also possible to sympathetically ‘see’ another where a measure of difference 
exists as long as the point of contact between individuals is perceived to be of greater 
importance than differencex. 
 
The pan-personal model enables identity to be conceived as that which transcends 
traditional masculine/feminine and male/female binaries with the result that importance is 
attached to the notions of choice, freedom and voluntariness.  It is a model that allows for 
the blurring of the boundaries between persons that were previously thought to be 
determined whilst at the same time attaching significance to the body.  Kessler64 writes: 
 
     Biological differences contribute to gender differences but are 
     mediated through an interaction with the environment according 
     to a person’s mental concepts.65 
 
 
Loren Cameron66., a F-M transsexual, seeks to challenge the binary nature of much 
thinking about masculinity/femininity and maleness/femaleness through his work both as 
a social commentator and photographer.  Whilst constructing a body that is deliberately 
and visibly male he does so without constructing a penis, as it is an object that is 
considered by some to be the essence of maleness/masculinity.  In his self-portraits he 
                                                 
 
ix See, David Gauntlett, “Media, gender and identity (electronic resource) an introduction Taylor and 
Francis e-library 2004, Judith Butler, “Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity” 1990, 
x Of interest here are the wives of transsexual men who facilitate the cross-dressing and socialising of their 
male partners.  A wife may often be the one who offers advice on clothing, make-up and posture as well as 
being the one who accompanies her husband on his/her first appearance in public in the desired gender role. 
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challenges the spectator’s understanding of the categories by which gender is usually 
assigned.  His most celebrated self-portrait is on the cover of his book Body Alchemy67 
and it is in the visible maleness of the image that the challenge is found.   
 
This model of gender is achieved by the blending together of gender constructions in 
academic feminism and in popular culture as well as in the application of philosophical 
concepts to the issues of human ontology.  This third model of gender can be understood 
to be an example of Hegelian dialecticxi in terms of the following formulation: thesis 
(gender is body/inter-personal model) leading to antithesis (gender is not body/intra-
personal model) leading to synthesis (gender is body plus/pan-personal model). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Elements of all three models can be found in contemporary debate about TS.  The 
particular model used often depends upon the context.  In medicine the inter-personal 
model pre-dominates, which is unsurprising given the biological paradigm of western 
medicine.  It is the intra-personal model that is often found in feminist discussions 
perhaps because it most usefully serves one of the aims of feminism which is to challenge 
the twin notions of patriarchy and phallocentrismxii . 
                                                 
 
xi This thesis is not the place for a debate on the correctness of attributing this formulation to Hegel himself.  
Rather I wish to make the general point on the three way process that ideas can develop 
xii Patriarchy is the notion that men both generate and exercise power within society for the benefit of men 
and that this power is predicated on the male body.  It is the male body that gives rise to notions of male 
superiority due to the fact that it is generally stronger than the female body.  Coupled to this are the 
limitations placed on women by the demands of menstruation and child-bearing and rearing.  
Phallocentrism is the privileging of the male phallus in social relations.  The male genitals become the 
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Many participants in the feminist debates seek to challenge the idea of male dominance.  
One way of doing this is to re-orientate the idea of gender identity so that it is no longer 
sourced in the body.  Personal identity is therefore freed from the constraints of the body 
and becomes a matter of development and acquisition rather than endowment.  
Accordingly everyone can acquire the same personal characteristics and therefore attain 
power in society.  The result is a levelling of relationships between people and the 
possibility of social equality. 
 
 
3. Defending the First aim of the thesis 
 
The first aim of the thesis is to demonstrate that there is conceptual incoherence in the 
current construction of TS.  The current conceptualisation of TS draws on an intra-
personal model of gender (i.e. sex and gender are not the same) but treatment by means 
of GReS assumes an inter-personal model (i.e. sex defines gender).  The move from one 
model to the other is neither recognised nor, therefore, defended.  I will argue that this 
leads to conceptual confusion because the two models make very different presumptions 
about how gender is derived.  Indeed, the models are so different that there is not only 
confusion but contradiction: either gender is not implied by sex (as the diagnosis of TS 
implies) or it is (as the use of GReS suggests) in which case it is difficult to see how TS 
can be justified as a condition.  I will now explain each of these claims in greater detail. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
prime source and significance of power between men and women.  Women are thought to envy the man his 
penis whilst the man ‘glories’ in the possession of it.  He feels it to be the source of his identity.  The penis 
is both passively experienced in the way that the man is conscious of it and is actively expressed in his 
relationships with women, primarily through domination. 
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3:1 The distinction between sex and gender is required in order for TS to be a rational 
possibility because it assumes that sex and gender can be separated.  The traditional 
model of sex as defined by the body cannot accommodate the possibility of TS and 
anyone claiming not to be the gender of the sexed body would be regarded as being 
irrational.  Accordingly, the concept of being transsexual was only made possible by the 
challenges to this traditional model that separates sex from gender.    
 
Throughout human history there have been individuals who have not fitted the usual 
models of maleness and femaleness and non-transsexual explanations have been offered 
to account for them.  For example in Native American culture, particularly before the 
coming of European culture, the berdache were men who were known as ‘half-men/half- 
women’ to whom shamanistic powers were attributed.xiii  The berdache was seen as a 
‘two-spirit’ person who was able to enter the perspective of either a man or a woman in a 
specific context and by doing so to bring insight and reconciliation to situations of 
conflict.  Similarly in India the hijras were (and remain) men who lived and functioned as 
women who attended weddings in order to bless the marrying couple.  Hijras occupied an 
ambivalent place in Indian society being seen both as a source of bringing the blessing of 
the gods and as a threat to the existing social order.  They were/are both revered and 
reviledxiv. 
                                                 
 
xiii For a discussion on this subject and specifically of the way that the berdache is used as a model for the 
historicity of homosexuality by American Queer Theorists see Califia “Sex Changes: The Politics of 
Transgenderism” p 123-158. 
xiv See: Peoples Union of Civil Liberties (Karnataka) Report on Human Rights Violations Against the 
Transgender Community, released in September 2003. http://www.countercurrents.org/gen-
narrain141003.htm 
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Perhaps modern transsexual people are in the fortunate position of experiencing ‘proper’ 
recognition and help to resolve their difficulties.  The medical model arguably offers a 
way of understanding TS that seeks to remove the stigma that may attend the condition.  
By making TS a medical problem accusations of immorality or deviancy that have often 
been associated with sexuality and gender are negated by the removal of room for any 
choice in the matter. 
 
3:2  The sex and gender alignment is both that which is desired by the transsexual and 
seen as the proper end of medical and psychiatric treatment.  Jorgensen wanted surgery in 
order to ‘present the best part of myself to the world’.68 The medical model of TS is the 
dominant model and as a result it is unsurprising that its treatment is physical.  Being 
unable at the present time to directly act upon the brain, where the origins of TS are 
thought to lie, it acts instead upon the body by seeking to ‘align’ it with the brain.  Hence 
surgery to the body is thought to be the proper treatment goal. 
 
Having been predicated on the separation of sex and gender, however, current models of 
TS seeks fulfilment in their alignment by use of the inter-personal model.  Accordingly, 
surgery that re-aligns the sexed body with the claimed gender alignment appears to be at 
odds with both the basic presupposition of TS.   
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I argue that a model that is founded on a sex/gender distinction and then terminated in 
sex/gender alignment, and does so without reconciling the different gender 
presuppositions involved is both conceptually incoherent and contradictory.  
 
3:3  GReS is discussed in terms of its effectiveness but not in terms of its conceptual 
coherence.  For instance, WPATH SOC guidelines discuss surgery in the following 
terms: 
      Sex reassignment is not ‘experimental’, ‘investigational’, ‘elective’, 
      ‘cosmetic’, or optional in any meaningful sense.  It constitutes 
      very effective and appropriate treatment for transsexualism or profound 
      GID (Gender Identity Disorder).69 
 
 
The guidelines suggest a ‘triadic’ sequence of therapy: hormonal therapy, the Real Life 
Experience, and surgery.  Whilst acknowledging that not every person wishes to follow 
this therapeutic triad, and increasingly many clinicians are aware of this, the guidelines 
state that should a person not want medical treatment then this is a matter of choice and 
not a comment on the coherence on the treatment itself.  There appears to be no 
discussion on the sex/gender concepts themselves or that the treatment goal appears to be 
at odds with the foundational premise.xv 
 
                                                 
 
xv Interestingly the same guidelines make the observation that without medical intervention most boys and 
girls with GID would outgrow the desire for surgery (see ref 35). In the section Natural History of Gender 
Identity Disorders the section states that all clinical decisions ought to be made in the light of data about the 
‘natural history’ of GID i.e. the experience of GID prior to medical involvement.  However, the data 
appears to be lacking apart from that about the majority of boys and girls outgrowing the desire for surgery.  
It is the intervention of medicine that seems to secure the desire for surgery.  It would be interesting to 
discover both how it is known that most would outgrow the desire for surgery without the intervention of 
medicine and whether it is that intervention itself which gives rise to TS as formally understood. 
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The conceptual incoherence and contradiction remains whatever terminology is used. 
Gender reassignment, sex reassignment or even the term re-assignment do not remove the 
incoherence.  Gender is not being reassigned in surgery, because the central claim made 
by a transsexual person is that his/her true gender identity is unchanged.  Sex is not being 
reassigned as gender as opposed to sexed identity is what is being asserted by the 
transsexual individual.   
 
It is the body of the transsexual that is the object of attention and treatment consists in the 
sexing of the body so that it reflects the idea that sex and gender are the same.  Sex and 
gender are co-ordinated as a result of surgery and often both the surgeon and the 
transsexual wish to construct a sexed body that accords with traditional gender identities.  
M-F transsexuals often appear to want a sexed body that conforms to notions of 
femininity that are closely associated with the body, such as breast size and body mass.  
In turn, an overtly feminised body is then augmented with other insignia such as hair 
length, make-up and jewellery as well as choice of female name.  All appears designed to 
bring the M-F into line with ideas of gender that are build upon the ‘body as gender’ 
model. 
 
In the letters column of an on-line support group for transsexual persons, one 
correspondent asks for advice on ideal feminine proportions and gets the reply that 
biological markers for femininity include wide hips and breasts70.  Whilst the advice 
giver rejects the notion of ideal feminine proportions it is worth noting that it refers to 
biological markers of femininity and not to biological markers of femaleness. 
 45 
 
 
It is the discrepancy between the two concepts of gender (gender is sexed body, gender is 
no sexed body) that establishes the first aim of this thesis. If the sex and gender 
distinction is correct then it is necessary for it to be applied across the board in a 
consistent manner.  At the present time this distinction is being observed in many areas of 
human activity, such as in employment law and practice where sex discrimination 
legislation is based upon the idea of equality of gender and not on the distinctiveness of 
biological sex.  Similarly equal rights law is predicated upon notions of gender equality 
divorced from biology.  This being the case, surgery as the proper goal of treatment for 
TS may be called into question.  It appears to run counter to prevailing social sex/gender 
constructions. 
 
Alternatively if sex/gender alignment is to be kept as a legitimate therapeutic goal then a 
new formulation of TS is required. The challenge is to explain TS in such a way that 
coherence is maintained.   
 
One solution may be to redefine TS not as a gender or sex problem at all but as a brain, 
and therefore a medical, problem.  As already indicated Chapter Two will examine the 
medical model. Briefly, this model locates TS within the BSTc region of the 
hypothalamus.  It is thought that this region of the brain gives rise to a gender identity 
and that this normally accords with a person’s sexed body.  Post-mortem examinations of 
the brains of a number of M-F transsexuals reveal a BSTc region of comparable size to 
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that of the average for women (See ref in Chapter Two).  The conclusion being that M-F 
transsexuals have a BSTc region like that of women. 
 
If TS is a brain problem then because it is not currently possible to work directly on the 
living human brain then the next best thing is to work upon the body.  GReS then 
becomes a coherent treatment goal.  A broader problem remains, however.  Whilst such a 
redefinition of TS may keep surgery as a coherent option, it would result in TS being out 
of step with the way that gender is understood more generally. As well as the distinction 
between sex and gender already noted, gender is thought to be that which is acquired and 
developed rather than that which is the result of brain function.  Characteristics that were 
once thought to be a matter of biology are now understood to be characteristics that both 
genders can develop. 
 
My argument in this thesis is that the sex and gender distinction, which is so widely 
adopted within society, needs to be maintained but both the medical model and the 
treatment goal needs to be replaced and redefined.  In Chapter Four, I will argue that the 
medical model should be replaced with the model of authenticity and that whilst surgery 
is an option, it should fit within the model of authenticity.  Surgery is regarded as the 
inevitable end of a medical conveyor-belt and it is this sense of inevitability and 
‘appropriate-ness’ that the authenticity model challenges. 
 
3:4 The transsexual’s experience of alienation and isolation is reported to be almost 
unbearable.  It is a direct result of the inability to be perceived correctly in terms of 
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gender.  This experience is the justification for medical and surgical intervention. The 
WPATH guidelines clearly link the distress of the transsexual with the ethical urgency for 
surgery (ref 26 in the Introduction).  However, this assumption is open to question in at 
least three ways:  
1. There is a need to examine why the desires of transsexuals are medically 
recognised and not those of other groups such as apotemnophiliacs who request 
the surgical removal of limbs or other body parts for reasons other than suffering.  
2. It begs the question about the legitimate scope of medicine in relation to issues of 
physical appearance, sexual pleasure, personal relationships, lifestyle choices and 
leisure pursuits and  
3. It leaves unclear the status of those who do not seek medical help in order to 
resolve their crisis in gender identity. 
 
In terms of 1), in 1997 and 1999 operations were carried out on two men who desired the 
surgical removal of limbs in order to fulfil sexual desires.  Due to the subsequent furore 
the surgeon was subsequently asked to suspend further operations whilst the ethics 
committee of the Primary Trust met to discuss the issuexvi.    
 
Presumably, if surgery is no longer a viable alternative, people seeking surgery 
amputation are now referred to psychiatrists for the assessment and treatment of a mental 
disorder.  Lawrence discusses the similarities between autogynophilia and TS and noted 
the difference in clinical approach71.  She concludes that just as surgery seems to bring 
                                                 
 
xvi http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/625680.stm 23/02/2009.gives details of this controversy, including 
the reaction of both the NHS Trust and members of the Scottish Parliament. 
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fulfilment in TS so it may to do so in autogynophilia.  If she is right then autogynophilia 
ought to be as legitimate a concern for medicine as TS. 
 
In relation to 2) the issue of the legitimate scope of medicine will be addressed briefly in 
Chapter Five.  
 
In relation to 3) according to Benjamin the seeking of medical and surgical help is a 
symptom of TS, creating something of a circular justificationxvii.  People whose gender 
identity differs from their sexed identity yet who do not seek medical help in order to 
resolve that difference cannot, therefore, be regarded as transsexual.  In which case how 
are such people to understand themselves and be understood by others?  This is especially 
important for an individual who wants to think of her/himself as transsexual in order to 
belong to the transsexual community where she/he feels that help and support can be 
found.  To have the designation of TS taken away from such a person solely because of 
the absence of the desire for surgery would seem to deny him/her a means of self and 
community identification.  This seems odd primarily because TS does appear to be a 
matter of self-designation even within the medical model.  Self-designation, it seems, 
only works if it leads someone to seek medical help but not if it leads someone else, with 
                                                 
 
xvii Benjamin writes: “The transsexual, however, puts all his faith and future into the hands of the doctor, 
particularly the surgeon.  These patients want to undergo corrective surgery, a so-called ‘conversion 
operation’ so that their bodies would at least resemble those of the sex which they feel they belong and to 
which they ardently want to belong” and “True transsexuals…for them…their sex organs are disgusting 
deformities that must be changed by the surgeon’s knife.  This attitude appears to be the chief differential 
diagnostic point between the two conditions…that is between transvestism and transsexuality”  The 
Transsexual Phenomenon The Julian Press Inc, New York, 1966 p 12. 
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a similar set of experiences, not to seek it.  WPATH guidelines seek to keep the DSM 1V 
designation to avoid this kind of problem. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlines the claims of conceptual incoherence and contradiction that lie at 
the heart of the medical model of TS.  This consists in the way that the medical model 
justifies both the condition and treatment of TS in relation to two mutually exclusive 
models of gender (the inter-personal and intra-personal models).  
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CHAPTER TWO APPLICATION OF GENDER MODELS, BODY 
IMAGE MODEL AND MEDICAL MODELS TO TRANSSEXUALITY 
 
Introduction 
 
There are three sections in this chapter: In the first brief section the three models of 
gender discussed in Chapter One will be applied to TS; in the second both the medical 
model and the body image model will be discussed in relation to TS; and the third 
consists of an interim conclusion. 
 
1. Application of the gender models to TS 
 
All three models of gender are concerned with the way that human characteristics can 
either be thought of as belonging to the categories of masculinity or femininity or as 
characteristics that are available to everyone and freely chosen. 
 
INTER-PERSONAL MODEL 
 
This model ties the experience of gender to that of the sexed body.   
Here the body is defining: genes, chromosomes, hormones, secondary sexual 
characteristics and internal and external bodily organisation are the sources of gender 
identity.  Though each individual is also the result of his/her interaction with his/her 
environment, this interaction is based solely on bodily foundation.  What is ideal for any 
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person is that gender identity is in harmony with those physical attributes and personal 
constructions that are associated with the sexed body.  
 
When applied to TS a major issue arises. The body of the transsexual is of the sex that 
does not match the gender she/he considers to be correct.  This does not seem to be a 
rational consideration if the body is the source of human ontology.  If the body gives rise 
to the sense of self as well as to specific characteristics such as tenderness, compassion 
and courage then what has occurred within the body to give the transsexual person the 
sense of gender that is distinct from the body?  A medical answer might be that nothing 
has occurred within the extended substance of the body itself, rather it is within the mind 
that the problem is to be found.  TS may be a psychiatric condition.  This seems to be the 
view of Dr. Barrett, head of the Gender Identity Clinic at the Tavistock Clinic, London 
who Christine Burns regards as having:  
 
     distinct contempt for trans people as a whole (and trans campaigners 
     in particular).  He dismisses the modern day self-descriptive language of the trans- 
     community, angrily asserts that transsexualism is a mental illness.72 
 
 
Dr Barrett (see Appendix1) argues for a mental illness definition for TS partly because it 
has a psychiatric classification internationally but also for potentially instrumental 
reasons.  He notes that in certain Islamic countries TS is linked with homosexuality.  As a 
result the protection that is afforded to TS on the grounds of mental illness is extended to 
homosexuals.  If TS were to have its psychiatric classification removed then, by default, 
so would homosexuality with the result that homosexual individuals, in such countries 
would no longer enjoy any form of protection: 
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     Were any country (including this one) to take a unilateral decision to remove 
     a particular diagnosis it would open the door for other countries psychiatric  
     bodies to do the same, or possibly to add things as diagnoses, including 
     homosexuality.  Thus, there may be a very gravely bad unintended consequence 
     of rather parochial libertarian thinking73. 
 
 
He argues that the medical establishment has a duty to act internationally and so to avoid 
any pre-emptive action which would have a possible detrimental effect upon patients in 
non-liberal cultures.  Barrett concludes with the observation that to access medical and 
surgical treatments it is necessary to have a medical diagnosis.  These observations will 
be further examined in Chapter Five of this thesis in a discussion on the implications for 
medicine of the model that I am proposing in this thesis (p. 286). 
 
A psychiatric understanding of TS would, however, be consistent with an interpersonal 
model of gender.  If the body gives rise to gender identity then gender ought to reflect the 
sexed body and so a transsexual must be mistaken in believing her/his gender to be 
different from the reality of the sexed body.  The belief must be a delusion because of its 
fixed and false nature.  If TS is a psychiatric condition then the participation of non-
psychiatric doctors and health care professionals in the current treatment regime should 
be called into questionxviii.  A justification for the medical and surgical treatment of a 
psychiatric condition would be required, one that demonstrates the rightness of a 
therapeutic goal that seek to align a person’s physical reality to that which is generated by 
                                                 
 
xviii A full compliment of endocrinologists, surgeons, speech therapists and behaviour therapist, for 
example, work at the Tavistock Clinic participating in the transitioning of the transsexual to full gender 
status. 
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his/her mental illness and including the mutilation of healthy organs.  Such a justification 
is unlikely to be forthcoming. 
 
Likewise the transsexual who has physically transitioned and is now living out her/his life 
in the desired way is living with an unrecognised and untreated psychiatric/psychotic 
illness.  This would be unacceptable in relation to any other delusional condition:  
medicine would be colluding with the delusions of its patients. 
 
Alternatively, the designation of psychiatric illness may reflect the idea that TS is a 
matter of brain dysfunction.  If so then perhaps because of the limitations of present day 
technology- it is not possible to work directly on the brain- the body must be brought into 
line with the brain condition, everything else being equal.  This could provide a possible 
justification for the medical and surgical treatment of a delusional condition.  This 
possibility will be discussed in the next section of this chapter which deals with the 
medical model. 
 
THE INTRA-PERSONAL MODEL 
 
In this model the categories of masculinity and femininity are anomalous modes of 
reference.  Certain character traits are referred to as either masculine or feminine for no 
other than historical reasons and it is open to us all to develop personal identity as a 
matter of choice.  A male is able to become tender, caring, gentle and nurturing and a 
woman could choose to develop traits of boldness, daring, risk-taking and recklessness.  
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The relationship with the sexed body is important but not defining and neither would it be 
deviant to pursue characteristics that have not been traditionally associated with the sexed 
body. 
 
This model of gender offers a different way of understanding the sex/gender dichotomy 
in TS.  The transsexual is able to define her/himself apart from, and even in opposition to, 
the body.  This generates at least two tensions.  First, a gender identity that bears no 
relation to the sexed body necessitates a justification for both the desire for, and treatment 
with, GReS.  This point is linked to the discussion in Chapter One where the crossing of 
models was noted in relation to the construction of TS.  Second, again related to earlier 
discussions, the TS narrative begins with the intra-personal model and ends with the 
inter-personal following GReS. 
 
This movement across models is arguably an unacknowledged conceptual incoherence 
and logical contradiction, as concluded in the previous chapter.  This potential 
incoherence is found both in the desire of the transsexual and in those who seek to help 
her/him.  This does not mean, however, that the desire itself is not real nor that no 
genuine suffering is associated with the discordance experienced between sex and gender.  
Neither is it necessary to argue that the transsexual should not be seeking to transition.  
Rather I am arguing at this point that this incoherence should be acknowledged.  I am 
making the conceptual point that the current constructions of TS are inadequate and 
invalid and that a new and more coherent model is required that does not move across 
concepts nor collapse into confusion.  In Chapter Four of this thesis Authenticity will be 
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offered as both an alternative model for understanding TS and as an appropriate model 
for a person seeking to transition and to re-sex the body. 
 
This conceptual incoherence is found in the designation GReS.  This appears to state that 
it is gender that is being reassigned by means of surgery yet it is the fundamental position 
of TS that gender is that which a person ‘has’ and it is the body that is the locus of the 
problem.  This is why the body is brought into line with gender identity. The designation 
GReS may be used in order to cohere with other terms such as Gender Identity Disorder 
and Gender Identity Clinics and there seems to be a reluctance to use the designation Sex 
Reassignment Surgery (SRS).  There are two possible explanations for this.  The first is 
that it is gender claims that prompt medical and surgical interventions and not sex claims, 
and the second is that the conceptual incoherence itself is difficult to resolve because its 
justification is based on gender dysphoria rather than bodily dysfunction. 
 
The designation SRS or sex change surgery is problematic both because it is not possible 
to change chromosomal sex and because some inter-sexed conditions require surgery and 
a distinction needs to be made between this and surgery for TS. SRS suggests that the sex 
function of the body is the reason for surgery not that surgery is of instrumental value to 
the needs of gender. This is the main reason why this designation is not preferred.   
People within the transsexual community criticise the ‘reassignment’ component of the 
designation because it is felt that gender is not being assigned but rather freely chosen.   
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GReS is not concerned with gender at all but with the surgical alteration of a healthy and 
properly functioning body not for the sake of that body but for the sake of an immaterial 
and subjective notion of gender.  This latter issue is not solely a matter of conceptual 
confusion, however.  Even if a coherent model of TS is found it would still be the case 
that healthy organs are surgically removed for a reason beyond that of the body. 
 
THE PAN-PERSONAL MODEL 
 
This model offers a way of resolving the problems of the previous two models.  
Significance is attached both to the body and to the development of personal 
characteristics through the exercise of choice.  This model acknowledges both the 
similarities and differences between people with the body functioning as both a source of 
sameness and difference.  This is the model that is to be used in Authenticity Model for 
TS to be developed in Chapter Four 
 
It is, however, the other two models that dominate medical discourse at the present time.  
The Pan-personal model is found mainly within the trans-gendered community. 
 
2. Medical Model 
 
This section will: look briefly at the nature of health and diseasexix; consider why TS 
should be thought of as disease and to trace the way that medicine seeks to explain TS. 
                                                 
 
xix This is not the place for a full discussion on the vast literature that deals with the subject of health and 
disease.  For a representative sample of authors who deal with this subject the following may be considered 
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HEALTH AND DISEASE 
 
Trimble points out that: ‘Our concepts of disease are not immutable, and various models 
have been proposed’74.  The models that are used to classify phenomena as diseases 
generally fall into two categories: welfare or functionalist.  The main welfare model is 
that used by the World Health Organisation (WHO) which states that health is: 
  
 …a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
     the absence of disease and infirmity75. 
 
 
Here health is seen as synonymous with well-being and this model emphasises the 
subjective element of happiness in human experience.  As a result it is thought to be a 
positive model of health.  The functionalist model of health has been articulated by 
Boorse: 
 
     The state of an organism is theoretically healthy i.e. free from disease, in so far 
     as its mode of functioning conforms to the natural design of that kind of  
     organism.76 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
as representative: A Caplan “Health, Disease and Illness: Concepts in Medicine” Georgetown UP 2004, 
“Making Sense of Health, Illness and Disease” Ed P Tuohig and V Kalitzkus Rodopi 2004, “Making Sense 
of Illness-the social psychology and Health and Disease” A Radley Sage 1994, “Worlds of Illness-
biographical and cultural perspectives on Health and Disease” A Radley Routledge 1993, “Concepts of 
Health, Illness and Disease-a comparative perspective” C Currer and M Stacey Leamington Spa- Berg 
1986, RM Hare Journal of Medical ethics 12 (4): 174-181 Dec 1986, W M Brown “On Defining Disease” 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10 (4) 311-328 1985 Nov and Steve Taylor “Approaches to Health and 
Illness” BMC Public Health (1471-2458) De Allegro 2001 Vol7. 
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As long as a person functions according to the norms for humanity as a whole then she/he 
is to be considered as healthy.  Functioning refers both to bodily systems and social 
interaction.  If a human heart works as it is believed that is should then it is healthy.  
Similarly if a person is able to work and form relationships then she/he is healthy.  No 
reference is made to the subjective condition of the individual. If a person is unhappy but 
able to function both in terms of body and by holding down a job then he/she is 
considered healthy.  Also if a person is happy but her/his body is not working properly 
then she/he is considered unhealthy.  Boorse claims that diseases are ‘deviations from the 
natural functional organisations of the species’ which are in turn determinable 
objectively.77 
 
This functionalist theory of health calls for a description of what is normal human 
functioning, one that is universally recognised and that sets a minimum standard of 
functioning achievable by all. To fall below this constitutes a state of ill health.  Such a 
model of health can be understood to be performative or mechanistic, with the 
mechanism of performance as the object of interest.  Boorse aims for a value free 
definition of health and to achieve this he makes a distinction between theoretical health 
and practical health.78  The latter consists of that which ought to be treated by medicine 
because it fails to reach normal standards.  No personal judgement is required in order to 
determine the presence of an illness as normal standards are objectively determined.   
 
McDonald79 offers a critique of both Boorse and functional models in general in terms of 
their inherent teleological goals.  She argues that instead of being based solely on 
 59 
 
observation of that which is natural to a species, functional models actually choose 
between potential options. She gives the examples of survival and reproduction and 
states: 
     It is simply not the case that all species pursue the goals of survival and 
     reproduction as individuals.  Many species have a majority of members 
     who are effectively infertile, and many species pursue reproduction only 
     in a manner that ensures the death of individuals.80 
      
She continues by discussing ageing, which Boorse referred to as ‘an inherent defect of the 
organism’.  McDonald argues that to be consistent aging would have to be viewed as a 
disease as it is not consistent with the normal functioning of a species.  This view would 
result in all beings considered as unhealthy as they age.  She concludes by suggesting that 
both concepts of health and the delivery of health care be based on a multiplicity of 
models. 
 
However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to offer a detailed critique of Boorse’s or 
MacDonald’s models.  It is sufficient to note that different models of health exist and that 
TS falls within the remits of both functional and well-being models.  A more details 
critique is offered in my thesis for the MSc Health Care Ethics (2002) Body Dysmorphic 
Disorder. 
TS WITHIN DISEASE MODELS 
 
Medicine defines TS as a disease for at least three reasons: TS is concerned with the 
functioning of the human body; it manifests as social dysfunction with increasing 
inability due to the tension between the body and sense of gender as a result of which the 
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transsexual may withdraw from social engagements and personal relationships; and it is 
accompanied by the subjective experience of unhappiness.  Unhappiness is often 
articulated as overwhelming and provides a major justification for both a medical 
explanation of the condition and for treatment and surgery.  The experience of suffering 
is so central to TS that Chapter Three of this thesis is devoted to an exploration of it. 
 
HISTORY 
 
This section maps out the well documented course that medicine has taken in order to 
explain TS as a subject of legitimate medical interest. 
 
Benjamin devoted a chapter of his definitive work to the subject of the aetiology of TS.81  
He reviewed the then existing literature that grouped TS into the two categories: the 
biological and the psychological.  Of the former Benjamin examined genetic and 
endocrine dysfunction as possible causes.  Whilst acknowledging that at his time of 
writing genetic science was at an early stage Benjamin cites the work of Hoenig and 
Torr82 and Melicow and Uson83 to argue for the possibility of the sex identification gene 
as a possible cause for TS: 
 
     A theory such as this would explain much better than psychological  
     ‘conditioning’ the astonishing depth and the intensity with which a 
     transsexual identifies with the opposite sex.  Incidentally, it would also 
     explain the resistance to treatment.84 
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Benjamin then discusses the possibility that TS is cause by endocrine dysfunction.  He 
begins by examining the possibility that the foetus may be influenced by the hormonal 
condition of the mother, specifically that a male foetus may be influenced by high levels 
of oestrogen.  This might occur as a result of the woman experiencing stress during 
pregnancy or if she has consumed certain chemicals whilst pregnant.  He discusses 
normal foetal development and how this may be influenced by stresses that the mother 
experiences.  He wonders if this may be why there are more M-F transsexuals than F-M 
and then examines the work of Stoller et al85 in relation to the possibility that M-F 
transsexuals may produce abnormally high levels of oestrogen themselves.   
 
 
Benjamin speculates whether this finding in relation to inter-sexed men and women may 
also apply to the transsexual.  Benjamin also examines the role played by the brain itself.  
He again reviews the existing literature, paying attention to that which examines cerebro-
neural functioning along with research into the effects of lobotomy upon sexual 
functioning and brain effects produced by the use of electrodes.  He focuses attention on 
the work of Gorsky86 who identified the hypothalamus region of the brain as of central 
importance and argued that this is inherently female and must be masculinised in the 
womb for male identity to occur: 
 
     Unless there is testicular tissue secreting testosterone during this period 
     of development to organise this portion of the brain along masculine lines 
     then it remains forever female.87 
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Benjamin completes his discussion of aetiology with an examination of the possible 
psychological causes for TS paying particular attention to imprinting, which is the 
impression made upon a developing mind from its surroundings. 
 
The identification of the hypothalamus as an important area for an organic explanation 
for TS was later taken up by Zhou et al88, who identified the BSTc region as potentially 
decisive.  Having studied the brains, post mortem, of six M-F transsexuals they conclude: 
 
     Here we show that the volume of the central subdivision of the bed nucleus 
     of the stria terminalis (BSTc), a brain area that is essential for sexual behaviour 
     is larger in men than in women.  A female sized BSTc was found in M-F 
     transsexuals.89 
 
 
They concluded that, following experiments with the brains of rats, this area of the brain 
may be responsible for masculine identity and that this finding can be applied to human 
beings.  They speculated that it is the absence of androgens in the womb that may be 
responsible for the size of the BSTc.  By ‘sexual behaviour’ it appears that they mean 
both gender identity and behaviour that has traditionally been understood as falling 
within the gender-as- body model discussed earlier.  The BSTc region is of similar size in 
both non-transsexual men and women regardless of sexual orientation90.  The conclusion 
is, therefore, that this region of the brain is linked to the subjective sense of gender 
identity that forms an essential element in personal identity.   
 
This work was later taken up by Chung, De Vries and Swab91, who sought to determine 
when the BSTc region becomes sexually dimorphic.  They concluded that this region 
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showed more neurons in men than in women from midgestation onwards and that this 
only becomes significant in adulthood.  In fact the difference between men and women 
may extend into adulthood.  They report: 
 
     Alternatively, it must also be taken into consideration that changes in BSTc  
     volume in M-F transsexuals may be the result of a failure to develop a male- 
     like gender identity92. 
 
 
This conclusion raises the possibility that the failure for a male sexed individual to 
develop a subjective male identity may have an effect on the area of the brain that is 
associated with gender identity.  It may be the case that the functioning of the will in 
some way alters the brain. This reverses the organic explanation for TS that is formative 
in the medical model. 
 
The BSTc region remains the focus of research into organic causes for TS.  The medical 
model itself provides the justification for such research and medical explanations 
continue to be sought. 
 
In its most recent formulation TS is now known as Harry Benjamin Syndrome (HBS)93.  
This designation is used to reflect the neurological understanding of the causes of TS.  
The claim is now made that Harry Benjamin Syndrome is not an illness, either physical 
or mental, but should be thought of in the same way as inter-sexed conditions.  Goair 
asserts in her on-line information site that: ‘experts now consider that HBS is not a 
mental disorder, but rather a natural and biological variation of human sexual identity’94.  
Her claim is that HBS is as normal an expression of gender and sexual identity as any 
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other, yet one that requires medical and surgical interventions in order for the person 
concerned to realise her/his identity. 
 
A transsexual is now considered to be ‘born’ a member of the opposite sex (this is the 
term used by those proponents of the designation HBS) who requires  
‘corrective surgery on physical structures’95.  There is no ‘trans’ element in this 
construction.  The idea of ‘trans’ or of moving across boundaries in the older model had 
overtones of fault and instability and is no longer considered to be an appropriate 
construction within the transsexual community. 
 
However, the medical model remains the primary model for contemporary reflection and 
treatment of TS both within scientific/academic and popular discourse. Accordingly the 
medical model warrants greater discussion within this thesis (see Chapter Four). 
 
3. The Body Image Model 
 
The third model that can be used in order to explain TS is the Body Image Model. 
DEFINITION 
 
Merleau-Ponty holds that the primary purpose of body image is to provide an individual 
with ‘a global, practical and implicit notion of the relation between our body and things, 
and of our hold on them’96. 
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Body image is an internal awareness of the appearance, shape, nature, position in space 
and time and identity of one’s body that informs a person from moment to moment of 
her/his position in the world relative both to others and to the world of things.  Head97 
identified two characteristics of the postural body image: plasticity and equilibrium.  
Plasticity refers to the body image’s adaptability and flexibility whilst equilibrium refers 
to the body image’s role as setting a standard against which both bodily and other 
changes are measured in order to promote stability. 
 
Plasticity means that the body image can change not only in relation to actual changes in 
the body due to age, illness and injury but also as a result of psychical and social changes 
such as the role of imagination focusing upon present and future possibilities.  Schilder98 
claims that each individual possesses an unlimited number of body images that need to be 
held together in tension.  This multiplicity of images is made up on an ideal body image, 
and both masculine and feminine images as well as distorted body image all compete in 
the mind for attention.  These images relate to one another in conflict and this in turn 
prevents any one image from achieving hegemony.  This conflict and lack of dominance 
can be thought of as a good thing because it enables a person to cope with change over 
time. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BODY IMAGE 
 
All body image theorists recognise the importance of perception in the development of 
the body image.  Perception here is a cognitive or conscious process by which an 
individual develops a sense of bodily identity as a result of self-awareness, the world 
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around the self and the reciprocity between that self and the world.  This develops 
gradually and the crucial stage has been identified by Lacan99 as the ‘Mirror Stage’: 
 
     (T)he Mirror Stage is a phenomenon to which I assign a two-fold value.  In the  
     first place it marks a decisive turning point in the mental development of the 
     child.  In the second place it, it typifies an essential libidinal relationship 
     with the body image.100 
 
 
The ‘Mirror Stage’ is the child’s awareness of its body from ‘outside’, what is called the 
specular image, in competition with its view of itself and its body from the inside.  These 
two perspectives are seemingly disparate experiences and the challenge is for the 
individual is to develop a coherent image out of the two.  This problem is not faced 
consciously but seems to be a task undertaken by the non-conscious mind.  Two 
difficulties need to be overcome in order for cohesion to be achieved.  First a person 
needs to realise that the specular image is not the self even though it may be one image or 
one representation of the self.  Second s/he must realise that the person is not located in 
the mirror but instead is located where he/she feels him/herself to be introspectively.  
This last term means the awareness of bodily position in space and time as a separate 
object. 
 
An individual has therefore to reconcile two forms of awareness: she/he feels him/herself 
to exist in an introspective sense yet she/he can also be seen by an external witness at the 
very same moment.  A space opens up between these two forms of awareness with a 
sense of alienation and fragmentation the result. 
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Merleau-Ponty101 suggests that the developing self has to incorporate the specular image 
into its own self image and this process involves active participation rather that passive 
acceptance of what is seen from the outside.  It is not only the mirror image that needs 
incorporation but also the perspective that others have of ‘my’ body and how they 
respond to it; 
 
     The specular image, given visually, participates globally in the existence of the 
     body itself and leads to a ‘phantom’ life in the mirror, which ‘participates’ in the 
     life of the child himself.  What is true pf his body, for the child, is also true of the 
     other’s body.  The child himself feels that he is in the other’s body, just as he feels 
     himself to be in his visual image.102 
 
 
This incorporation allows for sympathetic identification with others later on in life and 
debate focuses on the place and role of deception in the development of the body image.  
Deception here refers to the role of dress and techniques of making the self attractive to 
others.  (Deception as a moral possibility will be discussed in Chapter Five in relation to 
both self deception and the deceiving of others in the context of intimate relationships). 
 
Body image continues to develop through the narcissistic stage when a person can be 
sexually aroused in response to their own bodily sensations.  This is linked to the 
experience of the self in relation to the world and the finer aspects of the body image are 
dependent upon life experiences, training and emotional attitudes. 
 
The self strives to achieve bodily equilibrium by means of establishing a stable body 
image.  This can never be achieved fully because a constant process of 
construction/deconstruction and reconstruction of the body image occurs.  Schilder 
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maintains that it is possible to be ‘tied down’ to one’s body image, meaning that one 
image becomes dominant with the result that it does not take account of changes to the 
body over time.  To avoid this, the body image can be ‘played with’ or experimented with 
by means of clothing, jewellery or even self mutilation.  Butler writes: 
 
     This desire for a kind of radical remaking of the body is obviously out there 
     in the public sphere.103  
 
 
She argues that a desire exists to transform the physical limits of the body and so it is 
necessary to think of one self as not being tied down to its present physicality.  This 
desire can be expressed through admiration both for sportsmen and women and for 
fashion models and those who are recognised as physically beautiful. 
ABJECTION 
 
This is the psychical process by which various physical phenomena are excluded from the 
sense of self and therefore from the body image itself.  This is done in order to sustain a 
healthy and functioning sense of self thereby enabling one person to relate to others. 
 
A self refuses to recognise any of its defiling or uncontrollable and impure bodily 
functions as part of the body image.  A person knows what it is to produce waste products 
as part of the functioning of the body.  These substances originate within the body but are 
then passed out of it, as that which is harmful to it.  As we have seen the body image is 
constructed in relation to the experience of the body and as waste products are part of 
bodily experience a way has to be found of not incorporating these into the image itself 
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otherwise the image would be built on a foundation that is unstable and toxic.  To prevent 
the incorporation of waste products in the body image a boundary needs to be established 
between the sense of self and that which is being abjected.  On one side of this boundary 
is the self and on the other are all those substances and functioning of the body that can 
be thought of as damaging to the sense of self.  Abjection is the process of expulsion 
from the one side of this boundary to the other.  This leads to a solid sense of self as that 
which is a substantial and idiosyncratic entity. 
 
Abjection, however, is problematic.  That which is abjected is necessary for the healthy 
functioning of the body.  Waste products are the result of food consumption, which in 
turn is necessary for life.  So there is awareness within the self that what is abjected is at 
one point necessary for life itself.  This is further complicated by the knowledge that food 
may be a source of threat as every time an individual eats he/she may be taking into the 
body a substance that has the potential to destroy it, as in the example of food poisoning.  
Abjection therefore is not a clear cut or straightforward activity.  It is not an activity in 
which a person performs consciously. 
 
Kristeva104 describes abjection as a process of letting go of that which one desires to 
keep.  This arises from the knowledge that what is rejected was once part of the self.  
Abjection can be experienced by the feeling of horror and disgust experienced when one 
sees vomit, blood or even a dead body.  The abject is to be distinguished from both 
subject and object.  Subject refers to the self who experiences abjection and object refers 
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to that which has never been part of the subject’s experience.  The abject lies between 
both and abjection is the process of removing it from within oneself to a place outside. 
 
One effect of the problematic nature of abjection is that the experience of the body can be 
at odds with the body image.  A body continues to function by utilising the very 
substances that are abjected.  The abject is therefore necessary in some sense to the body 
and ambivalence exists between the self and the abject.  Furthermore that which is 
abjected has the potential to seep back into the body image and so threatens it.  One 
possible outcome of this is that the body image can be distorted. 
 
Weiss105 has considered the way that abjection can threaten the body image. She finds 
evidence of this in anorexia nervosa.  She argues that an individual with anorexia sees 
bodily processes that lead to the development of fatty areas as abject and therefore as 
being rejected from the sense of self.  This is the result of an over-identification with one 
particular body image, which she identifies as the culturally desirable female body image 
that has been constructed in patriarchal western societies.  As seen earlier, a person 
requires a multiplicity of body images in order to adapt to the changes in the body over 
time. This is called destablisiation. Weiss argues that an anorexic may identify 
exclusively with one body image to the exclusion of others and the one that she identifies 
with is the ideal: 
 
     By contrast, I am claiming that it is precisely the lack of destabilisation in the 
     anorexic’s body image that is the source of its deadly destructiveness…I am 
     claiming that she is too coherent 106. 
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Weiss’ analysis of anorexia differs from many accounts in relation to the place occupied 
by the body image.  She argues that it is not a case of distorted body image, which is the 
popular view, but of too clear a view.  In the popular view it is believed that there is a 
disconnection between the way that an anorexic sees herself and her actual bodily 
appearance.  Weiss argues that there is not a contradiction between the two but a 
dominance of one image. She argues that what is required is that other body images be 
created: 
 
     (there is a ) need to respond corporeally to these contradictions through the 
     creation of multiple body images.107 
 
3. Body Image and TS 
 
The application of the body image model to TS is something that I consider to be of value 
both in terms of the ‘mirror stage’ and in relation to abjection.  Prosser108 devotes a 
section of Chapter Two to a discussion of body image and TS from the perspective of 
‘being trapped in the wrong body’.  He describes body image as an internal sense of 
sexed identity which is ‘radically split for the material body’ body and leads to a rejection 
of the sexed body.  Prosser states that this is sufficiently powerful as to: 
     feel sufficiently substantial as to persuade the transsexual to alter his or her 
     body to conform to it.109 
 
Citing the work of Anzieu and Sacks, Prosser discusses how the body image of the 
transsexual leads to a sense of loss of the sexed body.  GReS seeks to restore what has 
been lost so that the transsexual can live normally.  Body image, therefore, is the 
conviction that the internal sense of the self is the real self 
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What I suggest is that it may be useful to explore how this disconnection between the 
body image and the sexed identity occurs within TS. 
 
MIRROR STAGE. 
 
TS could be associated with the disjunction between the body image of the transsexual 
which, as we have seen, is known ‘introceptively’ and the image of the self that is 
perceived specularly.  This is the difference between the way that a transsexual ‘sees’ 
him/herself subjectively or mentally and what he/she sees when looking in a mirror.  A 
transsexual may have ‘seen’ him/herself as having a body that belongs to the opposite sex 
and only realises that this is not the case at that point in human development designated 
by Lacan as the ‘mirror stage’.  As well as the usual disconnection experienced when 
confronted with the specular image the transsexual has the added distress of a total failure 
to recognise the self in the image in the mirror.  This may come slightly later than the 
actual mirror stage, when the child has both the mirror stage itself and the knowledge that 
men and women are different. 
 
The distress of the transsexual may be greater than that which is normally experienced in 
the development of the body image.  One outcome of this may be not just a failure to 
recognise the self in what is seen but to have no point of contact with the image at all.  
This may result in a total rejection of the image in the belief that what is seen is not true: 
rather the truth lies in the introceptive image.  This image is the more familiar one, one 
that has been ‘with’ the transsexual longer than the specular image.  It is the familiarity of 
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the introceptive image than may lead the transsexual to believe that it represents the truth 
about him/herself.  This may explain why he/she holds on to this image, for which there 
is no objective evidence, instead of the specular image, for which there is. 
 
The transsexual may not receive the specular image as representing the self or as showing 
some form of truth about the self.  Instead he/she sees it as that which denies his/her own 
self, as that which is a contradiction and will lead others to the wrong conclusions about 
who he/she really is.  The specular image is rejected.  The ‘usual’ course of events is that 
a person ‘comes to terms’ with the image that she/he sees in the mirror.  However, in TS 
there seems to be a failure to adjust or to integrate this image with the result that a 
transsexual disconnects totally from that image that she/he sees. 
ABJECTION 
 
The process by which a transsexual may come to disconnect from the specular body 
image may be abjection.  Prior to the mirror stage a transsexual may have developed a 
body image in which the sexed characteristics of the body have been abjected.  A body 
image has been gradually developed which is that of the opposite sex.  If the idea of a 
multiplicity of competing body images is adopted, as discussed earlier in terms of 
destabilisation, then as with anorexia, it may be that the transsexual develops a dominant 
image with which he/she identifies exclusively.  So instead of seeking to integrate a 
whole number of competing and contradictory body images by means of a creative 
tension, a transsexual has one dominant image. 
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The secondary sexual characteristics of the actual body are moved outside of the 
boundaries that form the self and are placed ‘outside’.  All the characteristics of abjection 
may be present.  The secondary sexual characteristics, the abject, are associated with the 
body and so at some level are associated with the self in the same way that bodily fluids 
are.  Also, just as bodily fluids, they have the potential to threaten the existence of the 
self.  Secondary sexual characteristics do so because it is the gender that is associated 
with them that is ‘seen’ by others and is that which forms the basis on which others relate 
to the transsexual. 
 
The initial experience of abjection lies in the way that a body image of the ‘opposite’ sex 
is set up.  This continues when the transsexual ‘abjects’ the specular image.  This may be 
the first occasion for suffering in her/his experience.  At least if not the first experience of 
suffering then it may be the first experience of significant and internally generated 
suffering.  Abjection continues for as long as the specular image exists and is experienced 
whenever that image forces itself upon the attention of the transsexual. 
 
Surgery may be interpreted as the ultimate abjection.  Surgery both removes the threat to, 
and promotes the actual survival of, the self in accord with its introceptive image.  
Understood in terms of threat and survival the sense of urgency in relation to surgery 
becomes more comprehensible.  Abjection is closely related to the positive desires that 
are present within the experience of TS and this will be discussed further in Chapter Four. 
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I have sought to include body image into the discussion of TS as a potentially useful 
means of exploring how a transsexual arrives at the conviction that she/he ‘inhabits’ the 
wrong body.  I have demonstrated that the notion of abjection appears to offer fertile 
ground both for an understanding of TS itself and as an alternative perspective to the 
medical model.  More work yet needs to be done to apply the insights of body image 
theory to the transsexual debate.  In this thesis I wish to direct attention to the importance 
of body image and the need to explore the way that this develops in the experience of the 
transsexual.  
 
Conclusion 
 
TS has been discussed in this chapter in relation to the models of gender, medicine and 
body image.  Within the transsexual community there is a move away from the medical 
model in favour of the gender model.  Bornstein110, a M-F transsexual, as well as 
rejecting a medico-surgical-psychiatric interpretation of TS, challenges the whole notion 
of gender categories and calls for them to be rejected.  She challenges the idea that 
surgery is necessary and that there exists biological factors that account for gender 
identity and by extension for TS: 
 
     By focusing on the so-called ‘inherent differences’ between men and women 
     we ignore and deny the existence of the gender system itself and so we in fact 
     hold it in place.  But it’s the…idea of gender itself that needs to be done away 
     with.  The differences will then fall aside of their own accord.111 
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She is aware that she is subject to criticism at this point as someone who has transitioned 
in the accepted medical way.  She acknowledges that she may be thought to be closing a 
door to others that she was able to walk through.  Her defence is that she has only come 
to realise after transitioning that by following the medical route she actually maintained 
gender constructions. 
 
Even some of those within the transsexual community who advocate surgery have 
difficulty with the medical model and its psychiatric classification. For instance, 
O’Hartigan112, disagrees with the idea of trans-genderism113 and also claimed that surgery 
saved her life: 
 
     Receiving surgery allowed me to aspire to what most take for granted… 
     a normal life!114 
 
 
For O’Hartigan the issue is not whether TS should be understood as psychiatric or 
biological in origin but rather that surgery works.  Hers is a pragmatic approach although 
she does seem to be willing to discuss the conceptualisation of TS itself.  For others115 it 
is the psychiatric gate keeping role that is seen as problematic and there exists a desire to 
move away from any psychiatric classification.  Califia116 wonders, however, if the 
medical and psychiatric justifications for surgery were to be removed what justification 
could then be found for the treatments that so many transsexuals seem to desire: 
 
     The desire to be free from the stigma of having been diagnosed with a mental 
     disorder is understandable.  But if sex change surgery is going to continue to be  
     in its most complete and fullest sense.  They are challenging 
     the imaginary assumptions through their own imaginations. 
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All three models discussed in this chapter are to a greater or lesser degree found in 
contemporary transsexual debate.  All three need to be critiqued both in terms of validity 
and in comparison to one another.  It appears, however, that for a number of reasons such 
a critique has been difficult to pursue up to the present time.  These reasons form the 
interim conclusion of this thesis which will be discussed next. 
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INTERIM ASSESSMENT 
 
This interim assessment seeks to do two things.  First, to examine my claim that 
insufficient critical attention has been paid to the three models and second to discover 
whether or not, because of the difficulties with the three models, there are any other 
grounds for offering medical treatment and GReS to those with TS.  There is not the same 
difficulty with the body image model as there is with the other two; the only difficulty 
appears to be the lack of development and application of it to TS.  Suffering will be 
explored in Chapter Three as an alternative justification for treatment. 
 
Insufficient critical attention seems to have been paid both to TS and to the three models 
because of certain cultural trends and preoccupations.  Writers such as Raymond117 and 
Millot118 have attempted a critical analysis of TS with the former offering an anti-
transsexual analysis.  Raymond argues against the medical construction of TS claiming 
that: ‘transsexuals (M-F) are not women.  They are deviant males’119. 
 
Raymond, a lesbian feminist, sees the creation of transsexual women as an attempt by 
male patriarchy to invade one of the last spaces occupied exclusively by women.  This 
space is the female body and the subsequent relationships between women in which the 
nature and experience of being a woman is discussed and worked out.  TS is a way for 
men to equip themselves with what they have always desired, which is the acceptance by 
women as being one of their own.  Raymond argues that M-F transsexuals ought not to be 
accepted by women as women but as men who are seeking to invade the space of women.  
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She has created a division of opinion amongst lesbian feminists with this claim and has 
provoked strong reaction from M-F transsexual writers and advocates.  Stone120  argues 
that transsexuals are ‘embodied voices’ whose individual stories need to be heard and she 
rejects Raymond’s claim that M-F transsexual’s ‘rape’ women’s bodies and belong 
‘outside of normal gender structures; 
 
     I suggest constituting transsexuals not as a class or problematic "third gender", but       
     rather as a genre-- a set of embodied texts whose potential for productive 
     disruption of structured sexualities and spectra of desire has yet to be explored121. 
 
 
It may be that this kind of critical assessment of TS has had the unintended consequence 
of hampering further analysis.  Doctors, for example, may fear being considered anti-
transsexual and, in turn, this may inhibit them from undertaking critical reflection on TS.  
This may be a reason for the failure of medicine, up to the present time, to identify the 
problem with the use of two mutually exclusive models of gender (as identified in the 
first aim of this thesis). 
 
It is certainly the case that some within the transsexual community have written about the 
caution that is required when non-transsexuals seek to write about, and comment upon, 
TS.  Hale122 offers fifteen guidelines for non-transsexuals who wish to express an opinion 
on TS, the first of which is: 
 
     “1. Approach your topic with a sense of humility.  You are not the experts 
     about transsexuals, transsexuality or transsexualism or trans…anything. 
     Transsexuals are!” 
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This claim to be the experts on the basis of experience rather than on knowledge and skill 
may be seen as an ‘anti-expert’ perspective which sees expertise as the preserve of white 
middle class males.  Suspicion of this class of people and the guilt that the class itself 
may be experiencing will be discussed in the next chapter in the work of Amato123.   
 
Other trends and values that may have hindered critical attention of TS include the value 
that is currently placed within society upon sex and sexuality.  Human sexuality is 
understood both as procreation and recreation and it is the value placed on the latter that 
is in focus here.  This value is seen both in the way that recreational sex is increasingly 
prominent and acceptable within society and in the belief that a full and satisfying 
recreational sex life is a basic human rightxx.  Linked to this is the belief that any failure 
to have and enjoy recreational sex is problematic and unacceptable.  TS, in a general way, 
is associated with sex and so the way that sex is viewed influences the way that TS is 
thought of. 
 
Szasz124, documents the value that is placed on recreational sex: 
 
     Next to the need for sleep, water and food the sexual urge is our most 
     powerful biological drive. 
 
 
He is deeply critical of the way that medicine has constructed medical difficulties around 
sexual functioning.  Medicine uses disease constructions in its discussion of sexual 
                                                 
 
xx Staff at The Douglas House Hospice, Oxford, UK recently helped a resident with Duchenne Muscular 
Dystrophy to have sex with a prostitute after consulting lawyers, clergy and doctors.  A human rights 
justification was used.  The Daily Telegraph carried the story on 31st January 2007. 
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dysfunction in a way that it does not do in relation to other bodily functions such as 
eating and enjoying food.  Medicine promises treatment to those who experience 
difficulties in relation to sex.  Szasz argues that sexual problems may not be medical 
problems at all but rather matters of taste or preference.   Medicine has constructed the 
idea of ‘normal’ sexual behaviour, with the corresponding notion of dysfunction when 
that norm is not realised, so that people now consider themselves to be ill when in fact 
they are not.  Medicine offers a range of treatments for those who wish to improve their 
own sexual performance.  As well as medicine reflecting the general value placed on 
recreational sex Szasz argues that constructing sexual dysfunction as a medical problem 
may be a way for medicine to increase its own prestige and mechanism for controlling 
human behaviour. 
 
The acceptance of something akin to the right to recreational sex is seen in a number of 
ways: pornography being given to prisonersxxi, lowering of the age of consensual sex to 
sixteenxxii, the ‘Right to Say No’ campaign for women125, sex being offered as therapy in 
some medical contexts126 and claims that the State has a duty to provide sexual fulfilment 
to those who through disability or other factors are unable to do so for themselvesxxiii. 
                                                 
 
xxi Reports from a number of countries describe the way that pornography is offered to prisoners and the 
way that this is justified cf The Daily Telegraphy June 02 2008, The Supreme Administrative Court in 
Stockholm in June 2007 ruled that the prison service has no right to withhold pornographic magazines from 
prisoners and The American Civil Liberties Union in 2006 sue for the right of prisoners in Indiana, USA to 
have access to pornographic material.  They argues that any prison ban on such material could be extended 
to a ban on personal correspondence as well as on the ‘great classical literature’. 
xxii Guardian February 11 2000 reported on Parliament’s decision to lower the age for gay sex to 16 on 
Thursday 10th February 2000. 
xxiii Asta Philpot travelled to Spain to a state sponsored brothel in order to loose his virginity.  He felt that 
his medical condition arthogryposis inhibits him from normal sexual practice.    Disability Now website in 
2005 suggested that 75% of disabled people believed in the legalisation of prostitution, with 62.5% of men 
and 19.2% of women saying they would use trained sex workers. 
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The value placed on recreational sex may have two effects; first in an unwillingness to 
criticise any form of consensual sexual behaviour amongst adults and second, as 
discussed above, in the medicalisation of both sexual failure and the desire for better 
sexual performance. 
 
Applied to TS the value placed on recreational sex may work in this way.  TS is 
associated with sex.  This may either be as a result of a lack of clear thinking on the part 
of those who are not called to theorise about it but who may be involved in some way, or 
because of the continued conflation of ideas of sex and gender.  This may be because TS 
has the designation ‘sex’ in its construction.  If this is the case then just as it is felt to be 
inappropriate to express a critical opinion of a person’s sexual practice or performance 
then it is inappropriate to question a transsexual’s claim to GReS. 
 
Szasz targets this medicalised response to TS.  He further reflects on the fact that TS is 
not a matter of either sex or medicine yet values and attitudes towards sex are applied to 
it.  He describes TS as ‘a condition tailor-made for our surgical-technological age’.127  
This may apply equally to medical practitioners as it does to the general population.   
 
A further cultural norm that may contribute to unwillingness to critically engage with TS 
is the way suffering is regarded.  Claims to be suffering tend to go unchallenged.  Indeed 
suffering individuals tend to be admired by others.  Transsexuals claim to be suffering, 
and so the way that suffering is viewed in general may be extended to them with the 
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result that the claim to be suffering is accepted at face value.  Having admired the person 
who is suffering, there is an assumption that suffering is to be alleviated.  I will 
demonstrate in Chapter Three that there is no absolute duty to alleviate suffering because 
suffering has potential value. 
 
The second thing for this interim assessment to do is to ask whether given the problems 
discussed in relation to the three models any other justification for GReS can be found.  
One possible justification of GReS is the suffering that a transsexual person experiences 
as a result of gender dysphoria.  As seen earlier such suffering has a profound effect upon 
the individual and this leads her/him to seek medical and professional help.  Surgery is 
often that which the transsexual desires both in order to bring suffering to an end and to 
make visible gender identity.  Therefore it may be that suffering alone is a justification 
for surgery.  The next chapter will examine this claim by firstly offering a specific 
definition of suffering in order to exclude this experience from other forms of 
unhappiness, secondly by examining the moral duty to alleviate suffering and, finally by 
examining the possible value of suffering.  The conclusion to be reached in Chapter 
Three is that suffering does not form a sufficient justification for surgery.   
 
A final issue is the value placed on medical knowledge and technology.  Both the 
necessary skills and technology exist to achieve GReS.  As well as contributing to the 
concept itself, medical technology may be thought of as driving forward the practice of 
GReS.  Meyerowitz128 offers a history of TS that includes a medical analysis.  She details 
the way that advances in technology enables the desires of transsexual people.  A 
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comparison can be made with other bio-medical practises such as In Vitro Fertilisation.  
The recent example129 of a woman giving birth to octuplets raised questions about the 
ethics of IVF treatment.  The existence of the technology to perform a task may result in 
that task being performed without too much critical reflection.  The question in ethics 
centres on the relation between availability of technology and its rightful use.  Because 
the technology exists it does not mean that it is right to use it.  
 
If, therefore, the current models do not form a logical and coherent justification for 
surgery and suffering does not either then the question to be asked is: Is there any other 
possible justification for surgery and therefore for the fulfilment of the desires of many 
transsexual people?  In Chapter Four a new model will be offered which both resolves the 
difficulties with the existing models and does not rely on the notion of suffering.  That 
model is Authenticity. 
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CHAPTER THREE SUFFERING 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will begin by constructing a specific definition of suffering.  This definition 
will distinguish suffering from other experiences of human pain, misery and unhappiness 
in order to be clear about the kind of negative human experience that have the potential to 
be of benefit.  This definition will then be applied to TS in order to establish whether TS 
can be thought of as suffering in this specific sense.  The next section will discuss the 
moral duty to alleviate suffering with the third examining ways in which value can be 
found in the experience of suffering. 
 
The central argument of this chapter is that even if the transsexual can be thought of as 
suffering it does not necessarily follow that there is an absolute moral duty to alleviate 
this suffering.  I will offer two reasons in support of this view: 
 
1. A duty to alleviate suffering is problematic both at the motivational and 
consequential level.  
2. Value can be found in the experience of suffering.  Value may be found both by 
the sufferer and those who are related to her/him.  This value may be lost if the 
experience of suffering is removed.   
 
The chapter will end with an application of all that has been discussed to TS. 
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1. A Definition of Suffering 
 
Contrasting views of the human condition can be found in the theological, philosophical 
and literary tradition of western thought that are both optimistic and pessimistic.  
Leibniz130is an example of optimism with his belief in a controlling benevolent Deity and 
Hobbes131 an example of pessimism. For Hobbes the three principles of competition, 
diffidence and glory contribute to the basic human condition.  Describing human 
existence in terms of a series of negatives Hobbes concludes with his well known 
description of the life of man as: 
 
      worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, 
      solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.132. 
 
 
There is a longstanding theological and philosophical tradition that holds to the futility 
and vanity of human existence.  Christian theology has reflected upon the insight of Job 
in the Hebrew Scriptures who concluded that: 
 
      Man, who is born of woman, is of few days and full of trouble.  He comes forth 
      Like a flower and fades away; he flees like a shadow and does not continue.133. 
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Such reflection has resulted in the belief that human life is fundamentally a negative 
experience.  The cause is believed to be the wrath of God provoked by human sin and no-
one is exempt from experiencing this because, in the words of St. Paul: 
 
      All have sinned and have fallen short of the glory of God134. 
 
 
Christian theology teaches that whilst God is essentially good and gives good gifts to all 
people the basic condition of humanity is one of misery.  It is from this that  
Humanity needs to be delivered and deliverance can only be found in God Himself and 
His redemptive purposes in the person of His Son Jesus Christ.  Men and women are 
unable to deliver themselves both because of their sinful nature and because of an 
unwillingness to recognise this nature with its inherent hostility towards God.  God has to 
take the initiative in delivering people from their misery and seeks to reconcile humanity 
to Himself by offering a place in Heaven.  Reconciliation takes place when an individual 
embraces the promises of God and as a result experiences divine grace135. 
 
Christianity’s answer to human misery lies in a relationship with God through Jesus 
Christ.  This relationship begins in human experience and finds fulfilment in eternity.  
The relationship does not guarantee exemption from the ordinary misery of life but seeks 
to utilise unhappiness to achieve a fuller and deeper knowledge and experience of God.  
It is in through these means that a Christian believer can live with the harsh realities of 
life. 
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Philosophy has also been engaged with the problem of human misery.  Philosophers have 
reflected on such experiences as ill-health136, natural disasters137, war138, misery139, and 
the daily disappointments of life140.  A history of this engagement can be found in 
Amato141. 
 
A modern philosopher who sought to engage with the subject of human misery is 
Schopenhauer142.  He maintained that human life is characterised by vanity which is 
found both in the way that the world itself is constructed and in the nature of men and 
women themselves.  In terms of human nature Schopenhauer argued that we are so 
constituted that: 
 
      we do not feel the health of our whole body, but only the small spot where the 
      shoe pinches, so we do not think of all our affairs that are going on perfectly well 
      but only of some insignificant trifle that annoys us143. 
 
 
His contention is that the only experiences that seem to register in human consciousness 
are negative ones such as the awareness of pain or distress.  This results in negativity 
being the only experiences we feel.  Happiness and pleasure are to be thought of as 
absence rather than presence. Schopenhauer states that happiness is:  
 
      the elimination of a desire and the ending of a pain144. 
 
 
Happiness consists of cessation which soon gives rise to the experience of boredom and 
frustration.  It is nothing more than a void which leaves the individual wondering what to 
do next.  No one is able to stay long in this condition and soon new desires being to take 
shape and new goals are formed and so a person begins to experience again all the 
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anguish of unfulfilled desire.  Effort is then expended in order to satisfy these new desires 
and to achieve the new goals.  To add to the experience of human misery Schopenhauer 
factors in the consciousness that each person has about the passage of time and the 
inevitable experience of death.  Self-awareness is the hallmark of the human condition 
yet this proves to be the very grounds for the experience of misery: 
 
      the enhanced power of knowledge renders the life of a man more woe- 
      begone than that of an animal145. 
 
 
For him to be human is to be aware of one’s own life in the light of the imminent and 
inevitable approach of death.  Such knowledge reduces the living of life to that of: 
 
      a task to be worked off…the world is just hell and in it human beings are 
      the tortured souls on the one hand, and the devil on the other146. 
 
 
The awareness of death is the greatest reason for the experience of vanity but not the only 
one.  Men and women are also tortured by the awareness that the future could hold things 
that could prove far worse than anything yet experienced.  Present happiness (or the 
cessation of pain) can be lost as it submerges into a generalised fear of the future.  Fear of 
the future causes men and women to re-orientate themselves to the present moment and 
to maximise the benefits of the now.  One way of doing this is by elevating basic human 
needs to a higher order of significance.  For instance the need for food becomes a desire 
to find pleasure in the eating of a meal either on an aesthetic or a social level.  For this to 
be achieved a great deal of effort now needs to be expended and this too can lead to 
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anxiety and the experience of disappointment.  The attempt to be orientated to the present 
proves to be a further occasion for the experience of misery. 
 
In the philosophy of Schopenhauer the fact of misery or vanity does not prevent men and 
women from searching for meaning and purpose in life nor from seeking happiness.  
Inactivity is impossible so people are thrust forward into an endless searching which will 
always fail to be satisfied.  Humanity is condemned to be future orientated, constantly 
pursuing gaols and dreams. Thoughts about the future dominate to such an extent that the 
present cannot be appreciated on its own terms.  Every one is pulled from the present 
time into the future with the result that all live with anxiety and restlessness. 
 
Schopenhauer’s conclusion is that true happiness is impossible.  Happiness is nothing 
more than an illusion.  If a person claims to be happy then she/he is merely indulging in a 
form of self deception: 
 
      No one is happy, but everyone throughout his life strives only for an alleged 
       happiness that is rarely attained, and even then only to disappoint him.147 
 
 
That human existence is like this ought to come as no surprise, according to 
Schopenhauer.  He sees it as proof that ‘human existence is some kind of error”.148 
 
Other thinkers argue that such views are unnecessarily pessimistic and point out that 
happiness is not always as transitory and as elusive as Schopenhauer argues.  Some 
people do seem to experience happiness in a profound way and to enjoy it in the present 
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moment free from any worries about the future. Similarly there are those for whom the 
achievement of a personal ambition brings lasting satisfaction and does not appear to lead 
to boredom and frustration.  Such people even seem to be able to revisit the achievement 
of an ambition and to recapture at least a vestige of the original pleasure. 
 
Nevertheless, it appears that, from the point of view of ordinary human experience, 
unhappiness seems to be that which is both known more extensively and for longer 
periods of time then happiness.  Unhappiness is talked about more often than happiness 
and there seems to be a greater willingness to hear stories about sorrow than of joy.  This 
is often reflected at a popular level in radio phone-insxxiv.  Perhaps we are curious about 
how people overcome sorrow and difficulties.  Sorrow provides an occasion for virtues 
such as courage and determination to be demonstrated.  A tale of how a person 
overcomes suffering commands greater interest than one of someone who has 
experienced unalloyed joy and pleasure.  The universal resonance of suffering, and the 
challenge of behaving virtuously, may account for the willingness to hear stories about 
suffering. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter it is important to distinguish the type of misery that 
seems to be part of ordinary human experience from that which can be thought of as 
unusual and of potential value to the sufferer. This distinction enables us to determine 
                                                 
 
xxiv A recent example of this is the audio diaries of Nick Clarke, the former radio presenter at the BBC.  
Having been diagnosed with a rare form of cancer that necessitated the surgical removal of his left leg 
Clarke kept an audio diary recording his ordeal that would be broadcast on the radio when treatment had 
been completedxxiv.   He records the reactions of his sons to the amputation of his leg and also documented 
his slow recovery.  He was eventually able to return to work before a relapse of his condition that 
eventually led to his death 
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that which ought to be alleviated, because no good can come out of it, from that which, 
perhaps, ought to be left alone because of the value it produces. The latter will be denoted 
as suffering and I will argue that because of its potential value there is not necessarily a 
duty to alleviate it.   
 
First, the concept of suffering needs further clarification.   Weil149 distinguishes between 
suffering and what she calls ‘mere’150 pain and she argues that for an experience to be 
considered an example of suffering it needs to contain the following three elements: 
physical, psychological and social factors.  Any negative experience that affects a person 
in only one or two of these areas cannot be considered to be suffering because it is 
relatively easy to overcome, to forget and fails to leave lasting scars upon a human 
psyche. For Weil it is scarring that forms the essential element in an experience of 
suffering.  Tooth ache, for instance, is an experience that ought not to be thought of as 
suffering because when it is over it is as if it never happened. 
 
Similarly she argues that a purely mental experience such as a cognitive interpretation of 
an event ought not to be thought of as suffering because the mind has developed ways of 
escaping from and dealing with any trauma it may have known.  An example of this is the 
mind’s ability to re-write or to re-interpret past experiences: the psychological defence 
mechanism. 
 
Weil lays particular importance upon the third element in her classification of suffering; 
the social: 
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      There is not really affliction unless there is social degradation or the fear of 
      it in some form or another151. 
 
 
Affliction is a term that she uses along with suffering and social degradation with 
reference to the response of others to the sufferer.  By social degradation Weil is referring 
to the way that a non-sufferer seeks to put distance between him/herself and a sufferer.  
This in turn exacerbates suffering.  She argues that this is a mechanism that permits the 
non-sufferer space and distance to pursue his/her gaols rather than becoming 
overwhelmed by the experiences of the sufferer.  This distance denies the sufferer 
comfort and support. 
 
Freud152 constructs a similar three-fold definition of suffering.  Suffering threatens the 
individual from three sides: 
 
      from our own body which cannot dispense with pain and anxiety, from the 
      external world and finally from our relations with others.153. 
 
 
He maintains that because life is hard for everyone to bear humanity has developed a 
system of palliatives in order to survive.  These consist of three distinct strategies: 
powerful distractions such as scholarly activity (which helps to make light of suffering), 
substitutive satisfactions (which act to minimise suffering) and intoxicants (that act to 
anaesthetize it). 
 
Weil uses the term ‘affliction’ as a synonym for suffering but this terminology will not be 
adopted in this thesis as the term ‘affliction’ is now understood to refer to chronic 
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physical impairment or disability.  Downs Syndrome or Cleft Palate, for instance, are 
regarded as ‘afflictions’. These conditions certainly impact upon an individual’s life and 
may be one of its outstanding features but they may or may not cause suffering. 
 
Suffering, on the other hand, is regarded as a deviation from normal experience. It is 
associated with the absence of justice, fairness and equality.  Where suffering occurs the 
hope is that it will be short lived either as a result of a change in circumstances or because 
help has been offered and received.  In contrast to affliction suffering is thought to impact 
upon the whole of the person and it is usually obvious to even the casual observer. 
 
A distinction can also be drawn between suffering and unhappiness: unhappiness is not as 
multidimensional as suffering.  For example, I might be unhappy that a shop sells out of 
the brand of jeans that I want, but my disappointment can hardly be described as 
suffering. 
 
So far suffering has been defined as an experience that impacts on a person in three ways 
simultaneously; physically, psychologically and socially.  This definition stresses the 
objective nature of suffering.  It is also important to examine the subjective experience of 
suffering to achieve an overall definition.  One place to begin an examination of the 
subjective nature of suffering is Epicurus154 and the importance he attached to the need to 
fulfil natural and necessary human desires. 
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Epicurus constructed a threefold classification of human desires: those that are both 
natural and necessary for the attainment of pleasure; those that are natural but not 
necessary for it; and, those that are both unnatural and unnecessary.155  Natural and 
necessary desires are those that are common to all people because of their shared 
humanity.  Examples include the desire to be loved, to be valued within a particular social 
context and to set personal goals that are both worthwhile to the individual and 
achievable. 
 
For Epicurus, that which is natural is common and morally valuable.  To fulfil them is to 
advance both the welfare of the individual her/himself and of humanity itself. 
 
The presumption of commonality assumes a human nature either in terms of essence-
being born with a nature that is inherent and which then reveals itself in development- or 
as a matter of existence.  In the latter human nature is not a given but is acquired: 
character and personality is developed and then regarded as a person’s nature.  
Commonality here would mean that all moral people would freely choose to acquire 
certain desires because they are universally regarded as right and good.  This distinction 
between essence and existence will be further examined in Chapter Four and the 
discussion of Authenticity.   
 
Epicurean necessity refers to basic human needs such as that for food, shelter, sleep, 
safety and community.  The fulfilment of needs is a basic requirement for human 
happiness.  Epicurus differentiates between desires that are necessary for life and those 
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that are necessary for pleasure.  The latter are a higher order type desire such as the desire 
to pursue knowledge, wisdom or the virtues of self reliance and fortitude over and against 
reliance upon the gods or good fortune.  We will return to the distinction between higher 
and lower pleasures later in this chapter.  Once these needs are fulfilled we are in a 
position to attain pleasure that is not dependent upon circumstances and is therefore not 
easily lost.  The Epicurean term ‘tranquillity’ describes the person who has fulfilled the 
natural and necessary desires for pleasure.  Based on the Greek ‘ataraxia’ Ferguson states 
that tranquillity is: 
 
      freedom from being shaken.156 
 
 
An example of a desire that is natural but not necessary for pleasure, or what could be 
styled as true happiness, is the desire for wealth, success or for immortality through fame 
with fame itself as the end goal.  Such desires are natural to the extent that they are 
common in human experience but are not necessary both because happiness can be 
achieved without them and because when they are fulfilled happiness is not guaranteed. 
 
Unnatural and unnecessary desires are those that are orientated to the achievement of 
immoral ends for the benefit of the individual or others or to the disbenefit of self or 
others.  These desires are unnatural to the extent that they seem to be particular to the 
individual and not shared by the rest of humanity. 
 
Suffering occurs when a natural and necessary desire is frustrated in some way and so it 
becomes difficult to achieve happiness.  Frustration can be sourced to factors within the 
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individual, outside of her/him or both.  This frustration results in the experience of the 
opposite of ataraxia. 
 
Mayerfeld157 discusses the nature of suffering and its relation to the satisfaction and 
frustration of personal desire.  He considers the claim that happiness depends upon the 
satisfaction of desires whatever their nature.  He points out that happiness ultimately 
depends upon the cognitive awareness of satisfaction, the subjective experience of 
satisfaction rather than the nature of the desire itself.  It is possible either to focus 
attention upon the desire, and to discuss which desires ought to be fulfilled and why, or to 
focus attention upon the fulfilment of desires. Mayerfeld’s claim is that happiness is a 
matter of the latter rather than of the former.   
 
It is possible for a morally acceptable desire to be fulfilled but for this not to lead to an 
experience of happiness, however, because the person disvalues the fulfilment for other 
reasons.  For example a PhD student may successfully complete her studies but fail to 
achieve happiness because her marriage fails because of the strain imposed upon it by the 
demands of study.  For a fulfilled desire to lead to happiness it must be experienced 
subjectively.  This subjective experience must be in relation to a desire that has remained 
current.  Mayerfeld writes: 
 
      happiness is correlated with the experienced satisfaction of an existing 
      desire.158 
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If this is what Epicurus and Mayerfeld mean by happiness then unhappiness must be 
understood to be its antithesis: the conscious experience of the failure to satisfy an 
existing desire, one that is both natural and necessary.  This failure is one of the 
components of suffering. 
 
An example of the frustration of a natural and necessary desire is that of a man who has 
formulated his first order preferences according to his understanding of the ideals of the 
Christian religion.  This is not to say that religious belief is a natural and necessary desire 
but the desire to build one’s life according to ideals and then to live in accord with them 
is.  For him, then, such ideals include the belief in the Scriptures as the inspired Word of 
God and as authoritative in all matters of belief and practice.  He also experiences 
homosexual desires which continually seem to frustrate his attempts to live in a way that 
he would wish.  He experiences a conflict between his ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ natures and if 
the lower desires are more keenly felt and are subsequently satisfied, he may feel unable 
to live up to the standards he has adopted for himself.  The result of this is that he suffers. 
 
Of course it is possible for this example to work the other way around.  A man who 
regards his homosexual orientation as an acceptable aspect of his personality and who 
regards heterosexuality as a patriarchal social construction may yet be unable to live a 
fulfilling and ‘out’ life because of acquired guilt.  His traditional religious upbringing 
with its teaching regarding the wrongness of homosexuality may dominate his character 
and even though he wishes to live as a gay man, he may be unable to deal with this guilt: 
these competing ideals prove to be irreconcilable.  Both are held with equal sincerity and 
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neither can be given up without a feeling of compromise or insincerity.  Suffering here 
results from holding competing and mutually exclusive ideals. 
 
Ideals seem to form part of what constitutes a necessary and natural desire and are tied to 
notions of common morality.  This consideration is important because it is possible to 
have ideals that are contrary to traditional standards of morality.  For example a white 
supremacist may have as an ideal a natural world order that consists of nations made up 
of pure races.  His happiness may depend upon the fulfilment of his desires to achieve 
such an order.  Both the ideal itself and the world that would come into being if the ideal 
became a reality, however, would be one that is morally undesirable because it would 
compromise equality.   
 
This discussion of the subjective nature of suffering has focused upon the awareness of 
frustrated desire.  This frustration can lead to a person experiencing the cessation of all 
desire.  This consists of a lack of concern to form first order preferences which leads to 
numbness.  This suffering is not the subjectively experienced frustration of personal 
desire but is rather the absence of any natural and necessary desire.  This absence is a 
long term consequence of continual and profound frustration of desire.   
 
So far in this discussion suffering has been distinguished from the ordinary experience of 
human misery and constructed in terms of the frustration of deeply held and 
autonomously chosen desires and preferences.  This frustration has the impact noted 
earlier.  Further considerations need to be added for the definition to be complete. 
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Portman159 argues that: 
 
      suffering is not only the absence of pleasure but…(is) also a disruption of  
      personal identity160. 
 
 
He uses the term ‘personal identity’ to mean the beliefs that people have about 
themselves, their self worth, their place in the world and the principles by which they 
live.  Suffering occurs whenever these beliefs are found to be inadequate or insufficient 
and are then subject to re-evaluation.  Bodily pain does not normally cause such re-
evaluation but experiences of shame, failure or rejection can.  This may result in a person 
abandoning a set of beliefs and the estimation of self that was based upon them in favour 
of a new set that may or may not lead to happiness.  The need to establish a new set of 
beliefs is a further occasion for suffering.   
 
This re-evaluation process is not necessarily a bad thing particularly if the first evaluation 
was either unrealistically optimistic or pessimistic.  What is of importance in Portman’s 
remark is not the rightness or wrongness of the beliefs upon which personal identity is 
based but the suffering that is experienced when those beliefs are found to be inadequate 
and in the need to create a new set of beliefs with the consequent reordering of personal 
identity. 
 
Portman sites Scarry who makes an observation similar to his own: 
 
      the annihilating power of pain to utterly nullify the claims of the world.161 
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Scarry makes her comments on the context of physical pain but the devastation that 
results is equally true in the context of personal identity.  This quote from her is included 
because ‘pain’ in her terms is the same as suffering in ours. 
 
Cassell162 in defining suffering, draws attention to its impact on the person: 
 
      Suffering occurs when an impending destruction of the person is perceived; 
      it continues until the threat of disintegration has passed or until the integrity 
      of the person can be restored in some way..it extends beyond the physical… 
      (it is) the state of severe distress associated with events that threaten the 
      intactness of person163. 
 
 
 
He sees suffering as something that impacts upon the whole of a person.  It cannot be 
confined to a person’s physical pain, but suffering may include physical pain if it is of 
sufficient intensity and duration.  He carefully defines what he considers a ‘person’ and 
lays stress on social context; subjectivity, in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears and 
aspirations; the past, present and future of the individual and the inter-relationship 
between the mind and the body. 
 
Cassell also emphasises the subjective nature of suffering and engages with the question 
of medicine’s interest in suffering.  He argues that medicine regards itself as an objective 
science.  Medicine demonstrates this by the way that it aligns itself with the natural 
sciences that seek to operate according to physical laws.  As an objective science 
medicine can legitimately concern itself with the functioning of the body, as the body is 
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an objective phenomenon.  The problem arises when medicine seeks to concern itself 
with an issue that is basically subjective.  Suffering is such an issue.   
 
Cassell argues that suffering has a problematic place within medicine.  It seems obvious 
that medicine should concern itself with people’s suffering as one of its stated goals is to 
promote well-being.  Yet, at the same time, suffering cannot be verified objectively with 
the result that medicine has to set aside its objective methodologies in order to engage 
with it.  Cassell concludes that medicine does concern itself with suffering but that it has 
difficulty accommodating it as suffering is a subjective experience. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis Cassell’s theory of suffering (that it threatens the integrity 
of the self, that it is both intense and of significant duration), helps to build the definition 
of suffering that I am seeking to establish. 
 
Two further considerations need to be added before the definition of suffering is 
complete. 
 
First, is the importance of both longevity and intensity.  For an experience to be 
considered one of suffering it needs to be experienced either for more than a fleeting 
moment or it needs to have a certain degree of intensity.  The latter is a variable criteria 
but the experience needs to register on the scale of intensity.  Mayerfeld discusses various 
measures by which the intensity of suffering can be measured.  He argues that methods of 
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measurement need to include more than the expressions of suffering made by the sufferer 
as this may not always be an accurate reflection of what is going on.  He says that: 
 
      the intensity of suffering may be rather less than what the alleged victim 
      represents to himself…claims to having suffered may not always be 
      authentic.164 
 
 
Mayerfeld’s method of measuring suffering include the Ordinal and Cardinal Measures of 
intensity which rate the experience on a scale of 1-10.  Ordinal refers to the points 1-10 
whilst Cardinal measures differences between those points.  Cardinal measures have four 
levels of intensity: 
 
1) The Intuitive measure which seeks to measure suffering in accordance with the 
expressed hurt of the sufferer. 
2) The Preferential measure which establishes a ranking system of personal 
preferences of happiness and suffering 
3) A Global Evaluation measure to assess the overall nature of a person’s experience 
4) A Local Evaluation measure which is similar to the above but focuses attention on 
one particular experience of suffering. 
 
These measures are useful to the extent that they focus attention on the need to recognise 
intensity as a valid criterion in the recognition of suffering.  It is not, however, 
straightforward to determine how a subjective experience of suffering can be measured in 
objective terms.  It may be the case that because it is difficult to measure subjectivity the 
 104 
 
reports of intensity by the sufferer should be accepted at face value, all things being 
equal. 
 
Second, a definition of suffering needs to take cognizance of notions of innocence and 
desert.  Innocence suggests that a person has not wilfully and deliberately brought 
suffering upon her/himself by acting in an immoral or irresponsible manner. Desert 
suggests the opposite.  A common moral intuition would be suffering resulting from 
acting irresponsibly does not deserve sympathy.  Sympathy is linked to desert.  
Undeserved suffering evokes the sympathy of others, and the sufferer regards the absence 
of desert as an entitlement to sympathy.  There is therefore suffering that invites a 
sympathetic response and that which does not.  
An example of deserved suffering is a justly imposed punishment. Such punishment 
fulfils the criteria of Epicurus, Weil, Portman and Mayerfeld in that it is distressing.  
Deprivation and incarceration will cause distress, which may even threaten a prisoner’s 
well being, but it would not ordinarily be regarded as suffering that merits sympathy. 
 
On the other hand, it is possible to feel sympathy for a prisoner without simultaneously 
seeking to repeal the sentence and put an end to his/her suffering.  This demonstrates that 
suffering can be acknowledged without this acknowledgement prompting a duty to 
alleviate it. 
 
The relationship between happiness and suffering is constructed as a polarisation with 
people being categorised as either happy or sad.  This dualism does not seem to allow for 
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the possibility that someone can be both happy and sad/suffering at the same time.  Yet 
we do experience things that bring both happiness and suffering simultaneously with the 
result that our overall condition is not one or the other but both.  It is, perhaps, 
unnecessary for anyone to reach a global conclusion about his/her overall state.  For 
example the father whose wife or partner dies whilst giving birth knows the happiness, 
not pleasure in this case, of the birth of a child whilst at the same time knowing the 
sadness of losing a partner and fellow parent.  The latter is likely to amount to an 
experience of suffering even though the happiness is real.  The birth of a child is an 
occasion for happiness rather than pleasure because pleasure is understood to be ‘in’ 
something which may or may not last.  The ‘in’ nature of pleasure usually consists of 
events or happenings that are of importance to an individual who takes pleasure in their 
fruition.  It is therefore inappropriate to talk about the pleasure that the birth of a child 
brings and it may be more appropriate to talk about happiness. 
 
Another example of how happiness and sadness can be experienced simultaneously is 
found in the case of parents of conjoined twins who realize that one twin is to be 
sacrificed for the sake of the other.  There is sadness at the loss of one twin and happiness 
at the continued and improved survival prospects of the other, and perhaps even that the 
loss of both has been averted. 
 
Accordingly, it is possible to be suffering in the sense developed in this chapter whilst 
also having reasons to be happy.  It is not necessary for a polarised or a one dimensional 
perspective to be taken.  If an overall judgement is considered desirable then the decisive 
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issue may be the way in which the individual comes to think about him/herself.  One 
person may think of himself as a sufferer whilst another may think of herself as 
fundamentally happy, even when there are comparable measures of both in the two lives.  
The difference may lie in the way that the individual thinks of him/herself.  The woman 
considers herself to be happy because she places value upon her experience of happiness 
and not upon sadness.  Happiness is given a greater meaning or significance by her and is 
held to be more characteristic and representative of the nature and quality of her life.  
This mindset enables her to think of herself as essentially happy even though to an 
observer it seems as if her life consists more of sadness than of happiness.  Similarly, the 
man understands himself to be a sufferer because he gives more significance, and pays 
greater attention, to his suffering that he does to the occasions in his life for happiness.  
To the woman he may seem to have every reason to be happy yet he maintains that he is 
not and this insistence may be a cause of both puzzlement and incomprehension to the 
observer. 
 
Two things are clear in this discussion about the relationship between happiness and 
sadness/suffering.  First, both can be present in the current experience of an individual 
and it is not necessary for an overall judgement to be made about which one is truer.  
Second, the subjective judgement of the person is necessary for a qualifying decision to 
be reached.  Ultimately a person can be thought of as a suffering iff this is what they 
claim for themselves and it is the strength of this claim and its relation to the three 
elements mentioned earlier that is of importance; physical, psychological and social. 
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Accordingly, regarding oneself as a sufferer may be a matter of personal choice. One 
chooses to think of oneself as a sufferer and this choice may or may not be a conscious 
one. It may be a response to what seems to be the overwhelming nature of the experience 
of suffering and once established this view remains in one’s psyche and becomes a 
perspective from which one’s whole life is then interpreted.  This view may persist after 
the occasion for suffering is past and happier experiences predominate.   
 
For example, consider a daughter who has suffered years of physical abuse at the hands 
of her father.  Her distress as a child was real, objectively verifiable and fulfils all the 
criteria of suffering.  As an adult she continues to define herself by her childhood 
experiences. Regardless of all the good things that fill her adult life, she continues to 
think of herself as a sufferer.  This may be because she wants her childhood experiences 
to be acknowledged by those around her and fears that these may be forgotten if she 
allows herself to embrace the good things that are happening in the present.  This 
acknowledgement is only possible if she keeps the memory of her early years alive by, so 
she believes, often thinking about her past and talking about it with others.  She may 
believe that if she were to forget and to allow others to forget then she would in some 
way be doing a disservice to her past self and all that this past self endured. The trauma of 
her past self becomes more significant than her potentially happier present self. 
 
This analysis suggests that suffering is not only a matter of what is claimed in relation to 
others but also a matter of self-definition.  Being a sufferer depends on the way that 
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person understands themselves.  Both the claim and the self definition are matters of 
choice.  Choice reflects the importance a person gives to suffering: 
 
      It is our attitudes towards events, not events themselves, which we can control.   
      nothing is by its own nature calamitous…even death is terrible only if we fear  
      it.165 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Therefore an experience can be considered to be suffering if it is a negative personal 
experience that: impacts upon an individual physically, psychologically and socially; 
causes significant frustration of personal goals and natural and necessary desires so that 
self integrity is threatened; that it is undeserved and would normally evoke a sympathetic 
response from others; is both intense and prolonged and if the person considers it to be a 
matter of suffering both in terms of claim making and self definition.  When these criteria 
are fulfilled then suffering can be said to be experienced.  For the purposes of this chapter 
it is this definition that will be used from here on in and to make this clear it will be 
referred to as suffering.  It is this understanding of suffering that will be used in the 
discussion about the duty to alleviate it, the possible value of such an experience and 
about TS. 
 
2. The Duty to Alleviate Suffering 
 
Mayerfeld distinguishes between suffering that is psychological in its nature and that 
which is objective.  The former is subjectively experienced whilst the latter consists in 
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events such as famines, wars and other calamities.  He argues that a prima facie duty 
exists to alleviate the former type of suffering- because it is avoidable-whilst it would be 
desirable to alleviate the latter but this may or may not be achievable due to the nature of 
the world. 
 
The duty to alleviate suffering is not primarily grounded on the need to eliminate the 
effects of it but in the fact that it exists at all.  Mayerfeld claims that it is so inherently 
catastrophic that the only possible moral response is to seek to alleviate it.  Suffering calls 
out for ‘moral condemnation’.166  What matters to him is not how an individual sufferer 
feels about the experience but the fact that the experience exists at all.  It is objectively 
undesirable even though the experience itself is a subjective one.  As an example he 
discusses a person who has lost the ability to care whether or not she is unhappy due to 
the fact that she has been unhappy for so long.  She may not be able to express a 
preference if asked about whether or not she wishes her suffering to come to an end.  
Nonetheless a duty exists to relieve her even though she is not in a position to ask for 
help.  Similarly whole populations have suffered under tyrannical regimes and are unable 
to hope for anything better.  They may be unable to conceive of any other way of existing 
as a society.  The same duty to help exists.  Mayerfeld argues: 
 
      As suffering increases in intensity the degree to which it is worth avoiding  
      outpaces the degree to which it feels bad.167 
 
For Mayerfeld the most intense form of suffering can be that which is not felt at all.  It 
fails to register in the realm of feeling because of its familiarity.  He links intensity of 
suffering with urgency and argues that the greater the intensity the more urgent is the 
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need to act on the absolute duty to help.  Help is to be given even where and when it may 
not be sought.  Failure to intervene is failure to act morally and he lays the initiative with 
the helper. 
 
One danger with Mayerfeld’s construction of the duty to alleviate suffering is that it runs 
the risk of being both paternalistic and possibly tyrannical.  It seems paternalistic to argue 
that one person is in a better position to judge what is and is not good for someone else.  
It also seems potentially tyrannical to intervene in a person’s life when they have not 
requested help on the grounds that it is for that person’s good.  Intervention may involve 
force, the deprivation of rights or liberties and be contrary to the wishes of the sufferer.  
In a society that both values and has respect for autonomy people should be free from 
interference unless the interference is invited.  Uninvited interference is justified only 
when there is doubt about capacity. 
 
Mayerfeld moves his argument forward to claim that suffering makes the world a worse 
place to live and that it ‘cries out’ for its own abolition.  This cry is instinctively heard by 
everyone and is not directly related to the merits or otherwise of the one who is suffering.  
He says that suffering has objective disvalue and that an ‘agent neutral’ consideration 
exists to eliminate it.  Even in a materialistic world that fails to acknowledge meaning it 
is still possible for everyone to agree that suffering is of no value and that the moral 
condition of the sufferer are irrelevant. 
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He couples his arguments about the duty to alleviate suffering to the fact that human 
beings are naturally attracted to the idea of happiness.  He claims that happiness is 
essentially a matter of feeling and that to feel happy is what everyone would naturally 
choose.   
 
In relation to happiness Mayerfeld argues that every human being is capable of evaluating 
her/his feelings and that this can be done without reference to any other consideration or 
circumstance.  The person concerned is best placed to know whether or not she/he is 
happy.  Mayerfeld sets great store upon this capacity to feel which he describes as: 
 
      an introspectively discernable feature of consciousness…which is found  
      desirable.168 
 
 
It is difficult to know what he means by the term ‘desirable’.  He may be saying that it is 
a good thing that human beings are able to feel and to register this fact within 
consciousness.  Alternatively, he may mean that some feelings are pleasurable and when 
they are it is a good thing.  It seems clear that he links feelings to both cognitive and 
volitional functioning.  Feelings are known in the conscious realm, and perhaps evoked 
by cognitive activity, which then cause a person to set both personal goals and the means 
to achieve them. Such goals can be the result of an introspective reflection upon feelings 
and serve as a means of either achieving again or maintaining the experience of 
happiness. 
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So far, then, the duty to alleviate suffering has been constructed both as the moral duty to 
remove from the world something that is undesirable in and of itself and because it 
militates against the natural human orientation towards an introspective awareness of 
happiness.   
 
Happiness is not the only thing that can be known as a result of introspection.  Suffering 
is also known introspectively and has a place in the realm of feeling.  As we have seen 
this capacity to feel suffering can be lost and when this is the case Mayerfeld argues that 
some form of objective measurement like those referred to in the first section of this 
chapter are required.  His method of measurement seeks to distinguish suffering from 
other forms of negativity and to correlate it with the desire to be happy.  Also, Mayerfeld 
would acknowledge that some people may be suffering without realising it.  They may 
even describe themselves as happy, though this would be an error in Mayerfeld’s view. 
An objective perspective is therefore necessary. 
 
The natural human orientation towards happiness is the foundational principle of the 
moral theory known as Utilitarianism.  This theory as formulated by Mill169 provides 
Mayerfeld with further support for his claim regarding the duty to alleviate suffering. 
 
Mill developed his Utilitarian theory in the mid-nineteenth century by building on the 
work of Bentham170.  Mill’s concern was to establish a scientific basis for morality and to 
do this he believed he needed to put forward one central and guiding principle which 
could be empirically provable.  For him this principle was the universal human concern 
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with happiness and so he made this his theoretical basis and called it the Greatest 
Happiness Principle (GHP).  Mill argues that: 
 
      Actions are right as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to  
      promote the opposite of happiness.171 
 
 
Mill’s claim is that happiness can either be thought of as a positive experience of pleasure 
or in terms of the absence of pain.  Unhappiness is either a positive or actual experience 
of pain or a deliberate and wilful privation of pleasure.  Pleasure is the only thing that is 
desired as an end in itself whilst all other things in life are desired as means to this end.  
Pleasure has to be understood as that which is appropriate to-in Mill’s terminology 
‘harmonious with’- human nature and is thereby the fulfilment of human ontological 
potential or ‘the gratification of human faculties’. 
 
He developed his argument to include the notion of higher and lower pleasures.  The 
former has greater intrinsic worth than the latter and is therefore both more valuable and 
more desirable.  A higher pleasure is more difficult to achieve but this difficulty is not 
only linked to the value of the pleasure itself but is considered to be an appropriate price 
that needs to be paid in order for the pleasure to be experienced.  A lower pleasure is 
more attainable and so is less desirable and less valuable.  Less effort is required in order 
to experience it and is thought not to be sourced in the highest human ideals and 
aspirations but in the commoner human concerns.  A higher pleasure is linked to the 
aspiration of truth, beauty, nobility and goodness whilst a lower pleasure is concerned 
with that which is physical, sensual, base or temporal.  In considerations of utility 
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preference is to be given to the higher pleasures even though the attainment of them is 
filled with difficulty.  Mill states: 
 
      if one of the two (pleasures) is…placed so far above the other that they prefer 
      it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, 
      we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment superiority in quality.172 
 
Again he writes: 
 
      A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably 
      of more acute suffering and is certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of 
      inferior type.173 
 
 
Mill here introduces the idea that difficulty and hardship (what he calls suffering) is 
inherent in the attainment of pleasure.  It becomes impossible to achieve the one without 
knowing the other.  In fact it seems as if the one becomes the means for achieving the 
other. The goals that a person sets for her/himself and which reflect the highest 
aspirations are to be pursued either in spite of the difficulties or as a result of embracing 
them in the knowledge that this is what is necessary in order to experience the higher 
pleasures.  A ‘superior’ type person will always value the higher pleasures and will 
recognise that, to paraphrase Bentham, ‘poetry is to be promoted over pushpin’.  An 
‘inferior’ type of person will either pursue the lower pleasures due to a lack of awareness 
of the higher pleasures or because he or she prefers not to pay the costs that are necessary 
in order for them to be experienced.  Such an individual may express a preference for the 
lower pleasures but Mill would argue that he or she is mistaken to do so and if only 
he/she could know a higher pleasure then the difference between the two would become 
clear.  Mill maintained that the fact that the lower pleasures are more commonly 
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experienced and more frequently favoured by so many does not invalidate his opinion 
about the superior nature of the higher pleasures. 
 
Whilst recognising that the best expression of human nature is found in the choosing of 
the higher pleasures Mill also recognised that people may choose the lower pleasures 
either for reasons within themselves or because of the character and moral climate of a 
particular culture.  It is possible for a society to be so organised that the lower pleasures 
are promoted as the most desirable and instead of aspiring to greater heights it favours the 
lowest common denominator.  This may occur in a society where ideas of human 
improvement are disvalued and the higher pleasures are considered to be elitist.  Mill 
would argue that every good society ought to promote not only the idea of happiness but 
specifically the valuing and attaining of the higher pleasures. 
 
He argued that the GHP is primarily concerned with: 
 
      not the agents own happiness but the greatest amount of happiness 
      altogether.174 
 
 
It is the total sum of happiness in the world that is of ultimate importance.  Mill’s position 
is that there is a duty to seek to put the interests of others before narrower personal 
concerns.  Humanity has chosen to organise itself into social groupings and for this to be 
successful each member of that community must seek to promote its general well-being 
whilst at the same time acknowledging that there is utility to be found in pursuing 
individual happiness.  He writes: 
 
      Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests 
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      of all are to be consulted…the good of others becomes a thing naturally and 
      necessarily attended to, like any of the physical conditions of our existence.175 
 
 
Mill developed his argument in the context of his principle of utility.  Not only is it 
grounded in individual human nature but in terms of the social nature also.  Therefore the 
duty to alleviate suffering has a broader reference.  It becomes not only a matter of 
relieving the suffering of one particular person at any given time but is also a matter of 
thinking abstractly about the nature of society.  Society itself is a better place if the 
quantity of happiness exceeds the quantity of unhappiness.  There needs to be a surplus of 
the right kind of happiness over unhappiness for the right conditions to be established for 
human beings to flourish. 
 
Mill next established reasons why any one individual ought to put the general happiness 
before his/her own.  He gives two reasons to this general duty.  The first is an objective 
rule which is binding for all and is to be constructed according to the belief systems of a 
particular community.  A community that believes in God might formulate the idea that it 
is the will of God that the needs of the whole group should take priority over those of the 
individual.  An atheistic society might formulate the maxim in terms of the laws of the 
state which can be enforced by the power of that state.  The second has reference to the 
subjective moral feeling, known as conscience.  The conscience consists of an innate 
feeling of concern for the well being of others, as well as for the rightness of individual 
behaviour, and it appears to operate intuitively.  This feeling of concern is the basis of 
human moral functioning and is a natural outgrowth of human nature.  Mill discusses 
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both the way that the moral nature is capable of flourishing spontaneously and how the 
need exists for it to be cultivated and developed. 
 
Mill finally stresses the need for the principle of utility to be taught to all due to this 
universal nature of the moral concern to alleviate unhappiness and to promote happiness.  
He recognises the difference between alleviating unhappiness and promoting happiness 
and argues that both can be achieved by making everyone familiar with the GHP.  He 
says: 
 
      the principle of utility should be taught as a religion and the whole force of 
      education, of institutions and of opinions ought to be directed to make every 
      person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and 
      practice of it176. 
 
 
Mayerfeld draws on these theories to justify the duty to alleviate suffering.  He 
incorporates beliefs concerning human nature and the natural orientation to happiness to 
add strength to this duty.  The need to alleviate suffering is not just to do with the 
experience of it but is also a matter of what is in the best interests of human beings.  The 
idea of best interests gives priority to the interests of society as a whole over those of the 
individual. 
 
The contribution of Mill to the duty to alleviate suffering can be constructed as a duty in 
relation to what is considered best in human nature.  Higher pleasures are a formulation 
of the human ideal and attaining the higher pleasures offers the best opportunity for the 
fulfilment of the highest human good.  Unhappiness is therefore the lowest level of 
human experience and is to be considered as that which works against the highest human 
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good.  If unhappiness can therefore be removed men and women are more likely to 
achieve the best in human experience. 
 
One further source of this duty needs to be discussed within the context of this chapter.  
This is the subject of human sympathy.   
 
Schopenhauer177 argues that our psychological make-up provides us with a natural 
affinity for moral action and the fundamental moral motivation is sympathy or 
compassion.  All human action can be traced to the three source of egoism, malice or 
sympathy and it is the latter which is the basis for morality.  He discusses the way 
sympathy functions, the expression of which gives moral worth both to an action and to 
an individual.  On this point he differs from Kant who, whilst recognising the worth of a 
sympathetic disposition, felt that moral worth was to be found in the activity of the 
human will in accordance with the demands of reason.  Kant maintained that the ultimate 
principle for moral action was the Categorical Imperative, of which one formulation is: 
 
      I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim 
      for action should become a universal law.178 
 
 
For Kant sympathy may be lost under certain circumstances and if the duty to help is 
based on sympathy then that duty is lost too.  Kant would maintain that because the duty 
is not based on sympathy the duty can be considered as universal and, therefore, not in 
danger of being lost.  Kant illustrates this point with the example of a philanthropist 
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whose capacity for sympathy has been extinguished as a result of his own misfortune.  
Nonetheless: 
 
      he nevertheless tears himself out of his deadly insensibility and does the action 
      without any inclination, simply from duty.179 
 
 
This thesis is not the place for a discussion on which perspective on morality is correct.  
It is sufficient to note that different views exist on the nature of the duty to act morally. 
 
Schopenhauer argues that sympathy is instinctive to human beings and remains operative 
no matter what a person may experience.  Even those who are numbed to their own 
misery have the capacity to feel for the misfortune of others.  The capacity to feel is the 
result of social attachment and this in turn is linked to emotional well-being.  Portmann 
notes this discussion in his work180 and cites Schopenhauer’s contention that the way 
sympathy functions is analogous to the activity of a virus, contagion or infection.   
 
Schopenhauer states that the person who takes pleasure in the misery or misfortune of 
others will pay the price for doing so in the ‘pangs’ or ‘stings’ of his own conscience.181  
Social discourse by its very nature elicits a sympathetic response.  An unwillingness to 
participate in such a response requires an act of will and therefore renders a person 
immoral.   
 
The importance of sympathy is also discussed by Scheler182.  He agrees with the 
importance of sympathy and argues that an ethic of response to the suffering of others 
should be based on sympathy. 
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This ethic of sympathy is to be derived from the attitude of the person who witnesses the 
misery of others.  It consists of an emotional response to the experience of the sufferer 
but the unhappiness must be undeserved.  It is inappropriate to sympathize with a person 
who has acted immorally and Scheler is making an observation here that is similar to the 
one made earlier in the chapter in the discussion on the definition of suffering.  Similarly 
a fellow feeling in response to another’s pleasure can only be viewed as moral if the 
sources of that pleasure are in themselves moral.  He writes: 
 
      It is certainly not moral to sympathize with someone’s pleasure in evil…the  
      sharing of another’s pleasure can only be moral when the latter is itself moral 
      and warranted by the value situation which evokes it.183 
 
 
Scheler argues that sympathy functions as an appropriate response to both the moral 
pleasures and sufferings of others.  He places emphasis upon morality and states that both 
the occasions for pleasure and the context of sufferings has to be moral if the sympathetic 
response of others is to be legitimate.  Sympathy can be offered at individual and 
communal levels and, as with Schopenhauer, its expression has the effect of causing or 
encouraging others to do the same.  As well as noting the infectious nature of sympathy 
he notes the way it identifies with suffering on an emotional level. 
 
In conclusion the moral duty to alleviate suffering can be said to be based upon; the 
undesirable subjective/objective nature of suffering; the desirable subjective/objective 
nature of happiness, and the moral importance of sympathy.  Sympathy is concerned with 
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the relationship between the sufferer and the non-sufferer and this relationship seems to 
be predicated upon two considerations.  The first is concerned with ideas of mutuality or 
community and predicates a connection or bond between all people that acts as an 
instrument of obligation and co-operation.  The primary focus of this bond is upon those 
who are in near relation to the individual but it is wide enough to encompass those who 
are more distant.  The second consideration is an acknowledgement that the sufferer/non-
sufferer relationship could exist the other way around if the situation were reversed.  
Reversal is a real possibility and so the non-sufferer offers sympathy in the knowledge 
that if it were the other way around then she/he would want to be sympathised with. 
 
3. Critique of the Duty to Alleviate Suffering 
 
This section of the chapter will offer a critique of the duty to alleviate suffering.  It will 
do so in three ways: at the conceptual or intrinsic level, at the motivational level and at 
the consequential level.  
CONCEPTUAL/INTRINSIC CRITIQUE 
 
Mayerfeld laid out an absolute duty to alleviate suffering.  An absolute duty is one that 
has a universal application and claims universal obedience.  It is not conceptually 
concerned with the condition of the person or of the one whose duty it is per se but is 
rather an analytic duty.  This is to say that it is concerned with the nature of the idea of 
absoluteness and seeks to analyse the ideas that are inherent in that concept.  On this basis 
at least two criticisms can be made. 
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The first is in relation to autonomy. Autonomy derives from the two Greek words ‘autos’ 
(self) and ‘nomos’ (law/rule) and refers to the self-determining nature of human existence 
and action.  Each individual is endowed with reason which enables him/her to determine 
the course of his/her life as a result of setting goals and the means to achieve them.  It is 
by the exercise of the will that these goals are to be realised and everyone ought to be free 
from any arbitrary and inhibiting external forces in order to pursue them.   
 
Kant formulated the idea of autonomy in the following way: 
 
      (autonomy) is the concept of every rational human being…who must regard  
      himself as giving universal law through all the maxims of his will so as to 
      appraise himself and his actions form his point of view.184 
 
 
Each person is considered as king of their own destiny with the right to rule the kingdom 
of their own lives.  When every autonomous individual acts in this manner then a 
desirable state of affairs has been brought about which Kant refers to as: The Kingdom of 
Ends185.  This is: 
 
      a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws. 
 
 
In such a kingdom each rational being is to be thought of as a subject as well as a king.  
Kingship consists in the establishing of universal laws to govern action whilst being a 
subject is a matter of subjecting the will to the demands of those laws. 
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Autonomy is one formulation of self-determination.  Placing an absolute duty to alleviate 
suffering may conflict with this concept and therefore with self-determination in at least 
two ways.  
 
 First, as discussed earlier, with regard to law making Kant constructed the Categorical 
Imperative.  Laws were only to be established by an individual if she/he were able to 
universalize them.  If the duty to alleviate suffering were universalised in this way so that 
the formula became ‘wherever suffering is to be found I have an absolute duty to alleviate 
it’ then the law maker would know that others would be bound by this duty in relation to 
her/him, too.  This law would be binding regardless of the situation or of other 
considerations that may feature at the time.  It may be that the law maker may not always 
want others to respond to her/him in that way nor to always be under a law to act in that 
way.  S/he must be aware, however, that everyone is to be under the law so if s/he does 
not want this then the law itself is in question. 
 
For instance, it is possible that a person chooses suffering as a means to an end.  This idea 
was glimpsed in the earlier discussion concerning Mill’s formulation of the difficulties 
that attend the attaining of higher pleasures.  If suffering is always to be removed then 
this may mean that the ends to which it would have led may be lost.  Mill may not have 
meant that higher pleasures are accompanied by suffering as defined in this chapter but 
the idea of it as a means to an end can be true both if that difficulty is not great enough to 
be styled suffering and if it is.  The removal of suffering could be thought of as 
interference especially if value is attached to it.  Even where there is no value attached a 
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person may still feel that the most important thing is that they are asked whether or not 
they wish to be helped as such an enquiry demonstrates that he/she is still being regarded 
by others as an autonomous being.  Suffering need not render a person unable to express a 
preference nor to allow another to disregard autonomy.  This remains true in the case of 
numbing.  A person may no longer feel any pain and it is left to others to recognise its 
extent but that person can still be asked whether or not they would like to be helped.  The 
answer to that question would still need to be respected and only disregarded in the most 
extreme of circumstances.  Persuasion may be legitimate and time may need to be given 
for the sufferer to consider the request but it remains important throughout not to rush in 
citing an absolute duty to alleviate suffering. 
 
Second, it needs to be recognised that there are occasions when pain must be inflicted 
upon others and if an absolute duty to alleviate suffering is in place then this is not 
possible.  This may even be morally necessary in certain circumstances.  Examples of this 
can range from the trivial to the important: a surgeon inflicts pain in the pursuit of a 
beneficial treatment and the negative effects of the surgery may last a lifetime; a parent 
imposes discipline upon a child; the State inflicts punishment upon a wrongdoer as an 
expression both of moral outrage and as a deterrent to others; one nation goes to war 
against another to defend its sovereignty and independence; and a person defends herself 
from the physical aggression of another and has to use force to do so.  In all these cases 
those involved would wish to limit the pain and distress caused to that which was 
absolutely necessary to achieve the ends in sight but the fact remains that pain and 
distress has to be caused for those ends to be achieved.  In all the examples given the ends 
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are considered morally justifiable and so the means have to be in moral accord with them.  
In these cases the means are considered legitimate as they are recognised as appropriate 
to the ends themselves.  
 
Whilst a very strong duty to relieve suffering may exist it is not necessarily an absolute 
one.  Perhaps the correct thing to say is that the duty exists unless there is a good reason 
to suppose otherwise.  Respect for autonomy appears to be one and the need to 
sometimes inflict suffering upon others may be another. 
MOTIVATIONAL CRITIQUE 
 
An absolute duty may have an unintended effect upon the motivation of those upon 
whom the duty lays.  It is generally recognised that some form of duty exists but if it is 
constructed in absolute terms then the result may be that people will feel overwhelmed.  
This in turn may then diminish a person’s capacity to respond to the needs of others. 
 
Lifton186 describes his feelings whilst working in Hiroshima following the dropping of 
the Atom bomb by the USA which brought WW2 to an end.  The scale of the suffering he 
encountered plus his own feelings of inadequacy led him to experience what he called the 
phenomenon of numbing.  Linked to the experience of not being able to recognize one’s 
own suffering, numbing is the inability to respond to that of others due to the enormity of 
what is being faced.  Lifton recognised that what he saw called for a response but he 
became increasingly unable to respond.  Eventually he became unable to offer any 
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emotional response and what he saw even failed to make a continued impression upon his 
consciousness.  He writes that numbing is: 
 
      a diminished capacity to feel…what I came to call psychic numbing, or in its 
      most acute form psychic closing off.187 
 
He thought of his own numbing as the response to suffering that existed on a catastrophic 
scale.  He argued that it was also possible to experience numbing in other ways.  It can be 
a response to the everyday suffering that a member of a family may feel and can be 
experienced by professional carers such as doctors.  Lifton describes the latter as a form 
of desensitisation which may be necessary for optimal technological functioning.  He 
classified the three forms of numbing (catastrophic, ordinary and professional) as an 
‘Anatomy of Numbing’. 
 
It is ordinary numbing that is more important for this chapter because whilst the suffering 
of the transsexual is of supreme importance to her/him it is ‘ordinary’ in its nature: only 
one person is affected and this in the context of health and disease in ordinary life.  For 
suffering to be considered catastrophic then many people need to be affected in 
extraordinary circumstances.  Because the suffering of the transsexual is ordinary so is 
the response to it.   
 
For example, the person who is in a relationship with a transsexual which would normally 
be characterised by sympathy to suffering may feel unable to sympathise if he/she has 
been exposed to that suffering in an unabated way.  She/he may feel they do not possess 
the personal resources that are required in order to respond in the way which the duty 
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demands.  Alleviation becomes impossible because the person is numbed to feeling and it 
is feeling that has provided the motivation to enable the duty to be performed.  Feeling 
has dissipated due to constant exposure.  The resource which is lacked is the ability 
always to sympathise.   
 
Another example here may help.  Imagine a woman who has a partner who is depressed 
and this has led him to seek help from a psychotherapist.  He experiences constant 
difficulty and perpetually seeks reassurance.  Work is a struggle for him as he is unsure of 
what others think of him.  He worries about whether or not he is accepted at work and if 
he does a good job.  Every night after work he talks about his day and expresses his fears 
and worries to his partner.  She hears his fears and complaints at the end of each day 
whether or not she wants to.  At first she offers sympathy and tries to be supportive.  She 
encourages him with his therapy and seeks to reinforce what the therapist has said.  The 
two of them are in this situation for over a year before she begins to realise that she is not 
as sympathetic as she once was.  He does not seem to be improving in any tangible way.  
Every day closes with a discussion of his difficulties and she increasingly feels unable to 
respond.  This is coupled with what is happening to her in her own work and the demands 
that she has to face in her own life.  She grows numb to his suffering.  If the duty to 
alleviate his sufferings is in place then she is morally at fault to feel as she does and she 
needs to overcome her feelings and to continue the daily conversations about his distress 
as this is her contribution to alleviating it.  She did once consider that she was under an 
absolute duty to alleviate the suffering of her partner but this prove so difficult to do and 
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the demands upon her proved so great that she is now numb and wondering about her 
ability to continue in the relationship.   
 
A counter-argument is possible: her attempts to listen to him every day were ineffective 
in helping him and she is therefore not under a duty to continue to listen.  If listening did 
help but she grew tired and weary and so stopped then she may be at fault.  A duty to help 
exists if help is effective but not if the intervention fails to help. 
 
If the duty is absolute then it is in place at all times and such a duty in its turn may lead to 
the numbing of sympathy with consequences not just for the sufferer but for the person 
who is expected to offer sympathy.  One possible consequence is the creation of distance 
between the non-sufferer and the sufferer.  This distance is both a reaction to the feelings 
of inadequacy and a means of allowing the non-sufferer space in order not to be 
overwhelmed by the sufferer and so to retain a sense of separateness and independent 
existence. 
 
Soelle188 discusses the way that Western societies have since the time of the 
Enlightenment looked to science to eradicate both the causes and the experience of 
suffering.  One of the unintended and unforeseen consequences of this search she 
describes as Apathea189.  This is the dynamic that allows a person to pursue his/her gaols 
of happiness and fulfilment against the demands to seek to relieve the misery and anguish 
of others.  If all of a person’s time were spend in alleviating the suffering of others, which 
an absolute duty requires, then there may be no time to pursue their own goals.  Therefore 
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a person has to develop a form of immunity or indifference to others which can in time 
develop into an aversion to suffering itself.  Soelle’s claim is that it is a small step from 
this to the avoiding of other people completely in order to avoid any contact with 
suffering.  She writes: 
 
      Apathea is a social condition in which people are so dominated by the goal of 
      avoiding suffering that it becomes a goal to avoid human relationships 
      altogether. 
 
 
Her argument is that the determination to pursue personal goals can lead to both an 
avoidance of suffering and of those who are suffering so that relationships deteriorate and 
men and women become increasingly individualised.  Suffering is avoided in order to 
avoid the absolute duty to alleviate it. Happiness is sought in isolation from the  suffering 
and the overall result is a diminution in the quality of life for all.  Because the non-
sufferer has lost contact with the sufferer both lose out and both fail to benefit from each 
other and so there is an all round lessening in the richness of human experience.  She 
writes: 
 
      a suffering free state (experiences loss)…so that even joy and happiness can no  
      longer be experienced intensely.  A consequence of apathy is the desensitization 
      that freedom from suffering involves-the inability to perceive reality.190 
 
 
Her conclusion is that an absolute duty to alleviate suffering results in a social reality of 
increased individualism and the concentration upon happiness to the exclusion of the one 
who is suffering.  A type of disengagement has occurred between sufferers and non-
sufferers with the result that the situation is worse for the former then was ever intended. 
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Perhaps, therefore, we should regard the duty to alleviate suffering as very serious but not 
an absolute one.  If the onus were put upon the judgement of the non-sufferer as to when, 
where and how she/he was able to help without interference with his/her personal goals 
then continued and effective motivation will be maintained.  As help is offered so the life 
of the one who is doing so is enriched both as a result of doing good and of the contact 
between the two, i.e. an imperfect duty in Kantian terms. 
CONSEQUENTIAL CRITIQUE 
 
Soelle argues that one consequence of this duty is an actual increase in the total amount 
of unhappiness that is experienced.  The overall quality of life declines because the 
apathy that is necessary in order for people to feel immune to the misery of others leaves 
those same people immune to the pleasures of life.  A loss of the capacity to feel has 
occurred.  This loss is a direct consequence of the concern to only experience happiness 
which in turn leads to avoiding both personal distress and that of others.  Soelle seems to 
suggest that a certain amount of distress is necessary in order to retain the capacity to feel 
pleasure and therefore to be happy.   
 
The idea that the duty to alleviate suffering leads to further suffering can be found in the 
work both of Nietzsche191 and Freud192 as well as in their critique of Schopenhauer193. 
 
Schopenhauer urged the universal need to sympathize with the sufferings of others.  In 
the earlier discussion it was seen that he understood sympathy to be universally required 
and that it ought not to take account of the individual sufferer.  However, if sympathy is 
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to be given to all indiscriminately its value may be diminished.  Expressed to all 
sympathy either becomes too thinly spread or is exhausted.  For sympathy to retain its 
value it needs to be discriminating in its operation.  Objects of sympathy need to be 
appropriately identified and expressions of it based upon desert.   
 
Therefore in relation to Schopenhauer’s view there will be insufficient sympathy to go 
around if the duty to alleviate suffering is regarded as absolute.  Stocks need to be 
preserved and one way of doing this is to ensure that it is given in appropriate ways.  If 
this does not occur then when someone deserves to be sympathised with she/he may find 
that sympathy is not forthcoming.  This is a first possible consequence of the absolute 
duty 
 
It is possible to argue that it does not matter where sympathy comes from all that matters 
is that it is to be found in a time of need.  A stranger’s sympathy can be welcomed as 
much as anyone else.  The sufferer expects sympathy to be given because it is a matter of 
duty and not of fellow-feeling and so it is the duty that is important and not the feeling.   
 
However, if sympathy is offered to a sufferer merely on the grounds of duty with no 
importance attached to fellow-feeling then this may appear to be cold and not to reflect 
the ideas that are inherent in the nature of human relationships.  Relationships are an 
expression of mutual regard and concern and part of this is the notion that when one 
suffers the other cares about this fact and shares in that suffering through fellow-feeling.  
The closer the relationship then the greater the expectation of fellow-feeling and in this 
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case if sympathy were to be offered on the grounds of duty then the sufferer may 
conclude that the relationship is not what he/she thought it to be.  Duty exists between 
strangers precisely because there is no bond of intimacy and so some mechanism is 
required to ensure that help is available.  Duty is one example of such a mechanism.  The 
nature of relationships in terms of obligations, duties and intimacy will be explored in 
Chapter Five. 
 
Schopenhauer, then, maintains the need for universal sympathy but he also acknowledges 
that attempts to alleviate suffering may result in its appearance in another form even 
within the same life.  Suffering in his view is impossible to eradicate successfully.  It is a 
weed in the sympathiser’s garden.  This weed has deep and unreachable roots and only its 
above ground flowering can be seen.  The gardener deals with what can be seen but soon 
discovers that the weed re-appears elsewhere.  Attempts to remove it are relentless: 
 
      The ceaseless efforts to banish suffering achieve nothing more than a change in  
      its form.  If we have succeeded in removing pain in this form…it at once  
      appears on the scene in a thousand others.194 
 
 
Nietzsche 195 argued that sympathy has reduced western civilisation to a level of 
weakness and powerlessness robbing us of the life force that is required to achieve great 
goals and at the same time denying us the will to live. 
 
He regarded Christianity as the greatest expression of the perverse nature of sympathy 
and thought that it had given rise to what he described as ‘slave morality’.  With its 
 133 
 
emphasis on the underdog and the need to attend the weak and the marginalised, 
Christianity has succeeded on elevating the slave, who is a contemptible individual, to a 
position of power.  Those who are strong have been emasculated by a morality of 
sympathy and are bound by feelings of guilt to defer to those who are less. 
 
Nietzsche argued that the weak envy the strong and that Christianity is for them the only 
way of emulating the strong and to attain prominence.  The strong have been forced to 
embrace the morality of slaves due to the fact that the slaves cause guilt feelings in the 
strong.  The latter then give up what is natural to them which is the will to power.  Guilt 
in turn leads the strong to feel that a duty is owed to the weak but by focusing energy 
upon helping them the strong forget their main task which is to affirm their will and in so 
doing to affirm life: 
 
      One should not embellish or dress up Christianity: it has waged a war to the 
      death against the higher type of man…it has taken the side of everything weak, 
      base…it has made an ideal out of opposition to the preservative instincts of  
      strong life.196  
 
 
Guilt is the basis upon which sympathy operates.  The duty to alleviate suffering is 
predicated upon an ignoble motive.  It does not affirm life.  The sympathetic motive 
behind the duty is ultimately harmful to the best interests of human aspiration.  Anything 
that proceeds from guilt cannot be good.  It gives a false shape to the conscience of the 
strong. 
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This is a further example of the way that this absolute duty can have detrimental 
consequences this time not in relation to sympathy itself but in the effects that it can have 
on the sympathiser.  Negative emotions are both necessary in order for sympathy to be 
possible and as a consequence of it.  Sympathisers are weakened and debilitated by its 
demands and are marginalised as a result of the needs of the suffering taking centre stage.  
This is a second consequence of the absolute duty. 
 
Amato197 devotes a great deal of attention to the subject of collective guilt and how this 
lies behind much of the action to alleviate suffering.  He collates two phenomena of 
twentieth century western society: post imperialism and the Second World War.  He 
argues that both of these have resulted in a sense of responsibility on the part of the west 
for the sufferings of the world as a whole.  Western aggression has occasioned much 
suffering one result of which is the proliferation of what he calls the ‘cult of the victim’.  
Whole classes of people are now learning to think of themselves as the victims of the past 
actions of others who therefore have a duty to help them. 
 
Amato dwells on the effects of past guilt.  One society believes that it owes an obligation 
to another because of the way its past members treated those of the other society.  The 
past treatment may even have occurred century’s ago but both present day societies 
believe that a duty exists.  Amato writes: 
 
       The post war world abounded in accusations about the west, in the form of 
       colonialist, missionary, capitalist and white man, as the primary cause of  
       innocent suffering198. 
 
 
 135 
 
This post-imperial guilt is that which was indicated in the interim conclusion in Chapter 
Two as one of the reasons for a failure to critically examine the models of transsexuality. 
 
Amato seems to be arguing that an uncritical acceptance of the duty will lead to the 
setting up of a victim mentality and the creation of people who consider themselves as 
victims.  Instead of taking personal responsibility and refusing to identify with either past 
or present suffering people may become preoccupied with suffering and seek recompense 
and recognition for it.   This preoccupation may be motivated by justice concerns and 
sympathy may be desired and given but the ultimate result may be an increase in the 
actual experience of suffering due to the keeping alive of issues that have long since been 
inactive. 
 
Potential example’s include: Afro-Americans who in the present gain a sense of injustice 
from the slave trade of the eighteenth and nineteenth century; present day Jews who think 
of themselves as victims of the Holocaust and followers of Islam who seek recognition 
for the injustice of the medieval crusades called for by the Papacy in its attempts to 
reclaim the Holy Land.  Victim status is problematic because it is unclear how a group of 
people in the present day can legitimately be thought of as suffering because of past 
events, especially if those events do not have direct and continuing effects.  Questions 
cluster about the issue of distance between past and present and of the nature of the duty a 
present day group have for the actions and their consequences of a past group.  A further 
example of the present day suffering that can arise out of past actions and their 
consequences is the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East.  Claim and counter claim are 
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made in relation to who has suffered the most and who is owed the most and by whom, 
but the result is that suffering continues to be experienced.   
 
Victim status and the suffering that follows is a possible third example of the 
consequences of the duty to alleviate suffering.  An absolute duty would include all 
people for all of their sufferings as long as they consider such sufferings to be relevant.  
As we have seen, relevance can extend backwards to include past events.  If a culture of 
sympathising for suffering as identified by the sufferer is created then this may lead to a 
victim mentality. 
 
Ignatieff199 discusses victim status and mentality and argues that this is so extensive now 
that everyone is a potential victim.  This awareness has itself increased both the personal 
and overall sense of vulnerability and so suffering results. 
 
Freud200  offers a further consequential critique of the duty to alleviate suffering.  He 
discusses the so called golden rule of Christianity which states ‘Thou shall love thy 
neighbour as thyself’201 and claims that a universal application of the rule not only 
devalues the love that is supposed to lie at the heart of the duty but increases the suffering 
of the one who seeks to fulfil it. He argues that the demands of the duty are beyond 
anyone’s capacities and the striving to do what cannot be done can only increase a 
person’s distress.  Blind obedience to a rule will in this case have the opposite effect to 
that intended. 
 
 137 
 
In summary this consequential critique of the duty argues that it carries a cost to both the 
nature and functioning of sympathy and to the experience of suffering.  The latter is the 
result of guilt feeling that motivates action, the formation of a victim culture and the 
distress caused by trying to perform an impossible duty.  Added to this is the financial 
burden which the demands of the duty might make upon both the individual and society 
in general.  This burden may prove unsustainable in the long term. 
 
To conclude this section, an absolute duty to alleviate suffering is problematic.  A very 
strong duty may well exist, one that is generally recognised in moral discourse.  It is a 
duty that is generally applicable but can be waived either because of the reasons 
discussed or because of the idea that value can be found in suffering.  This last idea leads 
to the next section of the chapter. 
 
4. The Value of Suffering 
 
The value of suffering is to be discussed within the context of a fourfold structure.  
Examples of value will be discussed. 
 
The fourfold analysis of value is as follows: 
 
1. I value my suffering for my sake. 
2. I value my suffering for your sake. 
3. I value your suffering for your sake in the context of a shared goal. 
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4. I value your suffering for my sake.  The idea of Schadenfreude is of importance 
here. 
I VALUE MY SUFFERING FOR MY SAKE 
 
In this analysis suffering can be thought to possess a value that is either intrinsic or 
instrumental for the person experiencing it.  An example of the former is sadomasochism, 
especially if this is thought of as a life-style choice which includes the setting up of a 
social network with whom the person spends as much time as possible.  Sadomasochistic 
interests can define the person who comes to value the practice.  The latter is found where 
a person believes that suffering leads to the fulfilment of a goal or an end that is valued 
and has been autonomously chosen.  Examples of the instrumental value of suffering 
include the following: 
 
First, suffering as a means by which a person experiences penance or atonement.  In this 
example one feels that one has committed a wrong for which one should be punished.  
One acknowledges that the wrong should be put right and that the harm that was done 
should in some way be neutralised or negated by accepting punishment.  The desire to 
atone seems to be a legitimate desire as it demonstrates awareness of the ill-effects of the 
original wrong-doing, an acceptance of culpability and a wish to make up for the wrong.  
Atonement has to be freely chosen and one may have the right to insist on making it even 
if others may wish to spare one the suffering that is involved.  Atonement may be made 
by someone on behalf of another.  An innocent person may wish to atone for the actions 
of someone with whom she/he is in close relation and who may be either unable or 
 139 
 
unwilling to make atonement themselves.  Christian theology is predicated upon the idea 
of vicarious atonement in the person of Christ.  If suffering is denied to a person in this 
context then she/he may feel that the wrong that was done lingers without anything taking 
place to put things right.  Atonement is a way of putting things right and for this to be the 
case then suffering is necessary. 
 
Second, suffering can provide a context in which virtues can be exercised.  It is important 
here both that suffering has not been chosen in order for virtue to be exercised and that 
such virtue is already part of the character of the individual otherwise such virtue could 
appear as a false display for an appreciative audience.  Virtue can be an indication of 
moral character and where this is genuine it can act as both inspiration and example to 
others.  Virtue can be that which enables a person to endure suffering as well as be the 
means by which life as a whole is lived in.  Courage, commitment to principle, resolve, 
optimism and determination are some of the virtues that are required at times of trouble.  
It is also possible that virtues can be learned in a time of suffering with the result that the 
sufferer’s character develops.  Patience and the ability to empathise with others are 
examples here. 
 
An example of this can be found in the history of classical Greece.  The circumstances 
surrounding the death of Socrates are well known202.  On the morning before his 
execution Crito tells us that Socrates was being prevailed upon by his friends to escape 
from prison.  Escape would prove a relatively easy matter and may even be what the 
Athenian fathers wanted.  It seemed obvious to all that Socrates should go on living and 
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so be able to continue teaching and influencing others.  The death penalty imposed upon 
him for blasphemy was felt to be unjust and that he would be justified in doing all he 
could to escape it. 
 
Socrates thought otherwise and claimed that whatever the rightness and wrongness of the 
judgement it would be wrong to disregard it and to set aside the demands of the law.  This 
would be the case even for personal or worthy motives and goals: 
 
      Whatever the popular view is, the fact remains that to do wrong is in every 
      sense bad and dishonourable for the person who does it.  Is that our view or  
      not?.203 
 
 
Socrates maintains that he always has sought both to keep the laws of the state and to 
teach others to do the same.  Laws are to be kept even if they prove onerous to the one 
whose duty it is to keep them.  He now demonstrates his own determination to keep the 
law even if this results in his death.  He values consistency and integrity more than his 
own life.  To escape would be to repudiate all that he has stood for.   
 
Socrates argues that obedience is required even if laws are considered bad and 
unnecessary and suffering is the result.  Any refusal to obey on the grounds of private 
judgement concerning the legitimacy or otherwise of the law will result in an 
undermining of the state itself.  He argues that just as men and women enjoy the benefits 
provided by the state they have a duty to obey its laws and meet its demands.  He believes 
that he is able to demonstrate his commitment to this principle by accepting the death 
penalty. 
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By accepting this judgement Socrates knew that his life would end.  This knowledge 
would undoubtedly be an occasion for suffering.  Yet he seems to regard this as a price 
worth paying and one that shows his deep attachment to his beliefs.  If there was another 
way to demonstrate his attachment then he may have chosen it and in doing so spared his 
own life.  No other way seemed possible and so to remain faithful to himself he accepts 
his own death.  Crito is left feeling admiration for his friend whilst disagreeing with him.  
Socrates’ suffering may not have lasted long but it may have been intense and with a 
possibility to threaten his understanding of himself if he failed to respond to it on a way 
that met with his own satisfaction. 
 
Martyrdom seems to be related to the example of Socrates.  Here men and women accept 
their own death as a price worth paying in order to demonstrate fidelity to beliefs and 
values.  Martyrs appear to believe that some things are of more value and importance 
than continued personal existence and that one way of demonstrating this is to adhere to 
them even if the cost is one’s own life. 
 
Rule-keeping may be a further occasion when suffering can be of value to the individual.  
Some rules can be considered to be so important that to keep them causes suffering which 
then become the measure by which commitment to the rule is judged.  Two examples can 
be considered.  
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First, a Muslim homosexual man may choose a life of celibacy in order to conform to the 
demands of his faith.  His faith matters more to him than sexual fulfilment.  Given the 
nature of some Islamic cultures no one else knows of his decision.  Only he does but the 
knowledge he gains from his adherence to his faith and the consequent suffering this 
causes him sexually, socially and personally is viewed as indicating his faithfulness.  
There may be moments when he longs for sexual fulfilment as well as facing the 
embarrassment of explaining why he is not married.  Others may misunderstand him and 
think him selfish or overly fussy and criticise him as a result.  He knows his true 
motivation and regards suffering as a means of measurement. 
 
Second, in a society that values marriage two unhappily married people who share that 
value determine to remain married to each other.  Both recognise the importance of 
promise-keeping and that this may require one to put aside personal feeling.  Promises 
that have been freely entered into ought to be kept in order to preserve trust and to make 
social relationships possible.  If a person breaks a promise then his/her integrity may be 
open to question.  Recognition is given to the fact that sometimes it is impossible to keep 
a promise but this is usually understood to occur for reasons beyond an individual’s 
control, such as unforeseen circumstances and the actions of other people.  In a marriage 
where both parties value promise-keeping then, in spite of any unhappiness in the 
relationship, it is possible for both to keep their original commitment to each other.  
Suffering occurs because both are reminded daily of unmet needs and the failure of the 
hopes and expectations which were present at the outset but the suffering is again viewed 
as a way of measuring the value of promise-keeping.  Marriage vows are often considered 
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to be taken in the presence of God and such vows are often believed to be even more 
binding.  Suffering can then be viewed as a demonstration of loyalty to God. 
 
Rules are worth keeping whether they are difficult or easy but some rules are of more 
importance than others.  Those that are considered the highest value often have the most 
difficulty associated with them and keeping them may result in suffering.  To try to love 
in the way that, for instance, the golden rule of Christianity requires, would daily oblige 
one to put one’s considerations to one side, to suppress personal desires and goals and to 
consistently put the wellbeing of others first.  It is in the denial of personal considerations 
that suffering is experienced. 
 
The self control of the athlete who puts aside all other considerations in order to train for 
a sporting competition is a further example.  Whilst competing she reaches the limits of 
physical endurance but continues in order to win.  She considers suffering to be a test of 
her physical condition and to be able to win having exerted so much is more valuable 
than wining as a result of little effort.   
 
Some people find pleasure in the experience of suffering as Sackville-West records in her 
account of unrequited love: 
 
      It is painful but also rather pleasant if you know what I mean.  It is good to have 
      so keen and persistent a feeling about somebody.  It is a sign of vitality.204 
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She is describing the pleasure that can be found in the experience of suffering.  Of the 
two, pleasure is more highly valued but this particular pleasure is not possible without the 
experience of suffering.  Pleasure seems to ‘piggy-back’ the suffering and is dependent 
upon it and so to this extent suffering is valued. 
 
Suffering can also lead a person to reflect upon the course that life has taken and provides 
an opportunity to re-evaluate personal goals and their chances of fulfilment.  As a result 
of reflection and re-evaluation a person can reassess life and achieve greater insight both 
of themselves and of life in general.  A person can seek to positively engage with 
suffering and as a result emerge with greater wisdom.  Suffering has a transcendent effect 
and engaging with it may be a means of achieving authenticity.  Authenticity will be 
discussed in Chapter Four where it will be presented as a new framework for thinking 
both about TS and GReS. 
 
For the purposes of this section of this chapter an example of suffering leading to 
authenticity can be given.  A sportswoman believes that she has sufficient talent and is 
hard-working enough to become a champion at her chosen sport.  She has been 
encouraged in this belief by her family, friends and coach. All tell her that hard work will 
bring its own rewards.  She enters as many tournaments as she is able but consistently 
fails to achieve the success that both she and others believe she is capable of.  At first she 
explains this away but eventually she re-evaluates her chances of success following a 
defeat to an opponent she considers to be far less talented.  The process of re-evaluation 
proves painful. She has to give up her belief in her ability to become a champion and to 
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change the way that others see her.  They have encouraged her in the belief that positive 
thinking is a means of achieving results but she now realises that she was mistaken to 
think so highly of her attributes and to have set for herself unrealistic goals.  She is now 
in a position to set for herself more realistic goals which may or may not be in the 
sporting arena and along with this has come to a new understanding of herself.  She feels 
more settled and under less pressure to achieve.  She feels more able to enjoy what she is 
doing and to find pleasure in her achievements.  She has experienced the suffering of 
failure through which she learned truth about herself and her potential in life.  She has 
achieved a greater measure of authenticity. 
 
A final example of the way that suffering can be of value to an individual for his/her own 
sake is in the way that it can prove to be a basis for personal identity.  The previous 
example of the woman who was abused as a child and keeps the memory of it alive in 
adulthood is instructive here.  There are dangers, as was noted earlier, but if the suffering 
is incorporated into personal identity, rather than being a way to define identity, then it 
may prove to be of value.  For instance, she may choose to work with abused children as 
a result of her own experience and as long as she does not think of herself as a victim, 
then she may value what she experienced as a child. 
 
It has long been understood in religion that suffering can be of value to an individual.  It 
may be found in various forms such as self-denial, the ability to withstand temptation, 
flagellation and the wearing of coarse garments next to the skin all of which are believed 
to be of value in bringing a person closer to God and in ridding the body of its sinful 
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thoughts and desires.  Suffering is chosen in the belief that it may prove to be the only 
way to achieve greater spiritual awareness and is therefore valuable to the person whose 
goal it is to become spiritual. 
 
I VALUE MY SUFFERING FOR YOUR SAKE 
 
One person’s suffering may be of benefit to another person who matters to her/him.  
Suffering may be either one means of benefit or the only means available in a particular 
context. For instance, Captain Oates, when he realised that the lives of all involved, and 
the very expedition itself was in danger, sacrificed himself for the sake of the others205. 
Oates sacrificed himself voluntarily for the benefit of the group and did so without 
discussing with his intentions with them.  He merely announced his intention to go 
outside of the tent for a while.   
 
Oates suffering can be understood to consist in both the intense moments of physical 
distress, with its consequent impact upon his consciousness in his final moments, and that 
he sacrificed the chance of future life. Had he made his intentions known they may have 
sought to dissuade him with the idea that good things could be anticipated in the future.  
This may then inspire hope and courage in their present extremity.  Oates may have 
reasoned in this way himself and, if he did then, he seemed to choose to disregard it. He 
made the judgment that a future life would be more likely for others if he sacrificed 
himself.  For Oates however he found value in his suffering knowing that it would be of 
benefit to others. 
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Notions of sacrifice can be understood as central to this particular value of suffering.  
Sacrifice can range from that which a parent makes for the benefit of a child, to a person 
offering to give her/himself up for the release of another being held hostage.  The act of 
sacrifice itself may or may not be painful.  If it is then the act can be thought of as an 
experience of suffering.  In either case a person who sacrifices themselves can be said to 
be suffering in the sense that he/she is losing the possibility of a future life that will 
hopefully contain good things.  Not all sacrifice is done for the sake of others, as in the 
case of Sister Luke (Gabrielle van der Mal) in the Nun’s Story who was asked 
deliberately to fail at her examinations in order to learn the virtue of humility, but always 
involves an element of suffering.  When undertaken for the sake of others it is a 
demonstration of the value placed by the one making the sacrifice for the one for whom 
the sacrifice is made. 
 
Sacrifice may not be valued by the one doing the sacrificing if it is forced upon her/him 
by a powerful outside agency.  A well-known example of this is William’s discussion of 
integrity in the context of Utilitarianism206.  He imagines a western tourist being asked by 
a group of terrorists to kill one Amazon Indian in order to save twenty others.  Williams 
focuses his discussion on the tourist but for the sake of this chapter the focus can be on 
the one Amazon Indian.  If the tourist consented to the demands of the terrorists and shot 
him then his life would have been sacrificed for the sake of the other twenty.  The 
Amazonian may or may not find comfort in the fact that the others are being spared as a 
result but because he did not choose to sacrifice himself, his suffering cannot be thought 
 148 
 
of as valued by him for the sake of others.  Sacrifice needs to be freely chosen by the one 
making it if the attendant suffering is to be valued. 
 
I VALUE YOUR SUFFERING FOR YOUR SAKE 
 
In this formulation a person who has a positive relationship with a sufferer and at the 
same time shares a specific goal with him/her may come to believe that the suffering is a 
means of achieving that goal. 
 
An example of this is the university tutor who encourages her student to work hard whilst 
knowing that it is burdensome to him.  The student may experience suffering comparable 
to the sportswoman.  The student may question his ability as he constantly evaluates 
talents and diligence.  The tutor may deafen herself to the agonies of the student in the 
knowledge that she cannot do the work for him.  Suffering is a means to an end for the 
student, who may consider his suffering as an indication of commitment to the study 
project.  The tutor may also share this view of his suffering in this way and places value 
on the experience of the student.  Both share the goal of the project but for different 
reasons.  The student desires a degree whilst the tutor desires a good outcome both for the 
student and for his/her own academic reputation.  The tutor knows that a degree may not 
be achieved without an experience of suffering for some people but values that element of 
it which consists of determination, self-understanding, courage and grit. 
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I VALUE YOUR SUFFERING FOR MY SAKE 
 
This value focuses upon the idea of Schadendfreude as discussed in Portman’s treatment 
of both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche207. 
 
Schadenfreude describes the pleasure a person feels when witnessing the sufferings of 
others, especially if those others have demonstrated undesirable or unattractive 
characteristics.  Subjectively it results in an observer feeling better about himself and his 
life whilst objectively the observer feels that something appropriate has happened to the 
sufferer.  Many philosophers believe that the pleasurable feelings are based either on 
considerations of justice or belief in the actions of a God who will not let the wicked 
prosper for too long. 
 
One example of Schadenfreude is the following:  Two teachers of similar ability and 
social standing work in the same school.  Both were appointed to their positions at the 
same time.  One is more adept at putting herself forward and at self promotion.  The other 
feels unable to promote himself as he feels this would be to run counter to his idea of 
humility, which he values highly.  The first teacher appears to reap rewards from her self-
promoting behaviour, whilst the second works quietly away in his classroom.  The first is 
seen as a dynamic individual whose reputation stands high with the educational 
authorities but not with her colleagues whilst the second is overlooked by the authorities 
but held in high esteem by those who work in the school.  If the first teacher falls from 
grace in some way, perhaps as a result of poor exam results or a parent’s complaint, the 
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second teacher may experience pleasure in her fall even though he may know that the 
first teacher is suffering as a result. 
 
For this pleasure to be considered as an example of Schadendfreude then it must stand in 
a relation of symmetry with the character of the sufferer.  The sufferer has benefited from 
some unattractive trait in her character and the benefits reaped as a result are thereby 
illegitimate.  Her sufferings are not thought to be deserved in the sense that she has 
deliberately brought it upon herself in the way that a smoker is said to bring lung cancer 
upon himself or obese people are said to bring health problems upon themselves.  Rather 
her suffering is resulting from some force at work that seeks to put right things that are 
wrong in the world.  Pleasure is linked to ideas of balance and justice.  One wrong thing 
has been put right and a sense of harmony and equality achieved.  In the case of the two 
teachers the downfall of the one is seen as an example of pride coming before a fall. 
 
Schopenhauer considers Schadendfreude to be immoral and is therefore never justified.208  
He believes that feelings of pleasure in the sufferings of others are wicked and ought not 
to be countenanced.  Furthermore he argues that to appeal to notions of justice in order to 
rationalise Schadenfreude is a mistake because there is no force at work in the world that 
seeks to put things right and punish wrongdoers.  To believe that justice is an objective 
reality is to believe in an illusion and so to be deceived  
 
Nietzsche209 had no such objections to Schadenfreude.  For him it is pity or sympathy that 
he considered immoral.  He believed Schadenfreude to be a universal human reaction that 
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was not necessarily linked to ideas of justice.  It may be nothing more than an experience 
of pleasure in the face of suffering.  Nietzsche argues that it is important that this laughter 
comes from a clear conscience and it is then something that is life affirming: 
 
      If the gods know how to philosophize…they also know how to laugh in a new  
      and superhuman way…and at the expense of all serious things.  Gods are fond of 
      mockery.210 
 
 
It is a celebration of both the good in, and the continuance of, life.  The suffering of one 
person causes the other to reaffirm his own life in a ‘count your blessings’ formulation as 
he makes a comparison between his experiences and that of the sufferer. 
SUMMARY  
 
I have discussed four examples of the value that can be found in the experience of 
suffering.  For many, suffering may prove valuable as an occasion for reflection.  This 
may lead to new attainments of wisdom and insight from which not only the sufferer may 
benefit but so may those who come into contact with him/her. 
 
In the final section of the chapter I want to tie the discussion about suffering to TS.  This 
will be done briefly here before expanding on it in Chapter Four and the subject of 
authenticity. 
5. Suffering and TS 
 
      
      A transsexual person is aware of being of a gender opposite to that (of their) 
      physical sex.  This conflict, between gender identity and physical sex, is always 
      manifest from earliest awareness, and is the cause of enormous suffering.  It is 
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      common for transsexuals to be aware of their condition at preschool ages.  This 
      agony can and does lead to self destruction unless treated.211 
 
 
The intense suffering that this quotation tries to capture is reflected elsewhere in the 
narrative accounts already referred to in this thesis.  If these are true, then undoubtedly a 
transsexual may experiences suffering in a way that satisfies the definition established in 
this chapter. This suffering appears to affect the sufferer physically (in the rejection of the 
sexed body) socially (in terms of withdrawal from social interaction and relationships) 
and emotionally (in terms of psychological instability, depression and suicidal ideation). 
As required by my definition of suffering it is fundamentally subjective in its nature, is of 
sufficient intensity to threaten the integrity of the self and results in the frustration of the 
natural and necessary desires for wholeness and integration of self. Moreover, no blame 
can be attached to the sufferer as TS is an accident of birth and their misery is all 
consuming. 
 
Suffering is not, however, the only subjective element to the transition from being an 
unhappy and miserable individual to a suffering transsexual. Autobiographical accounts, 
medical case studies and stories in the mass media suggest that a person comes to think of 
himself/herself as transsexual by mapping their own experience of suffering onto the 
accounts they in turn have read of other people’s experience of TS.  In this respect, TS is 
self-diagnosed: the transsexual him/herself makes the connection between his/her 
suffering and that described by others. Indeed, this may be experienced as a form of self-
realisation or self-understanding, which is then present this to a doctor or therapist for 
‘official’ verification.  As outlined in Chapter Two, this process of verification takes the 
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form on making a judgement about the patient’s sincerity, strength of feeling, and lack of 
any other medical condition. And, according to some transsexual literature, on whether 
the physical appearance of the transsexual is compatible with ‘moulding’ into the desired 
gender.212 
 
Returning to Cassell’s theory of suffering – but taking it a step further - this process of 
self-diagnosis presents something of a double challenge to medicine. Not only must the 
clinician take at face-value the transsexuals claim to be suffering, but there is no 
objectively verifiable means of ‘testing’ for TS. The clinician must themselves make a 
subjective judgement based on their own impression of the patient’s sincerity or strength 
of belief. The only blood tests or similar tools that may be available are those employed 
to discount other conditions. In other words, the suffering is subjective, the diagnosis is 
self made on the basis of how the patient feels and the clinician’s own subjective 
judgement is used to confirm the accuracy of this subjective impression. 
 
The lack of objective criteria, both to recognise suffering and to identify TS, is a matter of 
concern within the transsexual community and attempts are being made to construct an 
objective test for diagnosis. Reitz213, for instance, has created the Combined Gender 
Identity and Transsexuality Inventory or COGIATI test which consists of sixty five 
questions concerned with issues such as memory, spatial awareness and powers of recall.  
The test seems to seek a biological basis for the differences between men and women and 
it is Reitz’s hope that the medical profession will take up her work and develop a more 
scientific model for establishing objective criteria. 
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The Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders214 (DSM-1V 302.85) of the American 
Psychiatric Association states that the diagnostic criteria for gender identity disorder in 
both adolescents and adults should take note of the measure of distress: 
 
     “This disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in 
      social, occupational or other important areas of functioning”. 
 
Referring to her pre-operative self Jorgensen recounts how she felt upon being perceived 
as a male homosexual.  This seemed to sum up for her all that she was then feeling due to 
her TS: 
 
      I sat alone in the darkness, drained and limp, devoid of any feeling at all, 
      watching the lights on the opposite shore, though that night they afforded 
      me no comfort…slowly an idea began to take form in my mind and I 
      remember thinking that beneath the surface of the water I could blot out the 
      revulsion and horror I felt.  It would be easy to end years of loneliness, 
      of hoping and searching by slipping quietly into oblivion.215 
 
 
It seems reasonable, therefore, to maintain that the experience of the transsexual is one of 
suffering in the sense defined in this chapter.  It is this experience that is the basis upon 
which the transsexual seeks help, and the request for help is often expressed in absolute 
terms.  The transsexual’s request is often constructed on an either/or basis such as ‘either 
I am helped or I’ll end my life as I can’t stand it any more’.  It is possible to argue that 
this formulation indicates that suffering may possess a certain currency.  It is that which 
‘gains’ the transsexual the treatment which she/he desires and the greater the claim to 
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suffering then the greater is the duty to respond to it.  For a significant number of 
transsexuals surgery is sought in the belief that it is the only means of resolving suffering 
and therefore the medical community has a moral duty to grant it. 
 
6. The duty to alleviate the suffering of transsexual persons 
 
I want to argue that there is no an absolute medical duty to alleviate the suffering of the 
transsexual.  I want to offer a critique of the duty to alleviate suffering structured in the 
same way as the general duty to alleviate suffering discussed earlier in this chapter. 
INTRINSIC OR CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE 
 
The intrinsic critique of this duty will focus on two issues: causation and medicalisation. 
 
In relation to causation at present there does not seem to be a consensus in medicine 
about the cause of TS as demonstrated in Chapter Two.  Research continues and at 
present a biological explanation is favoured as the underlying causation with 
psychological and environmental factors contributing to the final condition. 
 
Due to this uncertainty to alleviate suffering using surgery may prove to be inappropriate.  
If, for example, future research proves that TS is a psychotic condition or that the binary 
categories of masculine and feminine are false constructs and all that matters are 
individual personalities, then a surgical response to TS will be viewed as a mistake.  
There may be a need to respond in some way to the current suffering of the transsexual 
but to make that response a moral duty to alleviate it surgically is to assume that the 
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current medical construction is the only and correct one and that it requires no further 
reflection. 
 
The medical construction of TS is problematic and is an example of the present trend to 
medicalise an increasing number of human experiences.  This trend has been in evidence 
since the beginning of the twentieth century and has been noted by a number of 
commentators both inside and outside the medical community.  Szasz216, for instance has 
noted the interest of medicine in such diverse areas of human experience as sexual 
performance, criminality, insanity, drug and alcohol consumption and emotional well-
being. 
 
Human experiences such as these are brought into the compass of medicine for 
benevolent reasons.  The hope is that by so doing such experiences can be both 
normalised and de-stigmatised.  If they are medical problems then the person who is 
experiencing difficulties in these areas are not responsible for them and can also be 
helped with them.  This attempt to normalise and de-stigmatise is an expression of the 
humanitarian concern that has been in evidence both since the Enlightenment and the 
decline of religion with its emphasis on sin, guilt, blame and punishment.   
 
The medicalisation of TS is problematic within the transsexual community itself.  This 
will be discussed in Chapter Five as the implications of the central idea of this thesis, 
authenticity, is worked out.  It will be postulated that transsexual suffering is currently 
considered to be a medical problem because of the interest that medicine has in the 
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subject.  As was seen in Chapter One, medicine began to take an interest in human 
sexuality and sexual identity with the work of the Edwardian sexologists.  Doctors are 
seen as experts in matters of both mind and body and as experts who offer an explanation 
for TS which has gained currency at the present time.  Szasz argues that medicine has 
replaced the Church in terms of authority and doctors now function as priests once did.  
He regards the idea that there is only one explanation for human phenomena as 
problematic: 
 
      The belief that there is only one right way to live, only one right way to 
      regulate religious, political, sexual and medical affairs is the root cause of the 
      greatest threat to man: members of its own species bent on ensuring his 
      salvation, security and sanity.217 
 
 
Szasz recognises that the motives behind this single-mindedness are benevolent but 
argues that they are intrinsically harmful to human well-being.  The harm consists both in 
the paternalism of those who propound the view and in the damage done to those on the 
receiving end. 
 
MOTIVATIONAL CRITIQUE 
 
The desire on the part of medicine to alleviate the suffering of the transsexual may well 
be an expression of the way that post-imperial, post Second World War guilt functions 
within western institutions as noted earlier in the work of Amato.  He argues that western, 
white, male and middle class awareness is suffused with guilt which in turn leads to an 
assuming of responsibility for and a desire to help those who are needy. 
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Amato argues that this awareness includes the idea that the western white male class are 
responsible for the sufferings of others and have not always responded well to it.  Once 
such sufferings would have been dismissed as irrelevant and no concern showed to those 
who are experiencing it.  Now there is a desire to make up for this earlier failure and so 
responsibility is assumed for present suffering and attempts made to alleviate it. 
 
In relation to TS it is possible to argue that the predominantly white, western and male 
medical community have assumed a responsibility for the suffering of the transsexual on 
the basis that there would have been a time when it would not have been recognised and 
the transsexual person left alone in her/his misery or given advice that is now regarded as 
paternalistic.  Evidence of this can be found in most transsexual autobiographies such as 
those of Jorgensen, Morris, and Rees et al.  This awareness is coupled with other 
examples of the way that medicine once mistreated or mishandled people in need such as 
those who sought help for such ‘problems’ as masturbation, hysteria and psychiatric 
conditions.  It is the publication of such autobiographies and the work of both the medical 
and activist transsexual pioneers that has raised awareness of the way that medicine once 
failed to help. It can now be argued that medicine has sought to reverse its previous 
approach. 
 
The suffering of the transsexual is now taken seriously, but sometimes uncritically.  Some 
doctors may be aware of the way that medicine previously failed to help people with what 
would have been then regarded as trivial or irrational problems.  A climate of taking 
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seriously the concerns of minority groups especially in relation to issues of sex and 
sexuality is now the result (see Chapter Two and interim conclusion). 
 
A motivation that is both unwilling to engage critically and that incorporates feelings of 
guilt and responsibility for past actions is a problematic motivation for action.  It can be 
argued that this motivation is fundamentally negative and as a result is wrong both for the 
one who feels the need to act and for the one for whose sake the action is undertaken.  
What medicine may need to learn from its past mistakes is not to seek to rectify them by 
uncritically accepting suffering claims but to discriminate between those claims that are 
the legitimate concern of medicine and those which are not.  Added to this is the need of 
medicine to measure suffering claims against its own skills and resources. 
 
CONSEQUENTIAL CRITIQUE 
 
One possible consequence of an uncritical acceptance of the duty to alleviate suffering is 
that it may reinforce the bipolar or dimorphic sexual essentialist views of gender.  It was 
seen in Chapter One that in the discussion on gender there is a contradiction at the centre 
of the current construction of TS.  The condition is predicated upon the separation of sex 
and gender yet treatment aims to reunify the two.  Without the separation of sex and 
gender TS would not be a logical and rational possibility yet by seeking a correlation or 
realignment between the two through surgery it reverses the very conditions upon which 
its existence depends. 
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The separation of sex and gender, discussed earlier in the work of Money, is part of the 
legacy of feminist theory.  Feminism sought to question the assumption that masculinity 
and femininity are essentialist categories determined by biology and fixed through all 
cultures and for all times.  It offered the view that they were social constructs concerned 
with power between the two groups, constructed by men on order to subjugate women 
and ensure the continuation of masculine dominance.  The idea of immutable categories 
of masculine and feminine was part of the attempt by men to maintain power and was 
accomplished by means of patriarchy. 
 
For instance Butler218 argues that gender ought to be viewed as a cultural construction 
that serves the interest of men: 
 
      the distinction between sex and gender serves the argument that whatever 
      biological intractability sex appears to have, gender is culturally 
      constructed.219 
 
 
Butler recognised that there are biological differences between the bodies of men and 
women and that there may be differences between the two in terms of physical strength 
and certain functions such as menstruation, pregnancy, lactation and child birth but 
denied that these either naturally do, or in some moral sense ought to, give rise 
characteristics that define the ontological possibilities of men and women.  Sex is 
therefore not to be understood as that which defines gender or as that which determines 
ontological realities. 
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The separation of sex and gender has contributed to the shift away from the idea of the 
inequality of women.  Traditional ideas of female inequality was predicated upon the 
notion that character is determined by body and as the body of the woman was thought to 
be inferior to that of the man then her character and her possibilities were also inferior.  
With this uncoupling of sex from gender then the latter became the limitless possibility of 
all people. Characteristics could now be universally experienced and along with this came 
the possibility of equality between the sexes. 
 
It is possible, therefore, to argue that the idea of gender as distinct from sex is a gain in 
terms of the equality of women.  By making the realignment of sex and gender the 
therapeutic goal in the treatment of TS medicine can be seen as working against this gain.  
This is not only out of step with those who regard sex and gender as distinct realities but 
may also ultimately harm the equality that has been gained as a result of the distinction. 
 
At some popular levels sex and gender are still understood as being one and the same.  
This is seen in the both the popular media and in ordinary and everyday conversations.  
Medicine may be aligning itself with these popular views with its current treatment goals 
for TS.  To do so may prove to be inconsistent with the insights regarding the difference 
between sex and gender.  On the one hand medicine recognises this distinction thereby 
allowing TS to be seen as a legitimate construct and, on the other hand, by its treatment 
approach denies it through presenting a transsexual person in whom sex and gender is 
one. 
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This consequential critique of the current duty to alleviate suffering argues that 
medicine’s current response is both incoherent and may possibly impact negatively on the 
gains that have been achieved by the separation of gender from sex.  This does not mean 
that medicine ought not to respond at all to the suffering of the transsexual but to do so by 
seeking to once again cohere ideas of sex and gender is not only incoherent with its own 
construction of TS but may also reinforce popular ideas that are at odds with academic 
discourse. 
 
7. The Possible Value of Transsexual Suffering 
 
In this section I want to argue that the chief reason why it may be inappropriate to adopt 
an absolute duty to alleviate the suffering of the transsexual is because of the potential 
value of suffering.   
 
It can be argued that there at least two possible ways that the suffering of the transsexual 
may be of value: the first is that it may benefit the person who is suffering and the second 
is that TS may be of benefit to humanity as a whole. 
 
The suffering that is experienced by a transsexual may be of personal value in existential 
terms.  This suffering is centred upon the nature of personal identity and the way this is 
understood both subjectively and objectively.  It is specifically related to the way that 
personal identity relates to issues of masculinity and femininity.  The transsexual is in a 
unique position to reflect upon this.  In a sense she/he has been forced to so reflect and 
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the experience of suffering that may be an opportunity to reflect upon why it is that some 
aspects of personality are seen as masculine whilst others as feminine.   
 
If a male transsexual believes that he is in reality a female and suffers as a result then 
rather than seek to do nothing other than alleviate this suffering he may embrace it and 
through it reflect on why it is that he can feel female.  He may be able to reflect on what 
femininity is and how it is possible for him to access this knowledge.  This in turn may 
lead him to address the broader issue of what both categories are.  He may well conclude 
that to construct them as opposites is a mistake the answer to which is to embrace the 
totality of his life experience and not seek an either/or solution but to seek one that is 
both/and.  Through reflecting upon his suffering he may learn to think of himself as 
neither male/female nor masculine/feminine but as himself.  He is a totality of a being 
which incorporates both his objective status and his subjective awareness.  He may be led 
to increased sincerity and authenticity as a result of his reflections and this latter 
possibility will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.   
 
The potential benefit that is gained from this reflection upon suffering may be lost if an 
absolute duty to alleviate it is in place.  An absolute duty disvalues suffering:  it is to be 
removed as quickly as possible.  Removal of suffering may involve suffering for the 
transsexual in terms of all that is required in the treatment process.  A transsexual’s 
willingness to experience suffering in order for it to be alleviated is not only necessary 
but is also seen as evidence of commitment to therapeutic goals.  This commitment 
appears to be a prerequisite for the granting of the treatment itself. 
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Suffering may prove to be of value then if it proves to be an occasion for reflection in the 
way described.  A transsexual is no more under an obligation to reflect upon suffering 
than anyone else in similar circumstances.  Whilst it may not be possible to maintain that 
there is a duty to reflect upon suffering it seems reasonable to argue that the option to 
reflect in the way discussed above ought to be available.  An absolute duty leaves little or 
no room for such a possibility. 
 
The second possible value of transsexual suffering is that it may prove an occasion for 
general reflection upon constructions of maleness/femaleness and masculinity/femininity.  
This may result in a rethinking of current understandings which may lead either to a 
reordering of the categories themselves or to an abolition of separate categories. 
 
Califia220 documents how Bornstein calls for such reflection in the hope that the whole 
idea of gender will be abolished.  Bornstein claims: 
 
      I know I’m not a man…and I’ve come to the conclusion that I’m probably not 
      a woman either, at least not according to a lot of people’s rules on this sort of 
      thing.  The trouble is, we’re living in a world that insists we be one or the other.. 
      a world that doesn’t bother to tell us exactly what one or the other is.221  
 
It is Bornstein’s own experience as a M-F post-operative transsexual that seems to have 
enabled her to come to this conclusion.  If she had been encouraged to reflect before 
treatment began then she may or may not have transitioned.  This is something that she 
recognises herself and Califia documents222. Bornstein regards gender as an expression of 
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suppression and classifies it along with racism and sexism.  Califia reports that Bornstein 
came to her conclusions as a result of reflection: 
 
      Bornstein makes it clear that she did not come to a place of being neither male 
      nor female until she had done considerable growth and soul searching.223 
 
 
Bornstein’s reflection was after the event and it lead her to question the medicalisation of 
TS and to wonder whether or not the desire for GReS can be reconciled to a non-medical 
construction of TS.  As indicated in the discussion in Chapter Two, authenticity may be a 
possible answer to this question.  If suffering were to be valued, as I am proposing here, 
then it may be that reflection can be done before the event of transitioning both by the 
individual and in society as a whole. 
 
There may be two beneficial consequences to making gender categories redundant.  First, 
the grounds for the suffering of the transsexual would be removed as it is the conflict 
between masculinity and femininity that causes the suffering.  If there is no conflict or no 
polarity of view then there may be no reason for the suffering.  A person may still be 
aware of traits that may once have been considered as exclusively masculine or feminine, 
but would not experience this as a contradiction.  Second, society as a whole may be freer 
in its understanding of the possibilities for personal development.  Gender polarity may 
be replaced as a concept with the view that identity is more free and more fluid an idea 
than was once thought. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter I have argued that there is a negative human experience that can be 
understood as suffering and which is distinguishable from other negative experiences by 
its multidimensionality. The importance of this experience is the way that the person 
concerned thinks about it.  There is a very strong, but not an absolute, duty to respond to 
this suffering.  Suffering is potentially of value both to the sufferer and to society in 
general.  The absolute duty to alleviate suffering is problematic and so a prima facie duty 
may not exist. 
 
Should a person who is suffering express the wish to be helped then this ought to be 
respected.  It would, however, still be legitimate to point out the potential value of 
suffering and if, on the basis of informed choice, someone then sought this benefit, it 
would be legitimate to offer support and to enable them to do so.  Counselling or other 
forms of talking therapy may be a means of enabling a person to benefit from the 
experience of suffering. 
 
The alleviation of suffering can not be thought, therefore, to be a sufficient justification 
for GReS to be prescribed as the treatment goal for all transsexual people.  Suffering may 
be a necessary condition for surgery to be offered but for the reasons laid out in this 
chapter it does not provide sufficient grounds for treatment.  A serious duty to respond to 
suffering exists but the shape of that response may depend upon the requests and the 
desires of the one who is suffering.  There is also an important role for the one who is 
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seeking to respond apart from that of alleviation.  The responder may have the role of 
encouraging the sufferer to positively engage with their suffering. 
 
If suffering is not a sufficient justification for surgery and the three models are also 
problematic, as was seen in Chapter Two, then an alternative justification for GReS is 
necessary.  Chapter Four will offer such an alternative justification, in the form of 
authenticity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR AUTHENTICITY 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will argue for a specific definition of authenticity and authentic TS.  The 
definition will be an Existential one which lays emphasis upon personal freedom and 
responsibility recognising the importance of choice and autonomous functioning. 
 
As we have seen, the current understanding of TS is essentialist in its construction, an 
understanding that is overwhelmingly medical.  Many transsexuals think about TS in this 
medical sensexxv, one result of which is that their sense of self is defined by TS.  Self-
identity is conceived in terms of TS with the belief that because the condition was not 
chosen there is no control over it and therefore no choice about how it is experienced and 
how it will impact upon one’s life.  
 
In Existentialism freedom is the fundamental truth of human existence and each 
individual has to recognise themselves as undetermined free agents.  Failure to do so 
results in what Sartre coins ‘bad faith’, a species of inauthenticity224.  Bad faith results 
from the failure to take responsibility for oneself, one example of which is the claim that 
because a person did not originally choose a condition or an experience there is therefore 
neither choice in how it is worked out nor responsibility for its implications.   
 
                                                 
 
xxv See the autobiographies mentioned in this thesis e.g. Jorgensen and Morris. 
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In this chapter I will argue that an essentialist construction of TS results in inauthentic 
living.  An inauthentic life has elements of deception, both self-deception and of 
deception of others.  To think that a person’s essence or original condition is an 
immutable factor that determines behaviour is to be in bad faith as it ignores personal 
responsibility which is a core feature of morality. 
 
Authentic existence consists in taking personal responsibility for one’s whole of life and 
then living that life in freedom and choice.  In order to develop the argument of 
authenticity in relation to TS this chapter will be organised in the following way.  It will 
begin by giving some background for Essentialism which, for the purposes of this 
chapter, will be understood as the idea that a person is defined by his/her essence. 
Essentialism relates to the original ‘given-ness’ of an individual.  Determinism is the idea 
that a person is defined, controlled, operates upon or shaped by factors outside of his/her 
conscious experience.  A person’s decisions and actions are ‘determined’ by antecedent 
events.  In relation to TS, then, this can be understood in the following way: the ‘essence’ 
of TS is found in the size of the BSTc region of the hypothalamus whilst ‘determinism’ is 
the view that gender identity arises inexorably from its functioning. 
 
This background will prepare the way for an analysis of the medical model of TS. This 
model is essentialist in nature and offers a form of determinism that states a transsexual 
individual is not freely choosing a gender identity but is ‘determined’ by the functioning 
of the BSTc region of the hypothalamus.  It is predictable, given the nature of the 
hypothalamus that the transsexual person behaves in the way that she/he does. 
 170 
 
 
There then follows an Existential analysis of TS leading to an existential account of 
authenticity and TS with counter arguments to this existentialist construction.  I will then 
address the question of what is gained by replacing an essentialist account with an 
existential one.  I will conclude that essentialist accounts of TS are both problematic and 
incoherent.  Such accounts are the product of the ‘first wave’ of thinking about TS in a 
medical context where doctors are considered experts, able to rationalise, codify, manage 
and act as gatekeepers for GReS.  Within the transsexual community a ‘second wave’ of 
thinking about TS is taking place in which the medical model is being challenged and an 
anti-essentialist perspective emerging.   
 
My thesis is that both essentialism and suffering per se are bogus justifications for GReS.  
Instead GReS is a means by which a transsexual may either achieve or work towards 
personal authenticity.   
1.  Essentialism 
 
Essentialism is the view that the nature of a particular life form is determined by its 
inherent nature that gives a life its shape and in turn governs how a life is lived.  It is 
based in the physical nature of the life form, which in the case of human beings tends 
ultimately to mean the structure, organisation and functioning of the brain.  The whole 
body is seen as that which is given and it is the brain that endows a person with those 
capacities that mark him/her out both as unique as an individual and also as a member of 
the human species. It is the capacity for reason that is the hallmark of human persons.  An 
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essentialist would hold that a person is a product of physical endowment and therefore 
ought to live in accordance with this.  Accordingly, morality is based on the belief that 
good action accords with human reason.  The capacity for reason is viewed as the highest 
human capacity. 
 
Philosophical essentialism is found in the works of Plato225, the French encyclopaedists 
Diderot226 and Voltaire227 and Kant228.  Aristotle writes: 
 
     Now we take the human’s function to be a certain kind of life, 
     and take this life to be the soul’s activity and actions that express 
     reason.  Hence the excellent man’s function is to do this finely and 
     well.  Each function is completed well when its completion expresses 
     the proper virtue.  Therefore the human good turns out to be the soul’s 
     activity that expresses virtue.229 
 
    
Aristotle argued for a hylomorphic understanding of all objects; they consist of an 
irreducible minimum of element, the sum total of which gives to an object its form and 
nature.230  Aristotle further identified this irreducible minimum as the material cause with 
the formal cause understood as the pattern used to assemble the basic materials into an 
object.  A human being consists of the basic material of humanness and is ‘assembled’ 
according to the idea or form of humanity.  The end of human life is to function 
according to its human nature. 
 
The concept of formal cause has been subject to much scrutiny since the time of Aristotle 
and has largely been replaced in modern secular philosophy with the idea that the only 
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element of design in nature is that provided by biological evolution.  Attention has 
become focussed upon biological functioning as the basis for human living. 
 
In modern secular philosophy one form of essentialism is the view that human 
consciousness is the result of the neuro-chemical activity of the brain making human 
consciousness ostensibly a physical activity.  Searle231. discusses human consciousness in 
the context of the ‘mind/brain’ problem and regards self consciousness as that which is 
distinctive about humanity.  He argues for an essentialist understanding of mind that 
maintains that human consciousness is the result of the physical workings of the brain: 
 
      As far as we know anything about how the world works, variable 
      rates of neuron firings in different neuronal architectures cause all the 
      enormous variety of our conscious life.  These variable rates of  
      neuron firings cause all the colour and variety of our conscious life 
      …the smell of the flower, the sound of the symphony and the  
      thoughts of the theorems in Euclidian geometry-all are caused by 
      lower level biological processes in the brain232. 
 
 
For Searle there is no duality between physical and mental things.  All mental activity- 
including higher consciousness- is the result if the workings of neurological processes.  
Lower level physical functioning gives rise to higher level consciousness, which is 
experienced both subjectively and in a manner that gives to the self an appearance of 
separation between brain/body and mind.  (It is the appearance of consciousness to the 
self as well as consciousness itself that is known as the mind).  Brain processes are the 
cause mental states and it is in the latter that a sense of self is formed.  This includes the 
knowledge that one is a self as well as the awareness of what it is to engage with the 
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external world including other selves.  Both the essence of a self and the expression of 
that self can be traced back to the neuronal activity of the brain. 
 
Searle suggests that all the aspects of personality results from neuronal activity.  Talents, 
tendencies, abilities and characteristics are all inherent features of the self that come to 
expression in the way that a life is lived out.  Also linked to this, not necessarily in Searle 
but in a general sense, is genetic determinism. 
 
Other philosophers working in philosophy of mind have offered alternative models to that 
of Searle.  In Popper and Eccles233 for instance, the goal of essentialist thinking is: 
 
      to formulate a theory that can in principle provide a complete 
      explanation of all the behaviour of animals and man, including 
      man’s verbal behaviour.234 
 
 
They argue for ‘interactionism’, which claims that mental states are as real as physical 
objects and that the brain, rather than being the origin, location and causation of mental 
states is the place where the mental and physical interact.  Both authors claim that the 
problem in philosophy of mind is to explain how interactionism works. 
 
This brief account of both the arguments and counter arguments in the realm of 
essentialism are provided in order to pave the way for a discussion of essentialism and TS 
 
2. Essentialist Explanation for TS 
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We are by now familiar with the fact that the majority view on TS is both essential and 
medical.  Hoenig235 produced a review of all the research into the biological basis for TS 
in 1985 and offered the following conclusion: 
 
      (the claim that) psychological factors determine gender identity 
      cannot be regarded as being established.  The search for  
      constitutional factors has brought to light interesting conclusions.236  
 
 
Hoenig developed the work of Benjamin by looking for biological explanations for TS 
and to further conceptualise it as a matter of a person’s essence.  Initial attention was 
focussed on hormonal abnormalities but this was soon superseded by interest in the brain.  
In Chapter Two the work of Zhou et al in relation to the BSTc region of the 
hypothalamus was noted.  They offer the following conclusion to their research: 
 
      Our observations suggest the small size of the BSTc in M-F  
      transsexuals cannot be explained by differences in adult sex hormone 
      levels, but is established during development by an organising action 
      of sex hormones, an idea supported by the fact that neonatal  
      gonadectomy of male rats and androgenitization of the female 
      rats indeed induce significant changes in the number of neurons 
      of the BSTc and suppressed its sexual dimorphism237.   
 
 
The difference in the size of the BSTc region of the hypothalamus between M-F 
transsexuals and non-transsexual men is thought to be the result of abnormal foetal 
development.  The brain of the foetus is thought to be organised as a result of hormonal 
‘washings’ from the mother and the foetus.  Such washings organise the sexual 
characteristics of the foetus all of which are female in initial formation.  After week 
fourteen a foetus may develop as male as a result of hormonal influence.  If the brain and 
the secondary sexual characteristics are masculinised then the brain will show differences 
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in organisation from the female.  One such difference is the size of the BSTc which 
appears smaller in females.  This region is believed by essentialists to be the source of 
gender identity and so if a M-F transsexual has the same brain organization as a female 
then she can be thought of as essentially female. 
 
Zhou et al collaborated with Krujiver and Pool238 in 2000 to produce an article which 
stated that M-F transsexuals have female-like neurons in the Limbic Nucleus: 
 
      In line with the hypothesis that in transsexuals sexual differentiation 
      of the brain contrasts with that of the genetic and physical 
      characteristics of sex, our group has recently found that the size of the 
      central subdivision of the BSTc was within the female range in 
      genetically M-F transsexuals.239 
 
 
The researchers sought to establish whether this difference is due to the neuronal 
organisation within the region itself or as a result of the organisation of the amygdale 
itself.  To do this they focussed attention on the somatostatin expressing neurons in the 
BSTc region.  Niedermayer240, reporting on the findings of Sapolski, comments: 
 
      The research suggests something new about the source of TS: your 
      pattern of chromosomes, gonads, genitals, secondary sexual 
      characteristics, the hormones of your blood stream and the way you 
      are treated by your parents, teachers and society at large may all be in 
      agreement that you are a certain sex.  But, something as hard-nosed  
      and biological as the number of neurons in a part of your brain may  
      be telling you that no, that’s not who you are: You are the opposite 
      sex.  Imprisoned.  The bodies transsexuals are born into actually are 
      the opposite gender of who they really are because prenatally  
      established brain structures determine innate gender feelings and 
      gender identity. 
 
 
Niedermayer concludes by quoting Sapolski’s response to these findings: 
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      These are dramatic, unprecedented, undeniable observations…the 
       implications are far reaching, especially for those who suffer from  
       cross-gender identities.  Instead of those gender feelings being  
       considered ‘psychological’ they can now be understood as being 
       ‘neuro-biological’ in nature.241 
 
 
These findings are thought to indicate that TS results from the brain being ‘wired’ in a 
particular way.  Other factors may contribute to the total picture but the essence is due to 
the structure and functioning of the BSTc region of the hypothalamus.  This essentialist 
construction gives rise to the idea that TS is an unalterable condition which in turn 
determines the experience of the transsexual individual. 
 
This essentialist construction is reflected in the way that many transsexuals learn to think 
about themselves as evidenced in autobiographical accounts.  As was seen earlier; the 
first transsexual to have a wide and popular readership was Jorgensen who was offered 
the following explanation of her condition by her doctor: 
 
      I think that the trouble is deep rooted in the cells of your body. 
      Outwardly you have many of the sex characteristics of a man, yet 
      it is quite possible that you are a woman.  Your body chemistry and 
      all of your body cells, including your brain cells, may be female.242 
 
 
She likened her response to this news to receiving an ‘electric volt 243 and it was this 
consultation which provided her with the medical support she needed to pursue 
reassignment. 
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A similar essentialist self understanding is found in Morris’s autobiography.  In her first 
encounter with Benjamin he acknowledged the limited understanding of TS at that time 
but maintained that it should be thought of as something which is fixed and unalterable.  
She records him as saying: 
 
      It (TS) is an immutable state.  So I ask myself in mercy or in  
      common sense if we cannot alter the conviction to fit the body, 
      should we not in certain circumstances, alter the body to fit the 
      conviction?244.  
 
 
As a result Morris’s dream of changing her body to reflect the way she saw herself 
became a real possibility.   
 
Both narratives suggest that transsexuals are experiencing the dissonance between sex 
and gender and as a result put themselves on the path to alignment using medical and 
surgical interventions.  The dissonance seems to be experienced as something that is 
fixed partly because it has been present from earliest memories.  A mistake of nature or 
of God is often the belief that a transsexual offers with the claim that it has ‘happened’ to 
them.  As a result of this sense of permanence a transsexual may think that she/he has no 
choice but to be a transsexual and that TS is somehow defining. 
 
As the two passages show it is often when an essentialist, medical explanation of TS is 
offered by a physician that an individual comes to think about themselves as transsexual.  
The explanation of the doctor   becomes a moment of insight and transcendence which 
both liberates and offers hope.  Also, as the recent ‘Between Ourselves’ programme 
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broadcast on the BBC Radio4 suggested the internet is also a source of information and 
insightxxvi. 
 
The on-line transsexual discussion forum Gendertalk contains many accounts of many 
people for whom the medical explanation of their experience was important and who 
learned to think about themselves as transsexual as a result.245   The moment of 
‘revelation’ from the doctor becomes a moment of self-understanding.  This suggests that 
the transsexual may buy into the medico-essentialist construction as that which explains 
her/his experience.  Not only does it seem to fit with the facts of experience but it also 
comes with the authority and weight of science and medicine.  The permanence TS and 
the medical explanation combine to form the understanding of the condition. 
 
The combination of subjective (as experienced by the person) and objective (found in 
scientific ‘evidence’) fixedness is often reinforced by contact with other transsexuals 
whether this takes place within the hospital setting or the transsexual community.  
Contact with others has the effect of consolidating self understanding. 
 
3. Essentialism and TS 
 
                                                 
 
xxvi Transmitted on the 17th July 2008 two partners of transsexual people discuss their experiences.  Both 
talk about how they understood their partners transsexuality and, amongst other things, how their partners 
found information about their transsexuality. 
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The inability to function has been identified by Boorse246 as one of the elements that 
constitute a disease.  Boorse argues that health corresponds to ideas of what is normal for 
a species in order for it to function: 
 
      the state of an organism is theoretically healthy, i.e. free from disease 
      in so far as its mode of functioning conforms to the natural design of  
      that kind of organism.  (Diseases are) deviations from the natural 
      functional organization of the species.247 
 
 
This view fits within the Natural Law Paradigm and within medicine it gives rise to the 
belief that the health of an individual is proportionate to the ability to function according 
to norms of human experience.  Boorse argues that health is a value neutral concept 
which can be thought of in three ways: as a matter of individual potential, species 
potential and as an unlimited view.  The first of these consists in an individual’s ability to 
achieve maximum functional potential, the second is concerned with the maximum 
potential of the species as a whole and the third is the idea that any increase in functional 
ability benefits the whole species.  Anything that interferes with this functional ability has 
to be considered as a matter of disease with illness being the subjective experience of 
interference with normal functioning: 
 
      diseases are internal states that depress a functional ability below  
      species-typical levels.248 
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Boorse maintains that health need not be thought of as a practical judgement made in 
relation to patients, nor as a commitment to what he describes as ‘positive health’.  Health 
is merely a description of what is the normal functioning of a species.xxvii 
 
According to this definition TS can be thought of as a disease as it results in a failure to 
function according to ideas of what is normal for men and women.  The dysfunction is 
rooted in the sex/gender dissonance and so it may be inferred from this that sex/gender 
congruency is both normal in human experience and necessary for human functioning.  If 
TS is a disease then transsexuals may be unable to live successfully or function normally 
so that she/he is unable to experience personal happiness. 
 
The sex organs of the transsexual are not diseased.  They function as Boorse suggests 
they should (to promote survival and reproduction).  One component of the ‘disease’ is in 
the perception of these organs and this may make TS partly a mental as well as a physical 
disease. 
 
If TS is a disease then medical treatment, if it can be found, is appropriate.  Without 
treatment both the condition and the suffering will remain: TS is a fixed condition.  There 
is also a relationship between frustration at the lack of access to treatment and suffering. 
Where it is difficult to access treatment there is often an increase in the experience of 
suffering. The knowledge that treatment is available but not a possibility for a specific 
                                                 
 
xxvii In Chapter Two a footnote sets out an example of the vast literature on health/illness definitions. 
Catherine McDonald has offered a critique of Boorse’s account of health (1V Annual Symposium on 
Biomedicine, ethics and Society 2004 Uppsala University Sweden). 
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individual (perhaps due to economic considerations) may intensify a person’s 
sufferingxxviii.  The elements of hope, desire and possibility are frustrated when treatment 
is denied and this leads to suffering. 
 
When no treatment is available a transsexual may adjust and accept that surgery is not a 
possibility for her/him.  This, in turn, may lead to a diminution of suffering. 
 
The essentialist belief about the fixedness of TS drives medical and surgical 
management:  
 
1. The G.P is the first point of contact who would normally refer the individual to: 
2. A psychiatrist for initial assessment whose first task is to test the strength of the 
belief in sex/gender dissonance coupled with an understanding of the strength and 
duration of the suffering claim.  The psychiatrist attempts to rule out other 
conditions that cause sex/gender dissonance, such as some form of psychosis, 
before accepting the claims of the transsexual and beginning the treatment 
process.  The psychiatrist has a gate keeping role in relation to the whole 
treatment process.   
 
3. Once the individual’s claim has been accepted by the psychiatrist then the process 
of transitioning can begin.  The first step is the taking of hormones and leads to 
                                                 
 
xxviii There has been a great deal of publicity in recent times about so called ‘patient protests’ in relation to 
cancer treatment e.g. http://www.bio-medicine.org/medicine-news/Cancer-Patient-Protests-Before-
Assembly-7513-1/.  It is the suffering that this causes in addition to the experience of cancer that is often 
highlighted in these cases. 
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the transsexual ‘passing’ in the desired gender role within the community.  This is 
seen as an essential indicator of the success or otherwise of reassignment surgery. 
 
4. Surgery (GReS) is the ultimate goal of medical intervention. 
 
No guidelines from NICE are currently available on the management of TS.  The Harry 
Benjamin organisation remains the body that governs the medical management of TS. 
 
Because of the importance attached to transitioning a few comments are necessary at this 
point.  First, it is possible for a person to live in a desired gender role without medical and 
surgical intervention.  This is known within the transsexual community as ‘living out’ 
and is thought of as a matter of personal choice.  Transitioning, strictly defined, is a 
medicalised process containing the idea of moving from one mode of being to another by 
means of technically and permanently altering the body.  A subjective decision is made 
by the individual between ‘living out’ and transitioning.  The former emphasises gender 
role and is a matter of what a person can ‘put on’ in terms of gender signifiers whilst the 
latter is a physical remodelling of the body.  ‘Living out’ is a matter of display and 
performance and transitioning a matter of re-orientating the sexed body. 
 
Second, successful ‘passing’ seems to be a matter of convincing others of gender 
performance. Reitz argues: 
 
      To the transsexual it [the ability to pass] can make the difference 
       between forever being an object or living a comfortable life..249 
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Transsexual’s are encouraged to study the characteristics of the desired gender and to 
incorporate then into his/her own life.  By transitioning a transsexual is encouraged to 
choose a construction of gender that is often stereotypical.  A M-F transsexual may seek 
to ‘pass’ as a very feminine woman whilst a F-M may seek to become a readily 
identifiable man.  This may be due to a desire to make sure that the act of passing is 
successful.  As ambiguity during this process may harm the prospects of being accepted 
for surgery, a transsexual may be under pressure to construct a gender presentation that 
conforms to stereotypical ideas as these are unambiguous.  It remains true, however, that 
such gender presentations often coincide with the wishes of the transsexual him/herself 
who may visualise their own gender identity in such terms. 
 
Lawrence suggests: 
 
      The importance of the Real-Life Experience (passing) is probably the 
      closet thing to a ‘sacred cow’ that exists in the world of transsexual 
      care.  But there is surprisingly little empirical evidence that a one year 
      real-life experience, or indeed that any real life experience, is either 
      a necessary or a sufficient condition for achieving favourable  
      outcomes after GReS.250 
 
 
Her comments cast doubt on the connection between the ability to pass and satisfactory 
post-surgical outcomes.  Nevertheless it remains a pre-condition for surgery and is 
something that is generally considered to be an important element in the treatment 
process.  WPATH lays stress on both aspects in its standards of care.251  
 
The goal of medical intervention in TS is a happy and adjusted individual.  In order to 
achieve this various medical specialists are engaged: urology, endocrinology and 
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dermatology as well as those already identified.  Psychiatry formally recognises TS 
according to its diagnostic standards and controls transitioning by referring transsexuals 
to the appropriate disciplines and exercising a supervisory role252.   
 
Psychiatry has, therefore, a central role in the construction and organisation of TS yet TS 
itself is not considered to be a mental illness.  As we have seen in the work of Zhou253 et 
al TS is thought to be due to brain disorder in the same way as epilepsy or Tourettes 
syndrome.  This would make TS a neurological matter rather than a psychiatric one and 
so a psychiatric classification of TS is problematic.  Even more problematic, then, is a 
surgical resolution to a neurological problem. 
 
4. Critique of Essentialism 
 
This critique will consist first of a general critique within the parameters of this chapter 
and second of the essentialist understanding of TS itself. 
GENERAL CRITIQUE 
 
Haldane254 offers the following general critique: 
 
      If materialism is true, it seems to me that we cannot know that it is 
      true.  If my convictions are the result of the chemical processes going 
      on in my brain, they are determined by the laws of chemistry and not 
      of logic.255 
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Haldane’s argument is that materialism reduces the whole of human experience to both 
the organisation and functioning of the brain.  He is critical of this view.  However, 
Haldane seems to conflate materialism with both essentialism and determinism.  For him 
materialism seems to refer to both the essence of a person and to the subsequent effect of 
that essence upon the person (determinism).  Materialism includes both 
conceptualisations. It reduces the whole of human experience to physical processes.  
Brain structures account for a person’s essence, whilst neuro-chemical functioning of the 
brain determines human behaviour.   
 
However, contrary to Haldane, materialism need not coincide with essentialism or 
determinism.  It is also possible to think of materialism as referring to the view that the 
physical world is the only world that exists and that ideas of an immaterial or spiritual 
world are mistaken.  In this sense materialism is the view that it is only physical and 
visible substances that can be thought of as existing beyond doubt or as ‘real’.  Haldane 
seems to be using the term ‘materialism’ to refer to the scientific view that discounts a 
‘mind’ as opposed to brain explanation for human behaviour or as the opposite view to 
Cartesian dualism. 
 
Working with his definition of materialism he points out that this concept must also be 
the result of the firing of brain chemicals and not a ‘pure’ thought.  The concept cannot 
be considered as a logical deduction about the nature of brain functioning but as a further 
example of brain functioning. 
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Materialism, in the sense critiqued by Haldane, attributes all human behaviour and 
experience to a combination of essence and determinism. This would include the 
functioning of reason.  It is a matter of brain organisation and functioning. A person is 
able to reason if she/he has the correct brain organisation that, in turn, functions 
accordingly.  There is no room, in this view, for the subjective life of the individual, for 
the idea that subjectivity is a ‘real’ area of experience and for the subjective choice of 
choosing whether or not to act rationally. 
 
Outside of materialism, reason is classified as a mental capacity linked to the will and is 
regarded as the highest good in human experiencexxix.  A person can freely choose 
whether or not to act rationally and be held morally accountable for doing so.  Haldane’s 
materialism undermines this understanding of both rationality and morality: moral 
categories such as goodness/badness are replaced by neurological function/dysfunction.  
Accordingly it is increasingly difficult to have notions of responsibility, moral worth and 
commendable behaviour. 
 
Robertson256 adds a further argument against essentialism.  She argues that an essentialist 
position would not allow for variation if the same original material is used. Using Ship of 
Theseusxxx type arguments she explores ideas of continuity and difference and argues that 
difference is in fact possible even where similar type building materials are used.  
                                                 
 
xxix This thesis is not the place for a full discussion of the work of Aristotle or Kant who emphasise the 
importance of rationality as the highest good and rational functioning.  It is sufficient here to note that this 
is the case. 
xxx The Ship of Theseus is a Greek legend told by Plutarch.  Overtime the ship in which Theseus returned to 
Athens was replaced piece by piece in order for it to be kept as a memorial.  Plutarch questioned if the fully 
replaced ship could be understood as the same ship which returned Theseus in the first place. 
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Applied to human experience if essentialism is true then it becomes difficult to explain 
human variety in terms of abilities, character and social presentation.  Human brains are 
similarly configured and operational yet the differences between people are incalculable.  
Robertson questions how this is possible if origins are determinative. 
 
She is concerned both to identify attributes that ‘make-up’ a thing and those which are 
present but not determinative and with how this distinction is to be made.  She makes a 
distinction between attributes that are essential and those that are accidental.  She does 
not consider essentialism an unintelligible theoretical position but questions the basis on 
which it distinguishes between essentials and accidents: 
 
      I do not mean to suggest that it [essentialism] is without its 
      perplexities.  Chief amongst these is the obscurity of the grounds 
      on which ratings of attributes as essential or accidental are made257. 
 
 
A slight variation in the essential make-up could greatly impact upon a finished object, so 
that it is difficult to distinguish the essential from the accidental.  This may be sufficient 
reason to be careful about the way that the original condition of a thing is constructed. 
 
Whilst essentialism recognises the importance of the original nature of an object or a 
person in terms of its nature it cannot be thought to be a complete explanation. First, it 
does not allow for the possibility of variation or difference and second, in relation to 
human thought, if all thought is reducible to neurological firing then principles or 
concepts are nothing more than neurological activity.  Common intuitions regarding 
morality are redundant and so a new construction becomes necessary. 
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CRITIQUE OF THE ESSENTIALIST CONSTRUCTION OF TS 
 
In this section I want to make four criticisms of the essentialist construction of TS. 
 
The first criticism is in relation to the current willingness of medicine to offer transition 
and reassignment as a solution.  This may be inconsistent with an essentialist 
understanding.  If essentialism is the basis for the experience of TS (in terms of brain 
organisation) then, at the same time and in order to be consistent, the suffering of the 
transsexual needs to be understood in the same way.  All human experience is traced back 
to brain function/dysfunction.  Suffering would be viewed as neurological dysfunction 
affecting those areas of the brain thought to be responsible for emotional experience.  
Chemical imbalances would be the reason for suffering and its alleviation would consist 
in controlling these imbalances with the appropriate drugs rather than through the current 
practices of transitioning and surgery. 
 
Yet, within TS, suffering is not understood in this way.  It is considered to be the direct 
result of the dissonance between sex and gender.  It is thought to arise within the mind of 
the transsexual and then to be experienced by the self.  It is the most ‘real’ element of TS 
as well as the most morally significant element in her/his experience.  It forms the basis 
for the present medical justification for treatment. 
 
TS suffering is understood to be different from the medical understanding of depression.  
In the latter a person is thought to be experiencing negative emotions as a result of brain 
dysfunction and treatment consists in attempting to restore the chemical balance.  An 
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essentialist construction defines both the formulation and treatment of depression with the 
result that it is viewed as an illness. 
 
TS is not seen as an illness even though it has a medical construction and treatment.  This 
is the case for those who seek to identify and treat illness even though TS has illness 
identifying markers and treatment modalities. Instead TS is thought to lead to 
malfunction or impairment with the problems of the transsexual understood to be 
emotional and social.  The transsexual does not claim to be ill nor does the doctor think 
of the transsexual as an ill person. 
 
To be consistent therefore the present medical model of TS would need to think of the 
whole of the experience of the transsexual, including the experience of suffering, as a 
matter of the operation of the brain.  Then, this essence would be understood to arise 
from a dysfunction of that essence with treatment being focused upon restoring or 
treating that dysfunction.  It would be the brain that would be acted on, primarily by 
means of drugs that would act on the chemical functioning of the brain. 
 
However, as things stand medicine explains the condition of TS as a matter of essence 
with suffering understood as a matter of experience.  Hormones and surgery reflect the 
essentialist understanding whilst the respect for and the conceptualising of suffering 
reflect an existentialist approach.  There seems to be a failure to be consistent here.  An 
essentialist approach would call for treatment that acts on the essence in order to restore it 
to proper functioning.  Alternatively an existential account would call for both the 
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condition itself, the role of the person and the way that the person is to be helped to be a 
matter of personal choice and responsibility. 
 
The essentialist understanding of TS is given by Morris in her account of the interview 
she had with Benjamin.  In refuting an existentialist understanding of TS she recalled him 
saying: 
 
      No true transsexual has yet been persuaded, bullied, drugged, 
      analysed, shamed, ridiculed or electronically shocked into an  
      acceptance of his physique.258 
 
 
This statement reveals several things about Benjamin’s view of TS.  First it implies that 
the difference between true and false transsexuals is that true transsexuals find that only 
surgery works.  The true transsexual’s experience is so bound to the body that it can only 
be remedied by treatments that affect the body: hormones and surgery.  Next it claims 
that because true TS is a matter of essence the related suffering cannot be resolved 
directly but only by means of treating the underlying condition, with a medico-surgical 
intervention. The implication, then, is if anything else works then the person was not a 
true transsexual.  Benjamin is appealing to medical practitioners to see TS as a matter of 
essence and to give up all attempts both to see it and treat it as a matter of the person.  
Yet the transsexual presents as a person who is suffering.   
 
To make the distinction between essence and experience clearer a comparison can be 
made between the suffering of a transsexual and that of a person with a broken wrist.  In 
the former case suffering is understood to engulf the totality of the person, both 
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objectively and subjectively, whereas with the latter the pain is associated with the body.  
The pain of the broken wrist arises from the broken bone; it is experienced as pain and 
loss of function and disappears when the bone mends.  By contrast the suffering of the 
transsexual is not a matter of a broken BSTc region or broken hypothalamus, nor is it 
experienced as such.  Suffering is not experienced as a broken body at all.  It is entirely 
subjective in nature with no attempt made by the sufferer to locate the suffering in the 
body.  It is not just that the transsexual is unable to point to the origin of the pain and say 
that it hurts here; pain is not located in the body at all even though it is linked with the 
body.  Currently the brain is not the target of surgery but the body is and this is altered in 
order to alleviate the suffering of the transsexual. 
 
A second criticism of the essentialist construction of TS I will call the ‘I have therefore I 
am’ criticism.  A claim is made that a given element determines the character and the 
experience of the person in such a way that they are unable to exercise choice in this 
matter.  The person is not, therefore, responsible for either the given element or for its 
subsequent effect.  Also a person is not thought to have a condition called TS but to be a 
transsexual.  Jorgensen’s reading of de Kruif’s ‘The Male Hormone’(New York 1945) is 
an instance of this.259 
 
Claims about identity are necessarily and causally related claims that are simultaneously 
made about the body.  An identity claim is something that forms the basis for personal 
identity and is offered by the person concerned as a justification for that identity.  Being a 
transsexual follows inevitably from either the subjective awareness of sex/gender 
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dissonance or from claims made about the body itself (that the genitals are not the correct 
one for the individual for example).  This may be articulated by the transsexual person as 
being trapped in the wrong body.   
 
A transsexual identity is added to the subjective awareness of the person as if the former 
both explains and accounts for the latter.  The identity is thought to be the explanation of 
the condition of the person.   The person concerned learns to think about him/herself in 
terms of this identity.  It is ‘added on to’ the experience of dissonance in order to make 
sense of it e.g. as a result of conversations with family, friends, professional people or 
with others who share the experience. 
 
But making an identity claim from a body or fundamental nature is a false move.  The 
latter does not necessarily follow from the former.  All that can be claimed as a result of 
fundamental nature is that fundamental nature exists.  Identity claims require an 
additional premise (such as choice or desire) and as such cannot be thought to be 
supported by a fundamental nature claim.  The two claims cannot be thought to prove 
anything other than the fact that the fundamental nature claim is true whilst the identity 
claim may or may not be true.  Any attempt to draw a conclusion about identity from a 
fundamental nature claim is invalid. In relation to TS all that can reasonably be claimed 
as a result of the awareness of sex/gender dissonance is that sex/gender dissonance exists 
within the experience of the person.   
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One consequence of establishing an identity on the basis of fundamental nature is that 
this becomes the only possible identity: TS is the only explanation for people with 
sex/gender dissonance.  It is then difficult for someone experiencing gender dissonance to 
construct an identity as anything other than transsexual.  Indeed, any attempt to do so 
may be viewed as ‘denial’. 
 
The force of my point is obvious when applied to other claims that people make, or try to 
make, about their identity.  For example, claims that a person is criminal solely because 
he possesses an extra X chromosome (I am a criminal because I have an extra X 
chromosome) or that a person is a homosexual because she is sexually attracted to people 
of her own sex (I am sexually attracted to people of my own sex therefore I am a 
homosexual) show the spurious nature of such claims. 
 
The analogy with homosexuality is worth pursuing further.  Norton260., in order to 
establish the legitimacy of the idea of homosexual identity, disagrees with those who 
argue that it is modern idea.  He maintains that the concept is as old as Western 
civilisation itself.  Citing literary and historical sources he demonstrates that every 
Western culture has had people with homosexual desires which he argues then formed the 
basis for personal identity.  His position is that sexual desires form the basis for identity 
claims.  This identity is then maintained over a lifetime and may be expressed by means 
of belonging to distinct groups that make up subcultures within society. 
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Norton contends that such identity was and still is a matter of being rather than of doing 
and to qualify as a defining desire it has to pervade the consciousness of the individual.  
Therefore the sexual desire of the person becomes the identifying marker for that person 
as a person in relation both to himself and to others.  This sexual desire is not something 
that has been chosen, and therefore needs to be understood as part of a person’s 
fundamental nature and because sexual desire is a fundamental element in personal 
experience, the desire is to be understood as something which determines the identity of 
the person. 
 
Norton seeks to challenge the medical construction of homosexuality which sees it as a 
matter of genetic make-up, brain structure, hormonal functioning during foetal 
development all of which is influenced by psychological factors in early childhood and 
adolescence.  It may be that medicine is able to explain what was not previously 
understood but he argues that this explanation does not create the idea of homosexual 
identity as this identity preceded explanation. 
 
Norton cites the work of Ulrich261 in order to strengthen his position.  Ulrich was a non-
medical journalist and campaigner for equality in mid-Victorian Germany and is thought 
to be the first person to coin the term homosexuality.  He argued for the idea of male 
homosexuality as ‘a female mind in a male body’. 
 
Ulrich argued that it is immoral to discriminate against homosexual men and women 
because their homosexuality is part of who they are.  It is natural to them and therefore 
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equality ought to be extended to them.  His ideas were slow to find acceptance both 
within the medical community and within society at large due to what Norton claims to 
be the prejudice that existed at the time.  As a result of the work of the early twentieth 
century sexologistsxxxi Ulrich’s views were eventually accepted (after homosexuality was 
firstly viewed as a matter of mental illness) and have become the norm today. 
 
Ulrich is cited by Norton because he was a non-medical person who thought of 
homosexuality in terms of identity.  For Norton it is legitimate to cite Ulrich in order to 
establish a non-medical view of homosexual identity.  Medicine adopted Ulrich’s idea of 
identity and then sought to find a medical explanation for it.  However the idea of identity 
came before medicine’s interest in it.  Norton’s position is that it has always been the case 
that identity claims have been based upon other claims that seem to be experienced 
before an idea of an identity.  A person is first aware of sexual attraction and what 
follows from this is a sense of who the person is as a person.  Personal identity is based 
upon their nature and the identity that follows from this is shaped by it.  Same sex desire 
therefore becomes the basis for a sense of personal identity which in turn gives rise to a 
whole mode of existence.  Essence in terms of sexual desire precedes existence and then 
shapes and controls it. 
 
Part of Norton’s critique is against those who argue that prior to the medicalised view of 
homosexuality same sex desire was viewed in terms of action and not in terms of identity.  
Same sex acts were seen as aberrations of a person’s identity.  Everyone was essentially 
                                                 
 
xxxi See Chapter One 
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heterosexual with same sex acts constituting a derivation from this norm which could be 
accounted for either on the grounds of morality or situational pressure.  Norton argues 
that whilst it may have been the case that the heterosexual majority viewed same sex acts 
as deviant, for those who experienced them such acts were expressions of their nature and 
not deviations from it. 
 
Norton clearly bases homosexual identity on ideas of nature.  It is the nature of the person 
to be homosexual.  He does not want to credit this concept to medicine yet at the same 
time he seeks a medical explanation for it. 
 
Yet both the medical construction of homosexuality and Norton’s views are problematic.  
It does not necessarily follow that sexual desire is a sufficient basis upon which to assert 
identity as a given.  Identity is constructed here in the following way:  “I am a person 
who is sexually attracted to members of my own sex therefore I am homosexual”.  An 
idea of possession leads to ideas of identity with the latter as an inevitable consequence of 
the former. 
 
Essentialist constructions of identity proceed in a “A therefore B” manner which does not 
seem to allow for choice, variation, freedom or alternative identities.  In the essentialist 
formulation ‘A’ refers to fundamental nature whilst ‘B’ refers to the identity that is 
believed to necessarily follow.  To criticise this formulation is not to argue that ‘A’ does 
not exist or is not a given but is rather to argue that it is not an inevitable identity.  Cystic 
Fibrosis (CF) is genetically determined but a person with CF may well object to the idea 
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that she/he is defined by it.  An individual could think of her/himself as much more that a 
person with a specific genetic condition and would want others to do the same.  Here 
essence is not thought to determine identity yet this seems to occur in the case of both 
homosexuality and TS. 
 
If a contrast between TS/homosexuality and heterosexuality is made at this point then the 
logical gap between “I have” and “I am” becomes clearer.  It is not inevitable that 
someone who is sexually attracted to people of the same sex is defined by this attraction, 
any more than someone who is sexually attracted to the opposite sex feels defined by 
their desires.  Yet individuals are more likely to be identified as being homosexual than 
heterosexual. 
 
Same sex desire seems to be the basis for a whole way of life that can be recognised by 
and promoted to others by means of specific symbols, cultural activities and discourse all 
of which is known as ‘pinkness’xxxii. This cultural expression is not merely a protest 
against perceived heterosexual dominance but is a positive celebration of homosexual 
identity as stated by Altman: 
 
      Gay liberation is a process whereby homosexuals seek to come to 
      terms with themselves and through self affirmation commence the 
      path towards human liberation.262 
 
 
Heterosexual desire does not seem to require self-affirmation leading to liberation in the 
same way. A heterosexual person does not need to come to terms with her/his own 
                                                 
 
xxxii Ironically adapted by gay man because pink is traditionally and stereotypically a female colour. 
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heterosexuality in the same way that Altman argues a homosexual person does.  This may 
be because it already is the dominant culture even if this is not always consciously 
expressed. 
 
TS and homosexuality, therefore, seem to be essentialist constructions in ways that do not 
appear to be the same for heterosexuality.  Transsexuals and homosexuals seem to assert 
their identities far more frequently and in a more essentialist way than those who are 
‘straight’.  In the former two cases essence is linked to identity.  Heterosexual identity 
claims may also be made in terms of essence. For example, if a straight man is asked why 
he is only attracted to women may answer that ‘it’s just the way I am’.  It does seem to be 
the case, however, that both homosexual and transsexual identities are claimed for more 
often than other identities appear to be in terms of essence, as was seen in the transsexual 
narratives identified earlier and in many homosexual biographiesxxxiii. 
 
If identity follows from a fundamental nature this negates the need to seek any other form 
of identity: the way to live is in accordance with ones nature. 
  
This discussion of TS, homosexuality and heterosexuality highlights the inconsistency in 
both the models that are employed and in the way that discourse is conducted.  Models of 
TS and homosexuality seem to employ essentialist notions of identity in a way that those 
of heterosexuality do not and both also use a subjective state in order to build notions of 
identity in a way that heterosexuality does not.  It could be argued that a consistent model 
                                                 
 
xxxiii See: “Science, Identity and the Construction of the Gay Political Narrative” Nancy J. Knauer   Law and 
Sexuality  Vol 12 p1 2003.   
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for all three would be desirable as all three are concerned with subjective awareness, 
personal identity and social relation.  If a consistent model is employed then two 
outcomes are possible.  An essentialist understanding could be employed for all three 
states of being with the result that heterosexual desire becomes a basis for identity in the 
same way as the other two.  Alternatively, the essentialist model could be completely 
abandoned so that the original nature of all three states of being is not seen as a basis for 
personal identity. Choice and freedom would be considered to be of greater importance 
than an idea of a fixed and determining characteristic. 
 
The Sartrean notion of Bad Faith throws additional light on the essentialist notion of TS.  
This is the idea that living one’s life according to notions of fixed identities is inherently 
deceptive.  A person begins with an idea of what a thing or a role or a nature is and then 
lives out that idea as if there is no choice in the matter or as if behaviour is prescribed by 
the identity. Sartre offers the example of the waiter to illustrate his point.  This man has a 
certain idea of what a waiter is, of how a waiter ought to conduct himself whilst at work 
and of what a customer requires a waiter to be.  He then conforms himself to these ideas 
and behaves accordingly: 
 
      He knows well what it means (to be a waiter): the obligation of  
      getting up at five o’clock, of sweeping the floor of the shop before 
      the restaurant opens, of starting the coffee pot going etc…his  
      movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. 
      He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick.  He bends  
      forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a  
      little too solicitous for the order of the customer.263 
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Sartre’s argument is that the man conforms himself to the idea of what both he and others 
have of what a waiter is.  This image controls what he does.  Yet Sartre argues that the 
man is much more than a waiter.  He is actually free and can choose how to live.  He can 
choose how to be a waiter and does not need to conform to any idea.  Instead of 
acknowledging his freedom he tells himself he is bound to conform to this fixed notion of 
‘being’ a waiter: 
 
      It is a ‘representation’ for others and for myself, which means that I 
      can only be in representation.  But if I represent myself as him, I am  
      not he; I am separated from him as the object from the subject, 
      separated by nothing.  I cannot be he, I can only play at being he.264 
      
 
To play at being is to negate the self.  As such it is a form of in-authenticity.  To play in 
this way is to propel oneself towards nothingness. 
 
Bad Faith can be used to understand the ‘I have therefore I am’ process in both TS and 
homosexuality.  A person with gender dysphoria ‘fits’ him/herself to the idea of a TS.  
The ‘I have’ of gender dysphoria becomes the ‘I am’ of TS and he/she is then limited and 
restricted to this idea. 
 
In conclusion then, this second critique of the essentialist position argues that 
essentialism does not allow for freedom, choice and authenticity.  A person is reduced to 
his/her essence and all that can be hoped for is that nature fulfils itself.  This is Bad Faith. 
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A third critique centres on how a transsexual is to be understood post-operatively. A 
claim is made that a person ‘is’ a transsexual.  Once a person has undergone surgery the 
issue becomes whether he/she is to be understood as someone who remains a transsexual 
or as someone who is now a man or a woman.  If the latter is the case then the issue 
becomes what has ‘happened’ to the TS.  Because TS has been constructed as a matter of 
the essence of a person then, following surgery, how is that essence to be understood?  If 
TS has been surgically removed then in some way the essence has been altered.  
However, it is problematic to claim that an essence can be altered.  If it could then it 
becomes difficult to conceive of it as essence.  Also, a distinction between ex- transsexual 
men and women and other men and women becomes illegitimate.  It appears that some 
wish for this distinction to remainxxxiv.   
 
If, however, a person remains a transsexual following surgery, because she/he remains a 
transsexual, then the issue is what has been gained by surgery.  A person may have a 
surgically altered body but because TS remains then she/he is not a ‘man’ or a ‘woman’ 
in the way that has been desired. 
 
Szasz refers to post-operative transsexuals as ‘fake’ men and women265 whilst Raymond 
uses the phrase ‘male to constructed female’266.  The phrase ‘Gennys’267 is commonly 
used in order to distinguish between men and women who have received GReS and those 
who have not.   
                                                 
 
xxxiv Raymond is critical of this idea and does not want post-operative transsexuals to be viewed in the same 
way as non-transitioned men and women.   Yet if TS has been ‘cured’ by surgery then that person must 
now be thought of the same way as anyone else 
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One solution to this criticism is to argue that TS is the experience of the dissonance 
between sex and gender.  TS is then located in subjective experience.  Once a person has 
undergone surgery then TS has been removed because the experience of dissonance has 
been removed.  A person is then free to be the gender that she/he has always felt 
themselves to be. 
 
For this to be accepted, however, then a rethink, along essentialist lines, is required in the 
way that TS is currently constructed.  First, the BSTc region would be understood to give 
rise to the experience of dissonance and not to be the ‘location’ of TS.  Second, TS would 
not be a matter of the essence of the person but rather as something that he/she is 
experiencing (suffering?) as a dissonance in the same way as other dissonances are 
experienced, as for example that between first order preferences and second order desires.  
Third, it would need to be established why the dissonance between sex and gender is to 
be a matter of medical concern. 
 
This rethink of TS may prove unacceptable to many because of the way in which it re-
categorised TS as the experience of dissonance rather than essence.  Also it may be felt to 
weaken the transsexuals claim to medical and surgical interventions. 
 
A fourth and final critique of essentialism and TS focuses on the way in which it seems to 
be predicated on the notion of a self divided against itself.  Currently TS allows for the 
gendered self to be understood to be the true self with the sexed self seen as false.  The 
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former is valued and accepted whilst the latter is disvalued and therefore is rejected.  The 
result of this accepting/rejecting dynamic is that drastic surgery is undergone in order to 
remove that which is disvalued. 
 
One problem with the way that the gendered self is accepted but the sexed self is not is 
that this leads a person not to accept him/herself as a whole.  Both the sexed and 
gendered aspects of the person can be thought as ‘true’.  They are at least to the extent 
that a person ‘has’ or ‘is’ both before coming to disvalue the one and rejecting the other.  
One further problem is the relative nature in which the gendered self is valued.  At the 
moment gender seems to be valued over against the sexed body in some cultures and TS 
reflects this.  Were this value system to be overturned, however,  and the sexed body 
became that which was valued, then TS  as it is currently understood may be threatened.  
This would suggest that TS is a culturally determined condition and not something that 
exists as an objective fact of human experience. 
 
Following on from this, if gender is the valued element in a transsexuals experience then 
to surgically alter the body suggests that it is the body that is being valued and not gender 
identity.  Gender is predicated on the idea that it is distinct from the sexed body yet it is 
the sexed body that is the object of concern and attention, 
 
In reference to the accepting/rejecting dynamic that lays at the heart of the current TS 
construction it could be argued that all of a self ought to be accepted.  In TS this would 
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include the sexed body as much as gender identity.  This would result in a transsexual 
accepting him/herself as a whole and therefore avoiding a divided self. 
 
Both theologically and philosophically men and women are often understood to be 
divided selves. Divisions are variously constructed between minds and bodies or between 
the God-ward nature and the sinful nature.  Such divisions are often thought to be true of 
all people and can furthermore be understood to lead to tension within the person.  In 
order to resolve this tension one aspect of the person is valued over the other.  That which 
is valued then becomes of first importance to the person who then seeks to ignore or to 
limit that aspect of the self which has been disvalued.  In relation to TS a further division 
of the self has been brought in, that between the gendered self and the sexed body.   
 
It can be argued, however, that instead of the idea that divisions are to be accepted in the 
experience of what it means to be a person, the whole of a person’s nature is to be 
accepted. Specifically for the transsexual this would mean that instead of a division 
between sex and gender, both would be accepted as they are.  Being transsexual would 
mean accepting what one is.  This would require living with the tension between sex and 
gender.  Others would also be required to accept this to. 
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5. An Existential Analysis of TS 
 
In this section I will argue that the essentialist, or medical, account of TS should be 
replaced with an existentialist one because an existential account resolves the difficulties 
noted above and provides a more coherent model. 
 
This existential construction draws on phenomenology.  Mainly systematised and 
developed by Husserl268 and later employed by Heidegger269, Merleau-Ponty270 and 
Sartre271, phenomenology is a method of investigation that seeks to eliminate all 
presuppositions from the subject under investigation in order that the ‘in itself-ness’ is 
revealed and can be examined. 
 
Heidegger applies the phenomenological method to the study of being itself and to that of 
the nature of human ‘being’.  After exploring the linguistic meaning of the term ‘being’ 
he states that an application of the phenomenological method will result in the: 
 
      letting everyone see (the subject under investigation) in its Being. 
      Thus the term ‘phenomenology’ expresses a maxim which can be  
      formulated as ‘To the things themselves’.272 
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The subject under investigation is, as a result, brought to a place of brightness and clarity 
and shows itself as it really is.  This is vital if the phenomena are to be rightly understood.  
The investigation reveals new insights to the subject.  This newness may be a matter of 
bringing to light ideas that were previously known only intuitively.  The result is both 
clarity and certainty. 
 
This approach allows the investigator to move beyond contemplating the subject as mere 
appearance, semblance, symptom, distortion, myth or any other generally accepted view 
as all may prove not to be true.  A particular culture may have view of a thing at any one 
time as a result of forces at work other than objective and rational factors, such as 
prejudice or expediency.  It is this that can provide the lens through which a thing is 
viewed, understood and discussed with the result that the truth is hidden.  
Phenomenological investigation seeks to remove the cultural accretions in order to look 
at that which lies underneath.  Such accretions can range from existing theoretical 
underpinnings to the ignorance of the investigator that leads to the inquiry in the first 
place. It is this ‘thing-in-itself-ness” that is sought because it is believed that this reveals 
the true nature of the phenomena.   
 
Criticism of the phenomenological method has been made by, among others, Todres273 
who states: 
 
      It’s (phenomenology) findings are experientially intelligible insights about the 
      life-world that are transferable as ways of understanding different life-world 
      phenomena in relation to the phenomena studied.  It’s findings are not necessarily  
      final ways or best ways of articulating these insights…Whether this is the same 
      phenomenon studied as that of another study is always to be examined as an 
      open question, and the transferability of insights is always a reflectively 
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      critical process274 
 
 
Todres’ point is that the phenomenological method of investigation can offer clearer 
views of any phenomenon but care must be taken not to think that these views are of 
necessity the whole truth about that phenomenon.  Neither are insights to be considered 
de facto as objective truths.   The removal of ‘coverings’ does not necessarily mean that 
all biases have been removed.  The result is still a matter of interpretation.  The individual 
perception of the investigator, linked to his/her belief systems, world-view and 
motivation, exercise an influence over the findings.  The investigator needs to be aware 
of this and not to naively think that her/his investigation has revealed ‘truth’.   
 
The benefit of a phenomenological approach is found in the use of reductionism.  The 
‘bare bones’, or essential features, of a phenomenon have been sought.  The use of the 
idea of essentials does not imply that an essentialist philosophy is at work but is 
concerned with seeking to identify those features of a phenomenon that can be expected 
to invariably belong to it. 
 
 So when applied to any investigation, including an investigation of TS, 
phenomenological findings seek to establish the ‘invariants’ that belong to the 
phenomenon and these would then be held by the investigator along with the knowledge 
that objectivity cannot necessarily be thought to have been achieved. 
 
   
A phenomenological investigation into TS, therefore, would seek to filter out all existing 
presuppositions in order to see the “thing-in-itself-ness”. It would seek to examine the 
 208 
 
phenomenon in a way that is as free as possible from its current cultural construction.  
This in turn may reveal with fresh force both the inherent nature of the experience of TS 
and certain intuitions of non-transsexuals about claims made by transsexuals.   
 
One such claim is the ontological claim that the individual is the same person after 
surgery that he/she was prior to it.  One anonymous correspondent writing in the on-line 
support group ‘Susan’s Place’ says following surgery: 
 
      I am the same individual you have come to know…I have only begun 
      to remove a shell.275 
 
 
Intuitively this claim seems not to be straightforward.  The transsexual person has sought 
to change the way that she/he is represented before others.  This change is a radical 
change achieved by re-sexing the body.  This was undertaken because she/he felt that the 
‘truth’ of her/his gender was not seen by others.  The ‘real’ person was unseen and 
surgery becomes the way to make the invisible visible.  A transformation has occurred. 
What was ‘true’ before surgery is no longer ‘true’.  To claim to be the same person 
following this transformation seems both to diminish the impact of what has taken place 
and to negate the claim that what she/he was before surgery was not the ‘true’ self.  
 
The claim to be the same person requires that temporal and spatial continuity is 
demonstrated.  Williams276 argues that three criteria are required for this claim to be met: 
historical enquiry, memory and proximity.  The first validates a claim and needs to be 
conducted by someone other than the individual concerned so that an objective 
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perspective is achieved; the second requires that both the claimant and the observer have 
recourse to shared memory, whilst for the third it is necessary for the successive stages of 
the individual’s life to have occurred in the closet manner possible.  Disruption in any of 
these, particularly in the latter, may bring the claim into doubt.  Williams argues that the 
body is the vehicle for continued personal existence.  Whilst a body may alter and a 
personality may change if a body can be recognised as the same body it has always been 
then a claim to be the same person can be thought of as reasonable. 
 
Williams moves his argument along by giving the example of Charles who claims to be 
Guy Fawkes.  Charles appears to have all the memories of Guy Fawkes but Williams 
maintains that it is not the make-up of the inner life that proves identity but the 
possession of the body: 
 
      For the memory claim of an event to be proved as true there needs 
      to be a witness to the event.  In identification this witness will point 
      to the body doing the event for verification277. 
 
Applied to TS Williams argument would focus attention on the body.  To validate the 
claim to be the same person post-operatively both the claimant and the observer would 
need to satisfy historical, memory and proximity requirements by means of the 
transsexual’s body.  The post-operative body would need to do this to the degree that is 
necessary for an identity claim to be made.  The closest connection between the claimant 
and the idea of identity through time is necessary with the body providing the connection.  
It is the body of the transsexual that is the object of focus both because it undergoes the 
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most extensive alteration and because Williams claims that the body is the most 
important factor in identity. 
 
It is possible to establish this in at least two ways.  First, by demonstrating that the post-
operative person stands in the closest possible relation to the pre-operative person, which 
can be done by videoing the surgery and then showing the video to anyone doubting that 
the transsexual is the same person. Second, if the transsexual individual argues that it is 
the same body following surgery, but that it has undergone changes. The post-operative 
transsexual does not have a different body.  Neither has her/his body been replaced.  
Rather things have happened to it, but not enough to make it no longer the same person.  
The fact of the same body could be established by resorting to DNA testing and 
fingerprinting but it is not the claim that it is the same body that is problematic here but 
that the same person is present. 
 
The upshot of this discussion is that there may be problems with the transsexual’s claim 
to be the same person before and after surgery.  It may be going too far to claim that a 
new person has emerged following surgery but it also may seem to be saying too little to 
say that it is the same person.  The transsexual her/himself wants to emerge in a new way.  
Others also recognise that a transformation has taken place.  The UK Government has 
sought to recognise this ‘new’ identity.  The Gender Recognition Bill (2004) gives legal 
recognition of this new identity by means of the replacing the legal documents of the pre-
operative individual.  All legal identifiers are now in place for the recognition of the 
status of the transitioned person.  There is no straight forward legal continuity between 
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the pre and post operative individual.  It would be possible to conduct a paper trail and to 
discover the previous identity in the same way as divorce certificates could provide 
evidence of previous marriage.  However the law may be understood to demonstrate that 
spatial/temporal continuity has been broken and the individual emerges with a new status. 
 
Transsexuals, however, often wish at the same time, to claim continuity.  To do both may 
be problematic.  As things stand some transsexuals want at once to be understood as both 
the same and a new individual.  The new individual is the one whom the transsexual has 
always both understood themselves to be and wanted to be seen by others to be.  The 
same individual continues to exist and this seems to be important in order both to reassure 
others and to establish a legitimate claim to the identity and rights belonging to that 
(previous) person.  One solution to this would be to claim that following surgery the 
transsexual could say to others that what they are now seeing is the person that the 
transsexual has always been.   
 
The result of this problem over continued or new identity is that both the condition of TS 
itself and the way it is experienced needs to be examined. The former examination is not 
concerned with correctness of diagnosis as applied to an individual experiencing distress 
in relation to gender, or with the aetiology of the condition but with the issue of whether 
or not the current construction is the most appropriate explanation for the experiencexxxv. 
                                                 
 
xxxv To do this it is important to note that both medical and literary sources provide evidence that medicine 
has constructed notions of illness and disease that were thought correct at the time but subsequently were 
discredited.  An example of this is Ovariotosis and is discussed by Laqueur.  A woman’s emotional 
difficulties were thought to be the result of problems with her ovaries and the treatment consisted in their 
removal by surgery (ovariotomy).  It was thought that a woman was defined by her body and that it was the 
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A phenomenological approach, therefore, would begin by removing the assumption that 
current models are correct with the result that there is the need to strip away this 
assumption in order to look at the phenomena itself.   
 
The initial stage of an investigation is concerned with the removal of what Heidegger 
terms ‘coverings’.  These can be understood to be models and labels and they have the 
effect of either distorting or determining perception.  A phenomenon is seen through the 
prism of a label/model and in turn the way that it is understood reinforces the 
label/model.  Once this has been realised and the label/model removed then it becomes 
possible to see the phenomenon as it is and a clearer understanding is achieved. 
 
The discussion so far has centred on the need to remove the conceptual coverings that 
surround TS.  Once this has done it is the experience of TS that can be investigated, 
particularly how an individual consciously experiences it.  Presuppositions can then be 
removed. 
 
The first pre-supposition to remove is the correctness of the interpretation of the 
conscious experience.  Currently a transsexual is believed to be correct in her/his claim to 
know the true nature of her/his gender identity.  This is not challenged even though it is 
not clear how a transsexual arrives at this understanding of his/her gender.  Individual’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
specifically female parts of that body that were responsible for uniquely female behaviour.  Many women 
experienced this operation with some even reporting benefit.  However, both the connection between body 
and emotional distress and of women being defined by their bodies lost ground and this view and procedure 
lost its place in medicine. 
 213 
 
making the claim may be challenged on the grounds of its strength or appropriateness of 
their claim, but the conceptual possibility itself is not challenged.  The claim is accepted 
at face value even though a gender identity is in part the result of how a person is both 
perceived and treated by others.  A transsexual is perceived and treated as belonging to 
her/his sexed body yet comes to think of her/himself and the opposite of this.  How this is 
possible is not considered. 
 
The removal of presuppositions allow for this claim to be examined.  The claim to be a 
gender that is distinct from sexed identity, when examined in this way, may be proof not 
of the existence of TS but discomfort with traditionally understood and culturally 
constructed notions of masculinity and femininity. The dissonance may be with 
constructions and not with categorisation. 
 
For example, a boy who develops a liking for reading books and playing musical 
instruments may come to think of these activities as unmanly.  This view may be 
reinforced by members of his family who understand masculinity to be a matter of 
playing sport and the free use of sexually referenced language.  If he believes what his 
family tell him then he may come to doubt the fact that he is masculine.  If he cannot 
think of himself as masculine then the only option he has is to think of himself as 
feminine.  This may be reinforced by the idea that reading and playing musical 
instruments are ‘girly’ occupations.  He may also be concerned to become a tolerant and 
kind individual and again this is traditionally associated as feminine behaviour.  He may 
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soon identify himself as being in some way feminine.  This in turn may lead over time to 
the idea that he is transsexual. 
 
Upon examining this claim it becomes possible to argue that what he is experiencing is 
not TS, but discomfort with culturally constructed notions of masculinity and femininity.  
It is one specific and local expression of gender identity that he has difficulty with and 
not the masculine gender as a whole.  To think that he is transsexual may be a mistake but 
without a willingness to examine his experience free from presuppositions it could be a 
mistake that would easily happen.  He could be asked to explore his preferences from a 
different point of view as to whether he actually does prefer them. 
 
A second presupposition centres on the correctness not of interpretation but of 
identification.  When a girl claims to ‘feel’ herself to be a boy this claim is accepted even 
though the knowledge of maleness or masculinity is outside of her cultural experience.  
Her claim rests on the idea that there is such a thing as ‘maleness/masculinity’ existing 
independently into which an individual can place himself.  The girl feels that she belongs 
to this class of ‘maleness/masculinity’ as a result of attraction/dissatisfaction.  This in 
turn leads to self-identification. This is not just problematic in TS but is problematic 
generally.  How any person comes to an understanding of themselves as masculine or 
feminine is questionable. 
 
The use of a phenomenological approach may challenge the idea that there is such a thing 
as a gender category into which an individual places him/herself as a means of self-
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identification.  The idea of two discrete and binary gender groupings may appear to be 
false.  A phenomenological investigation may offer this insight and then proceed to state 
that gender characteristics are available to all persons as persons and are not fixed by the 
sexed body.  A person conducting such an investigation could offer this view.  This view 
would be in line with the current conceptualisation of TS. 
 
Alternatively, a different person conducting a similar investigation into gender may come 
to the conclusion that gender is fixed by the sexed body.  The point I am making here is 
that it is not phenomenology itself that has a view about gender; rather it is that the view 
is the interpretation of the person conducting the investigation. Phenomenological 
investigation leads to a subjective interpretation by the investigator.  The gain is found, 
not in a claim to objective truth, but in achieving closer scrutiny. 
 
What I am suggesting is that if this method of investigation were done into TS, then it 
might reveal that what a transsexual experiences is not a mistake of nature, nor a medico-
psychiatric illness, nor something which is the result of faulty wiring in the brain but is a 
matter of desire.  It is desire that is being identified as the crucial element and not notions 
of illness or physical dysfunction.  A transsexual may be experiencing the desire to 
breakout of traditional gender constructions.  As we have seen the sexed body has defined 
gender identity and TS may be one way in which a person experiences discomfort with 
this. 
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This desire to be a certain gender appears to have at least two elements to it: one negative 
and the other positive.  The former consists in the desire not to be the assigned gender 
whilst the latter is the desire to be in the fullest sense of this term.  This is formulated as a 
rejection/grasping towards dynamic. 
 
The negative element of the desire does not appear to centre in feelings about the body as 
a body but rather on the representation of that body.  The negativity is a matter of the 
association of gender and sexed body.  The male body of a M-F transsexual may conform 
to notions of beauty, desirability and performance that it normally associated with 
maleness but is rejected because it represents a gender to which the M-F person does not 
feel she belongs.  This negative attitude to her male body is a subjective reaction of the 
transsexual which leads her to totally reject her male body. 
 
The positive element of the desire is a longing to be able to present to others by means of 
a sexed body what is believed to be the true gender identity. 
 
As has been already seen in the discussion of Primary TS this positive desire presents 
itself both solidly and immutably within the perception of the individual.  A transsexual 
comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to remove, alter or ignore it.  It comes to 
dominate the individual to the extent that it gives shape to a sense of personal identity.  
The desire is thought to reveal some fundamental truth about the nature of this person’s 
identity.  This solidity of belief is coupled with imaginative functioning where the 
transsexual fantasises about what it would be like to ‘live in’ the appropriate body and so 
 217 
 
be able to live out the gender role.  This fantasy often focuses on the fulfilment of sex and 
gender congruency and if this appears a real possibility to the transsexual then ideas of 
happiness are attached to it. 
 
Before Jorgensen transitioned she confessed to two friends her gender desire: 
 
      Yes…I have the physical characteristics of a very immature male 
      but as far back as I can remember I’ve always had the feelings… 
      the emotions of a girl.278 
 
 
This was the first time she had told anyone of her distress and because it proved to be a 
positive experience she felt encouraged to seek medical help.   
 
In Secondary TS the desire becomes increasingly prominent over time.  It presses itself 
on the consciousness of the individual until it can no longer be ignored.  Here desire is 
coupled with the experience a transsexual has of living in the sexed role.  This can be 
done successfully as with e.g. Morris or unsuccessfully as with e.g. Rees279. who 
continued to experience distress following surgery.   
 
The medical explanation offered by Zhou et al280 is that the BSTc region of the brain is 
responsible for TS.  This may make sense in relation to Primary TS.  In Secondary TS 
however, the need to transition comes later on in life after a significant period of time 
lived out in the original role.  The question is how this is possible in relation to claims 
made both about the BSTc region and the experience of suffering.  On the one hand is the 
claim that due to the effects of the BSTc region a person has early knowledge of gender 
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identity which causes clinically significant distress resulting in significant inability to 
function, whilst on the other hand it is possible for a person to live for some time, perhaps 
successfully, in the original role before coming to doubt their true identity.  Conceptually 
it can be argued that either TS is a matter of brain dysfunction that leads to suffering that 
makes life impossible so that treatment becomes a priority, or it is a matter of awareness 
that can be lived with until the person reaches a point when she/he decides no longer to 
do so. At the moment the medical model seems to allow for both.  This may therefore be 
a matter of conceptual inconsistency and this then becomes a further reason to question 
the current essentialist constructions and the claims made for it.   
 
Alternatively the difference between Primary and Secondary TS may demonstrate that 
people’s pain and suffering thresholds are different.  Suppose I am in what I regard as an 
unhappy marriage.  I remain married either because I think it’s best to do so for the 
children or because I believe that I should keep the promises that I’ve made.  Eventually, 
however, either the reasons to bear the suffering disappear, or the suffering grows to an 
unbearable level or I meet someone else and this gives me the impetus to act.  Any of 
these reasons do not mean that the marriage was happy until I chose to leave, or that it 
was ever happy.  Rather it shows that it was bearable for a while.xxxvi 
 
If this is what happens in Secondary TS then the experience of suffering needs to be 
understood alongside a person’s coping mechanisms and belief systems. 
                                                 
 
xxxvi This was demonstrated in the “Between Ourselves” radio programme.  One man was able to cope with 
his suffering up to a point but when other sources of distress were added it become too much for him to 
bear.  This does not mean, however, that he was not suffering before. 
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A third presupposition focuses on the correctness of the belief that it is only by 
transitioning that a person can experience happiness and fulfilment.  This belief is a 
correlation of the disvalue that seems to be attached to the experience of suffering (see 
Chapter Three).  This disvaluing of suffering is often accompanied by the idea that a 
condition of happiness exists which is achieved once a barrier has been crossed or a 
significant point has been reached.  Happiness is thought to be achieved when certain 
conditions are fulfilled.  This can be styled as a “Land of Canaan” perspectivexxxvii 
 
This view sees happiness as an all or nothing construct depending on the fulfilment of 
certain criteria.  Until the criteria are fulfilled then happiness is impossible and life is on 
hold.  When Canaan is entered happiness will be achieved with no further effort. 
 
In TS the “Land of Canaan” is life beyond transitioning where suffering will be over.  
Until this time life is on hold.  The whole of life appears to be negative and a transsexual 
often claims to be sustained by the hope that transitioning will bring the happiness that 
she/he has longed for.  Happiness is not, however, guaranteed as the case of Sam 
Hashimi/Samantha Kane demonstrates281.   
 
                                                 
 
xxxvii Based on the Biblical story of the deliverance of the Hebrew slaves from ancient Egypt and their 
journey to inhabit the land of Canaan as recorded in the Book of Exodus, the “Land of Canaan”  syndrome 
occurs when happiness is held to be a future and permanent prospect.  However, the history of the Hebrews 
should that their original hopes were not realised.  During the difficulties of slavery it is easy to see how 
they hoped for future happiness in their own land.  This sustained them in Egypt but subsequent 
disappointment may be due in part to unrealistic expectations. 
 220 
 
Kane is a M-F transsexual who believed that the decision to transition from male gender 
to female was a mistake.  This conclusion was reached as a result of her continued 
experience of unhappiness plus her continued family difficulties.  She laid the blame on 
her treating physician and has taken an action against him for professional misconduct282.  
She has returned to living in the male gender and is now known by the first name of 
Charles and is seeking further GReS. 
 
The idea that happiness is achieved by means of transitioning would therefore need to be 
carefully examined. Presently it appears to be the case that both the transsexual and those 
around her/him too easily accept this claim about happiness/suffering and therefore may 
be setting up a possibility of further suffering.  If this presupposition is removed then the 
transsexual may be in a position to make more realistic assessments of what surgery may 
achieve and what degree of happiness is attainable.  This is more than an issue of 
informed consent as it is concerned with the whole direction of a person’s life and not 
just with the imminence of a decision. 
 
A fourth presupposition that a phenomenological analysis would examine is the response 
of medicine to TS suffering.  The current one is that medicine has a duty to alleviate it 
(Chapter Three).  This will be discussed further in the next chapter and the discussion of 
the implications of the model of authenticity for medicine.   
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6. Authenticity and transsexuality 
 
Heidegger283 styled the human being who is concerned with the subject of her/his own 
being as Dasein and as such us able to reflect upon its existence in the world.  The term 
means “Being-there”: 
 
      This entity which each of us has is himself and which includes 
      inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote  
      by the term Dasein.284  
 
 
When all else is right Dasein will seek to construct a life that is consistent with its own 
nature.  Existence occurs in a context which Heidegger describes as arbitrary, without 
order or system.  Dasein must therefore take responsibility for its own existence and to 
establish a life built upon freedom, choice and personal responsibility.  Dasein seeks to 
understand its own existence in the light of the world in which it finds itself.  This world 
is full both of objects that are ready to hand and other beings that are both like and unlike 
itself.  Heidegger argues that the one characteristic of the individual Dasein is “mine-
ness”.  Authentic existence is the result of reflection upon this “mine-ness” of the 
individual Dasein. 
 
Heidegger comments upon authentic existence in the following way: 
 
      Is there not a definite ontological way of taking authentic existence, a 
      factical ideal of Dasein, underlying our ontological interpretation of 
      Dasein’s existence?  That is indeed so.  But not only is this fact one  
      which must not be denied and which we are forced to grant; it must 
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      also be conceived in its positive necessity.285 
 
 
Dasein seeks to realise its potentiality for being and to engage with the fact that existence 
is to be lived out against both the realities of time and nothingness.  Dasein can either 
chose authenticity or lose it by its absorption in average everydayness.  Both are possible 
modes of existence but it is the choice of authenticity that is to be regarded as the proper 
telos of human existence because of its moral significance.  Morality is freely exercising 
choice as part of engaging with the world. 
 
Heidegger’s concern with authenticity is characteristic of Existentialism; it denies that 
there is a pre-established pattern for human existence and states that a person is to 
establish his/her own existence as a result of living.  For Sartre: 
 
      (it is) necessary that a man be for himself only what he is…Good  
      Faith seeks to flee the inner disintegration of my being in the  
      direction of the in-itself which it should be and is not.286 
 
 
For Taylor self-determining freedom… 
 
      demands that I break the hold of all such external 
      impositions and decide for myself alone.287 
 
 
Taylor argues that authentic existence recognises both individual uniqueness and the need 
for self-determination.  This is why a ‘one size fits all’ approach either in terms of labels 
or of a fixed human nature is mistaken.  Emphasis should be placed not upon that which 
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is common to all men and women but on what sets an individual apart from the rest.  
Authenticity is the realisation of unique potential.   
 
Trilling288 traces the development of the concept of authenticity in literature and 
philosophy.  He maintains that it is possible to sum up the concept with the popular 
phrase ‘to thine own self be true’. 
 
 
Authentic TS would therefore have to recognise that all constructions of human 
experience that see one thing as true and another false are inauthentic.  The whole of 
human existence must be accepted.  For the transsexual this would mean an acceptance of 
the sexed body, of the gendered self, of the discordance between the two and of the way 
that society presently constructs gender identities.  This willingness to accept is a 
rejection of value systems that categorise certain human characteristics as 
desirable/undesirable.  Such a system of classification is inauthentic because it is 
regarded as objectively true and therefore as something which is to be accepted and lived 
out.  A total acceptance of the self rejects such value systems and maintains that truth is 
to be found in the whole of personal experience.  Equal value is to be placed on all human 
nature. 
 
This does not mean, however, that it is possible to reconcile those elements of personal 
experience that appear contradictory.  Neither is it desirable to place them into a 
hierarchical system.  Rather it can be argued that authentic existence is one that seeks to 
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hold together, sometimes in tension, all aspects of experience even if to do so seems to be 
an impossible task that generates great anxiety. 
 
Authenticity in TS means holding the experience of gender in tension with the experience 
of the sexed body because both are ‘true’ of the transsexual.  There is no necessity to 
reconcile the two, or to reconcile the subjective experience of gender with its objective 
cultural constructions.  So, a male transsexual (a male sexed individual) who is 
subjectively drawn to ideas of femaleness must hold both these ideas together and choose 
a way of engaging with them to construct his personal identity.  He may be helped to 
learn how to engage with both aspects of his experience but this help would be aimed at 
enabling him engage with both rather than to promote one at the expense of the other.  
The suffering of the transsexual is also part of the totality of his experience and needs to 
be embraced.  This may be achieved by seeing it as something that reveals a personal 
truth about the transsexual, or as a means to achieve virtues such as empathy and 
patience.   
 
Authenticity can only be acquired by effort.  It demands that one thinks about oneself and 
the world in a way that is free from labels, constructs and ready-made explanations. 
Authenticity places value upon personal responsibility.  Fear of criticism may result in a 
reluctance to take personal responsibility and leads us to hide behind the claim to have no 
control over certain of our characteristics or dysfunctions. Personal responsibility 
assumes a willingness to be honest about ones choices, decisions and actions and then to 
defend against disagreement or to accept that one was mistaken. 
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Authenticity is difficult to achieve.  It involves a struggle with both oneself and with the 
world.  Failure to engage in this struggle results in conformity to the established and 
existing norms.  Authenticity may only be achieved through suffering, and a transsexual 
who is already suffering due to sex/gender dissonance may not have the same reluctance 
to engage with suffering that a non-suffer may have.  Because of the familiarity with 
suffering a transsexual may be more willing to engage with authenticity and it is then a 
matter of achieving a unique and freely chosen existence.  As outlined above a 
transsexual may choose to incorporate suffering into a life goal. 
 
Authenticity is, however, compatible with radical surgery if this is necessary to achieve a 
goal that has been autonomously chosen.  For example, a woman may wish to become a 
fatherxxxviii.  She already has a masculine gender identity and in relation to this wishes to 
know what it is to be a father to a child.  It may be that ideas of fatherhood have for a 
long time been part of her masculine imaginings. She may decide that the best way for 
her to be a father is to align her body with her gender identity.   
 
This decision is not made out of regard for cultural norms but from what she considers to 
be the best interests of the future child, especially in its earliest years.  She may be 
attracted to the cultural constructions of fatherhood and wishes to engage in this way.  
                                                 
 
xxxviii Or alternatively a F-M transsexual wishing to become a father decides to have a baby by keeping her 
womb intact.  This is the experience of Thomas Beatie who transitioned ten years ago and gave birth on 
Friday 4th July 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/04/usa.gender 
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She is working against the idea that to be a father is exclusively the privilege of those 
born with a particular anatomy. 
 
This may pan out in the following way:  a woman wishes to become a Royal Marine.  
Only men are accepted and so she may decide to align her sexed body with the gender 
that she both recognises in herself and seeks to become in order to achieve this life goal.  
She has to conform to an external and irrational requirement over which she has no 
control in order to become her authentic self. 
 
In authentic TS suffering is not a justification for surgery.  Neither is it a matter of 
inevitability or necessity.  Rather it is the means by which an individual is able to 
accomplish her freely chosen goals 
 
Surgery is an authentic response to sex/gender dissonance provided it is freely and 
responsibly chosen as a means to an end.  The authentic transsexual would not believe 
that she/he had no choice but to proceed.  S/he would seek to be rid of the coercive 
influence of an idea.  Surgery is not the solution to a medical problem but the means of 
facilitating authentic living.  The need for a medical explanation for sex/gender 
dissonance disappears.  Authenticity accepts gender dissonance and does not seek to 
explain it.  To regard TS as a disease is inauthentic because it relies on a construction of a 
‘normal’ relationship between sex and gender. The disease model values sex and gender 
congruence above divergence and thereby constructs an artificial normative dimension to 
the experience of divergence.  The role of medicine in the light of authenticity will be 
 227 
 
discussed in the next chapter, but essentially surgery ought only to be offered in response 
to autonomous decision-making. 
 
Autonomy for the transsexual is to be understood in the same way as it is for any other 
individual.  Authentic existence is a matter of developing the idea of what sort of person 
she/he wishes to be and then pursuing the characteristics and attainments that make that 
possible. 
 
7. Critique of Authenticity 
 
Taylor289 offers two criticisms of authenticity.  The first is directed at the concept itself 
and the second is a discussion of the value placed upon authenticity in contemporary 
society. 
 
From a conceptual point of view authenticity is open to the charge that it is a celebration 
of subjectivity, especially in relation to morality.  The good is determined by the 
individual rather than according to objective standards.  Subjectivism can not 
accommodate commonly accepted norms that are binding within a culture.  Individuals, 
within authenticity, are free to choose a moral system for themselves and so it becomes 
possible to choose behaviours that others regard as immoral.  
 
Taylor answers this criticism by arguing that an authentic individual will choose those 
things that have traditionally been understood as morally good and will do so not because 
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of tradition but because she/he will see them as the means by which personal goals can be 
achieved.  He argues for a ‘horizon of significance’290 which brings into view ideas of 
morality and then acts as a perspective along which an authentic individual can plot the 
course of her/his life.  This horizon prevents a slide into subjectivism and as well as 
charting a path to authenticity.  It facilitates communal living with its requirements of co-
operation and mutual assistance. 
 
A counter-criticism here is to challenge Taylor’s idea of ‘horizons of significance’.  If 
such a horizon exists then how is this different from the notion of an accepted moral code 
that defines any given society?  The answer to this counter-criticism is that the element of 
choice makes it different.  Authenticity requires that a person thinks about his moral 
compass and then owns it at a personal level.  Moral behaviour is justified on the basis of 
that choice and not with reference to codes or impositions.  These choices are also 
justified in as much as they accord with morality. 
 
A further counter-criticism can be levelled.  If both an authentic and an inauthentic 
individual behave in the same way then what has been achieved by the one acting 
authentically?  One possible answer to this is that for an action to be considered moral 
then the choice that lay behind it must be a real choice:  the person could have chosen to 
behave differently.  Choice must be free if it is to qualify as choice and so it is the 
authentic person who is behaving morally because her behaviour has been freely chosen 
and is not the result of conformity to rules that have been handed down to her. 
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Taylor’s second criticism of authenticity is that it is a celebration of individualism over 
collectivism.  This is problematic because of the social nature of men and women.  
Authenticity’s emphasis upon the individual may lead to a loss of a sense of community 
with the result that, as society becomes increasingly atomised, it becomes more difficult 
to pursue common goals.  Taylor notes: 
 
      A fragmented society is one whose members find it harder and harder 
      to identify with their political society as a community.291 
 
A fragmented society loses cohesion and becomes less able to look after its most 
vulnerable members.  The emphasis on the worth of the individual is a recent one and 
may be seen as a corrective to the view which held the individual to be unimportant 
because society, or rather the elite within it, were more valuable.  The worth and value of 
the individual was given special prominence during the Enlightenment and has been 
enshrined in moral and legislative programmes since. 
 
 
It may be that there has been too much emphasis on individual and that what is now 
required is a move towards the middle ground where both the individual and society are 
equally valued.  The danger of social atomisation has been recognised by writers in the 
existentialist tradition such as Houllelbecq292 who chronicles the way that individualism 
leads to a diminution of the traditional support structures such as the family and 
neighbourhood communities.  The result of this can be isolation, a failure to achieve 
fulfilment and a reluctance to admit to difficulties because of the value that society puts 
on individual freedom as a means of achieving happiness.  Houllebecq reflects on the 
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popularity of psychotherapy and wonders whether this is an expression of, and has added 
to, the individualisation of society.  Its emphasis on the self and the need for self-
fulfilment downplays the needs of others in favour of the individual. 
 
Authenticity begins, therefore, with an acceptance of the essence of the person but is not 
a matter of a person identifying that essence and then living in accordance with it.  
Authenticity requires engagement with that essence in a way that reflects the 
establishment of goals and preferences.  This may also involve living in tension with a 
person’s essence.  Authenticity is distinct from essentialism because it incorporates the 
transsexual’s present desires.  It is not a ‘backwards’ looking way of understanding a self.  
The essence can be understood as a springboard for the present self.   
 
However, neither is authenticity a ‘forward looking’ way of constructing a self.  If a 
transsexual person has a mental picture or mental ideal of what she/he is or is to become, 
then she/he is no longer acting authentically. To match actual living to a mental ideal is to 
act, in Sartrean terms, in ‘Bad Faith’.  No such mental picture can fit into an account of 
authenticity.  A mental picture of the self would function as a form of ‘essence’, this time 
as a future essence to which a person seeks to conform rather than a past essence exerting 
its influence in the present. 
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Authentic living is a matter of present engagement with life. To live authentically means 
to live in the moment, to take responsibility for the whole of oneself as one is in any 
given moment.  Present engagement is the focus of authentic living. 
 
8. The gains of an authentic account of transsexuality 
 
At least two potential gains from an existential account of TS can be identified; the first is 
respect for autonomy and the second is the removal of the current medico-psychiatric 
classification. 
 
Respect for autonomy is described by Beauchamp and Childress in the following way: 
 
      To respect an autonomous agent is, at minimum, to acknowledge that 
      person’s right to hold views , to make choices, and to take actions  
      based on personal values and beliefs.  Such respect involves  
      respectful actions, not merely a respectful attitude.  Respect involves 
      treating persons to enable them to act autonomously.293 
 
 
An existential account of TS recognises both the autonomous choices of the individual 
and respect for the transsexual’s autonomy. It frees the transsexual from the ontological 
constraints of the current transsexual label enabling autonomous functioning.  With no 
label to define his/her possibilities the person with sex/gender dissonance is free to 
construct an identity for him/herself in a way that is both unique and in accord with 
his/her own preferences and desires.  This is consistent with the Sartrean idea of Good 
Faith or authenticity. 
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Also, by recognising choice in relation to both gender/sex dissonance and to GReS, 
respect for autonomy is served.  Respect for autonomy recognises the other person’s right 
to live according to his/her values and choices free from any constraint or coercion.  
 
 In relation to TS this principle both prevents the coercive or constraining effect of the 
current construction and ensures that any decision that the transsexual makes in relation 
to surgery is be respected.  It may not be appropriate, therefore, for a surgeon to disagree 
with the reasons why a transsexual wants surgery or to withhold his skills.  As long as the 
person is acting rationally, then the surgeon places his skills at his/her service. 
 
A comparison can be made here with Body Dysmorphic Disorder, where a person 
requests the surgical amputation of healthy limbs.  Levy and Bayne294 suggest that this 
request should be honoured out of respect for autonomy.  They argue that there are no 
compelling reasons to refuse surgery as long as those making the request are capable to 
do so.  A doctor ought not to impose his will over against that of the patient, using her/his 
expertise as a justification.  A similar rational can be applied to TS. 
 
Clearly, this view of the surgeon’s role may undermine both the need for clinical 
judgement and the duty to act in the patient’s best interests.  Surgeons are mechanics 
rather than as clinicians295.  One solution may be to align the authentic model of TS with 
cosmetic surgery, where clinical judgement is a means to successful treatment rather than 
a barrier to surgery.  Surgeons could therefore regard GReS as a matter of personal 
choice, in the same way that cosmetic surgery is regarded.  Clinical judgement then 
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becomes a matter of determining the correctness of procedure and not a matter of 
correctness of person for surgery. Objective standards, such as ruling out psychosis and 
determining capacity, would remain in place to safeguard the patient’s interests.   
 
The current medico-psychiatric classification of TS has the inevitable consequence of 
making it a psychiatric conditionxxxix. The preferred designation is ‘disorder’.  Barrett 
offers a pragmatic justification for this and regards it as a means of treating disabling 
symptoms.  It is rare for a transsexual to be told that she/he is mentally ill but nonetheless 
it is a psychiatrist who confirms the diagnosis of TS and who co-ordinates the 
treatment/transitioning process. 
 
Within some transsexual communities there are attempts to de-classify TS as a 
psychiatric condition.  One such is offered by the non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
Gender Identity Reform, (GIR), who describe themselves as: 
 
      medical professionals, caregivers, scholars, researchers, 
      students, human rights advocates and members of the  
      transgender, bisexual, lesbian and gay communities and their 
      allies who advocate reform of the psychiatric classification of 
      gender diversity as mental disorder.296 
 
 
GIR argues that because it is now generally recognised that gender identity is a matter of 
fluidity, this awareness ought to be recognised within the experience of TS itself.  People 
who experience difficulties with masculinity and femininity, therefore, need not be 
                                                 
 
xxxix See earlier references in the Introduction 
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regarded as psychiatrically ill, but rather as those occupying a place at the extreme end of 
the sex/gender spectrum. 
 
GIR draws attention to the history of homosexuality as a psychiatric classification.  As 
recently as 1984 in the APA DSM III classification system homosexuality was considered 
to be a mental illnessxl, but as a result of the campaigning by the gay community then this 
classification was entirely removed form the DSM in 1986, a decision endorsed by the 
American Psychiatric Association. GIR hopes that the same could be achieved for the 
current classification of TS (DSM 1V 302.85). 
 
This attempt by GIR to de-classify TS as a psychiatric condition does not deal with the 
issue of what will replace the current medical model or with how GReS can be justified if 
the medical model is abandoned.  Califia297 wonders how a transsexual will be able to 
obtain GReS without the current psychiatric justification: 
 
      The transactivists who are trying to eliminate GID from the  
      DSM-IV have not come up with any credible replacement for 
      the diagnosis, which is the prerequisite for sex reassignment.298  
 
 
My thesis is that an account of authentic TS is a credible replacement for the current 
medico-psychiatric one and as such it is an alternative model that justifies GReS for those 
who construct it as a means to achieve personal goals.  It is not free of problems, but is 
more coherent and less contradictory than the medical model as it does not cross between 
                                                 
 
xl Ego-dystonic homosexuality, a persistent lack of heterosexual arousal leading to interference in opposite 
sex relationships. 
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two concepts of gender, as is the case with the current construction of TS. Also, the 
model of authenticity removes the stigma of psychiatric classification. 
 
Authenticity can be both encouraged and substantiated in the following way.  Medicine 
would need to engage with the narrative of authenticity that the transsexual (if this term is 
in fact to be used) has constructed for him/herself.  The purpose of this is not to judge its 
sincerity but to validate or affirm it.  The General Practitioner may be the most 
appropriate person to do this.  Her/his involvement is not to detect the presence of illness, 
particularly mental illness, but to act as gatekeeper to those services that are necessary in 
order for the person concerned to achieve his/her goals. It is the psychiatrist who 
‘authorises’ other medical specialist for the sake of the transsexual, some of whom, as we 
have seen, desire surgery. A transsexual’s current narrative of suffering is therefore 
replaced with one of authenticity and just as medicine currently engages with the former 
so it can engage with the latter. 
 
The model of Authentic TS has the following benefits. First it recognises the whole of the 
fundamental nature of the transsexual individual and affords her/him the freedom to 
respond to that fundamental nature in the way that fits best into her/his own value system.  
He/she is able to construct a life that is pleasing to him/her.  There is no division within 
the self, no accepting/rejecting mechanism at work in relation to the self.  Second, he/she 
is not labelled as ill, diseased or as experiencing a disorder and so does not need to think 
of him/herself as ‘deviating from the norm’ in any way.  The transsexual has a 
fundamental nature in the same way as any other individual.  Every fundamental nature is 
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unique with none being thought of as better/worse or healthy/unhealthy than any other.  
Each person has the responsibility to ‘own’ one’s fundamental nature and to engage with 
it in order to construct an authentic existence.  Third, as discussed earlier in relation to the 
principle of respect for autonomy, doctors and surgeons can offer GReS to those who 
choose it in relation to their value systems.  Califia’s observation can now be answered.  
The model of authenticity is a credible replacement for the medical diagnosis and so 
becomes the prerequisite for sex reassignment.  Califia’s criticism can now be answered; 
a model that both removes psychiatric classification and provides a framework for 
surgery is found in authenticity. 
 
The authentic model removes TS from that which currently stigmatises it both as a 
deviation from that which is normal and as a psychiatric condition.  This may achieve 
what the transsexual desires, both in terms of understanding their experience and in terms 
of a rational for seeking medical treatment.  A model of authenticity ‘normalises’ both TS 
and the process by which an individual responds to it.  It is no longer necessary for the 
transsexual to view her/himself as ill or deviant or marginalised from the rest of society.  
It is a matter of personal choice what she/he does in response to the normalising of 
his/her experience in exactly the same way as it is for anyone else in relation to her/his 
own fundamental nature.  The element of suffering that is now integral to TS may either 
be engaged with for its own sake or alleviated by the pursuit of freely chosen goals.  
Indeed suffering may be prevented if TS is no longer thought of as deviant or a matter of 
disease but regarded as just another personal characteristic.  If a person then chooses to 
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construct a life in which sex and gender are to be aligned then GReS can be offered out of 
respect for their autonomy. 
 
On an authentic model, the transsexual need present not to satisfy the psychiatrist that 
her/his gender identity is real nor that her/his suffering is so extreme that unless treatment 
is given she/he may seek to end her/his life because it is so unbearable.  Instead it 
becomes a matter of articulating autonomous choices and as the transsexual seeks to live 
as a rational being like any other.  The psychiatrist is assessing capacity to consent and 
ensuring all information is given and understood. 
 
The authenticity model can not only replace the medical model but could also make the 
designation ‘transsexual’ obsolete.  No designation would be necessary to explain why a 
person has a gender identity that is not the same as his/her sexed identity.  This would 
just be seen as something that is the case for the person concerned in the same way as, for 
instance, sexuality is regarded.  No medical or moral explanation is required.  Certainly 
designations such as ‘gender dysphoria’ or ‘gender identity disorder’ would be obsolete 
as these are specifically designed to reflect a medical understanding of the experience.   
 
The medical designation, ‘transsexuality’ would no longer be thought of as a condition or 
as an experience.  A person would simply, from the time that self awareness emerges, 
begin with an awareness of his/her own body and develop an understanding of his/her 
gender identity.  Where society regards sex and gender as one and the same then the 
individual will need to think for her/himself how to respond.  She/he needs help to do this 
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and to work out a response to that society’s view.  If a society sees sex and gender as 
distinct categories, then it may be easier for the individual to choose how to begin to live 
authentically. 
 
Sex and gender identities need not be thought of as dissonant or discordant, or at odds 
with each other, or that they need necessarily to be in agreement with each other.  It is up 
to the individual concerned to choose how and in what way she/he relates his/her 
experience of sex and gender together. 
 
There are a set of virtues that are generally recognised as being associated with 
authenticity.  These are honesty, prudence, integrity, truthfulness, freedom and 
responsibility and form, as we have seen, what Taylor refers to as ‘an horizon of 
significance’.  These virtues provide the moral imperative to pursue an authentic 
existence.  In addition, authenticity may be regarded as a manifestation of autonomy.  
There is some debate over whether people are obliged to be autonomous.  Moral agency 
certainly seems to require this299.  On the other hand, a distinction can be drawn between 
respect for, and even promotion of, autonomy and a requirement that an individual must 
maximise autonomy in their own person.  It may not be the case that a person is obliged 
to act autonomously but it seems obvious to argue that respect for autonomy is a 
universal obligation.  Respect for autonomy is one justification for a moral imperative to 
make autonomous existence possible. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, I have argued for a re-thinking of the phenomena of TS.  In the ‘first 
wave’ of thinking about TS the medical scientist has taken the lead and the transsexual 
community has fallen in with the scientific construction.  A ‘second wave’ is now 
building from within the transsexual community, which seeks to remove TS from the 
medical context and place it within the broader context that recognises both gender 
fluidity and that binary modalities of gender are out dated.  This thesis reflects this 
‘second wave’ of thinking. 
 
Authenticity can replace essentialism as the justification for surgery.  It requires, 
however, the medical profession to reflect seriously on what TS means and how it reflects 
artificial norms related to sex and gender that have been abandoned in other contexts.  
The profession ought to reflect upon the incoherence of, and inconsistencies with, the 
current medical model.  
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CHAPTER FIVE THE MODEL OF AUTHENTICITY IN PRACTICE 
  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter, consisting of four sections and a conclusion, details how the model of 
authenticity will work out in practice in relation to TS. It will first examine its advantages 
over the medical model; second, explore the idea that authenticity reveals the possibility 
of deception in the current taxonomy of TS both in terms of straightforward deception  
and self-deception; third consider the activity known as ‘passing’ from the point of view 
of the medical model to see if it is inherently deceptive; and finally to examine whether 
authenticity requires a fully transitioned individual to reveal that she/he has transitioned 
to those with whom she/he seeks an intimate relationship.  The duty to disclose will be 
balanced against both the right to privacy and the right to self definition. 
  
1. Advantages of the Authenticity Model over the Medical Model 
 
If the model of authenticity is adopted then there are at least four advantages over the 
medical model:  
 
The first is that the transsexual need no longer be defined by his/her essence.  An 
authenticity model removes the need for TS to be constructed along essentialist lines 
without at the same time calling into question the gender identity of the person 
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concerned.  It can be accepted that a person genuinely experiences a gender identity that 
is distinct from the sexed body without the recourse to an essentialist position. 
 
The move away from an essentialist understanding to the view that identity is a matter of 
construction places TS within mainstream views on the nature of personal identity.  It is 
generally accepted that individuals achieve an identity over time as a result of interacting 
with the world in order to realise freely chosen goals.  These goals reflect the importance 
placed on desires and a person exercises freedom of choice and bears the responsibility 
for doing soxli. 
 
It is not the purpose of this section of the chapter to offer a full treatment of the 
philosophical problem of personal identity, or how a person acquires identity or how it is 
possible for this to exist as the same identity over time in tension with change and 
continuity.  An example of the philosophical treatment of this subject is found in the 
work of Sider.300  Nor is it the purpose of this section to explore the debate over the way 
in which a sense of gender is acquired either as a matter of essence or existence.  
Wesselius301 offers such an analysis. Rather the purpose at this point is simply to argue 
that ordinarily personal identity is thought to be that which is constructed over time.  The 
way that a person constructs a masculine or feminine identity is a matter of choice and 
not of fundamental nature. 
 
                                                 
 
xli Cf Archer, M.S. (2000) “Being Human: The Problem of Agency” Cambridge University Press: Glover, J. 
(1988) “The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity” London; Allen Lane; The Penguin Press: 
Perry, J. (2002) “Identity, personal identity and the self” Cambridge Hackett Publishing. 
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The second advantage over the medical model focuses on gender identity.  The medical 
model posits gender identity as a matter of brain organisation (Chapter Two) but feminist 
theorists such as Raymond302 argue that it is much more than this.  She claims that the 
identity of a woman flows from the fact of being born as a woman into a community that 
is known as ‘women’ with all its history and struggle.  This does mean that she begins 
life with a certain genetic/organic fundamental nature but this is not that which defines 
her.  It merely brings the possibility of gender.  The realisation of gender is a matter of 
development.  She begins a gender narrative at the point of origin and then works this out 
during the course of a lifetime: 
 
      Women take on self-definition…not only from the fact of being 
      born XX but also from the whole history of what being born with 
      those chromosomes mean in this society.303 
 
 
To be a woman is to identify oneself as a woman by placing oneself into a stream of 
existence that is known as ‘woman’.  This stream has an identifiable history, cultural 
place, collective experience and collective hopes and fears.  A person becomes part of 
this at birth and then actively participates in it throughout the course of a life.  Raymond 
places particular stress on the notion of history which she applies on two levels: first, at 
the personal level and second, at the corporate level.  The former is concerned with a 
woman’s personal history as a woman and goes back to the issue of fundamental nature.  
She argues that a M-F transsexual cannot be thought of as a woman because she lacks 
this history.  GReS cannot give a person this history and so cannot be thought to enable a 
person to become a woman.   
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Authenticity accepts that gender identity is a matter of choice in which a person places 
her/himself into a stream of existence.  This is because of the emphasis authenticity 
places upon human freedom.  The essentialist model of gender would be redundant.  
However, it is possible to hold this position and disagree with Raymond regarding TS.  
For her a post-operative M-F transsexual cannot be thought of as a woman because of the 
lack of a woman’s history.  Entry to this history occurs at birth.  It could be argued that 
entry does not have to be restricted by birth but could be a matter of the possession of the 
gender identity that is part of a person’s fundamental nature.  To be born with a certain 
sense of gender could qualify that person as a member of that gender and GReS could 
then be thought of as similar to other ways in which the possibility of gender can become 
a reality.  Birth is one means of entry whilst gender awareness is another.  Both require 
that what is possible becomes actualised through the exercise of choice. 
 
The third advantage over the medical model is concerned with the gender claim.  Under 
current guidelines the transsexual’s gender claim is evaluated for sincerity and 
genuineness by using criteria such as duration of the conviction and the level of 
identification with the gender classification.  This evaluation is done to establish whether 
or not the person making the claim can be understood to be ‘suffering’ from TS.  
Benjamin304 adds to this the persistence of the experience of gender dysphoria, the 
intensity of the desire for surgery and the amount of disgust a person feels towards the 
sex organ.  With reference to the employment of the Sex Orientation Scale (SOS) he 
writes: 
 
      As a working hypothesis, but with good practical uses, the SOS 
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      should illustrate six different types of the transvestism- 
      transsexualism syndrome as clinical observations seem to 
      reveal them.305 
 
 
Benjamin’s six types are; active/passive transvestism, mild, moderate and severe TS 
which can be thought of as either primary or secondary in its manifestation.  Other 
illnesses such as the inter-sexed condition and mental illnesses are to be ruled out whilst 
evaluating the gender claim.  He argues that the SOS provides an objective means of 
evaluating the claim itself because at the present time it is impossible to directly measure 
the BSTc region of the brain of a living person.  The SOS is also thought to provide an 
objective model for determining the nature of gender experience.  Testing seems to serve 
the purpose of assessing a person’s sincerity in making the claim.  Sincerity here needs to 
be understood to be both a matter of morality and correctness.  The former is concerned 
with whether or not the person is making the gender claim for reasons other than the 
presence of TS whilst the latter is concerned with whether or not the person may be 
mistaken in thinking that she/he is a transsexual.  
 
However, no such evaluation is required by the model of authenticity as it proceeds from 
the basis that a person’s given experience is to be accepted not just by themselves but by 
others.  It is sufficient that the person making a statement about her/his gender identity is 
thought to be competent to do so and provided all the relevant information has been given 
to her/him and understood, the person should  be allowed to proceed with the realisation 
of personal life goals (Chapter Four). 
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The medical model, by locating TS in the essence of the person, needs to locate that 
essence by means of evaluation.  Once it is believed that the essence has been identified 
then it is thought that the person is correct in making a gender claim.  The words and 
experience of the individual is not thought to provide sufficient proof.  Something 
greater, which is beyond the immediacy of the person, is required if the claim is to be 
accepted.  This is believed to be found in the measuring tools of which the SOS is an 
example. 
 
The authentic model does not seek to locate TS within the essence of the person as it is 
not concerned with essences but with the ‘lived-outness’ of a person’s life.  The model 
accepts an individual’s fundamental nature and is concerned with the way in which a 
person seeks to live.  Therefore the gender claim of the transsexual can be accepted at 
face value providing all else is equal. 
 
A fourth advantage over the medical model is concerned with the way that at present a 
transsexual ‘buys into’ the medical model as a way of making sense of the experience of 
gender.  The model of authenticity does not require a person to ‘buy into’ a model.  By 
contrast the medical model provides a framework of meaning for the transsexual.  Once 
this framework has been accepted then the individual filters a sense of identity through it.  
If he/she uses a conceptually confused model in order to achieve this sense of personal 
identity then he/she can be thought of as being harmed as a result of thinking that one 
thing is true when in fact it may not be.  This may be the case even if he/she is unaware 
of this.   
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The possibility of being harmed even when unaware of it is well understood in the area of 
personal relationships.  Take, for example a married man, a father of two children, 
apparently happy with the life he is living but who is conducting a secret affair with a 
male prostitute.  As far as his wife is concerned, life is as it appears to be.  She believes 
one thing whilst not knowing the falsity of her beliefs.  Harm consists in the discordance 
between what she thinks is true and what is actually true but unknown to her. 
 
Those caring for the transsexual may inadvertently harm her/him by applying the medical 
model as if it is the only model and as if it is the whole truth about TS.  This may be done 
when someone fails either to think through the limitations of the favoured model or to 
pro-actively question traditional practice.  I am not suggesting that doctors and others 
deliberately seek to mislead the transsexual but by passing on medical orthodoxy in an 
uncritical way they may be failing to give the transsexual the opportunity to think 
differently about her/his experience. 
 
These advantages stress the importance of conceptual consistency.  As has been pointed 
out, the medical model is predicated on the separation of gender and sex with the former 
being understood as both essence and non-essence.  It is essence to the extent that gender 
is a matter of TS and non-essence in the sense that it is generally thought not to be a 
matter of fundamental nature or tied to the sexed body.  This confusion with regard to the 
way that gender is to be understood is at the heart of the medical model and by removing 
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the requirement that gender in relation to TS be thought of as a matter of essence then the 
authenticity model removes this conceptual confusion. 
 
What is required by both the TS and medical communities is a willingness to engage with 
the medical model at the conceptual level in order to see the problematic nature of its 
essentialist construction.  As long as it is constructed along essentialist lines then the 
value of the gender reconstruction is open to question.  Similarly if an essentialist model 
is jettisoned on conceptual grounds then an alternative justification for medical treatment 
and for GReS is required.  The current justification is that of treating an essence.  
Treatment is offered in the belief that personal happiness consists in living in accordance 
with one’s personal essence and if this belief is rejected then time and effort must be 
spent in making it possible for that person to live as much as is possible in accord with 
his/her existence. 
2. Deception in the Medical Model 
 
In this section of the Chapter I wish to discuss the way that deception is at work in the 
medical model of TS, both in a general sense and in relation to self deception 
 
GENERAL DECEPTION 
 
Mele306 discusses deception as “to cause another to believe what is false”.  Causing 
someone to believe what is false can be a matter of either intentional or unintentional 
activity.  The latter happens when a simple mistake in the passing on of information takes 
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place; Mele gives an example of one person inadvertently misreading a newspaper article 
to another causing him to believe something that is not true.  Due to the lack of intention 
to deceive the reader has not deceived the listener only misled him.  Deception requires 
an intention to deceive.  A deceiver is a person who knows one thing to be true but 
intends another person to believe that either the true thing is false or that the false thing is 
true.  The motivation for doing this can be either benevolent or malevolent but the 
motivation is irrelevant to the definition of deception. 
 
Deception occurs as a result of the use of words, actions or omissions and it is the 
intention behind the deception that gives rise to moral issues.  Deception that is 
intentionally malevolent is generally regarded as unacceptable whilst intentionally 
benevolent deception is more problematic.  Jackson307, for instance, weighs up the moral 
merits of intentional benevolent deception in the context of health care.  She argues for 
both a broad concept of benevolent deception and for its use to be regarded as acceptable 
in the context of health care because it can be beneficial for patients.  For instance, it 
enables a patient to maintain morale in the face of a poor or terminal prognosis.  Lying, 
on the other hand, has the potential to destroy the trust between a patient and those caring 
for her and if this was to happen then the patient may no longer be able to believe the 
advice or the explanations that are being offered.  Jackson concludes: 
 
      The teaching that I am advocating would allow you to conceal 
      information and even to use deceptive tricks-telling half truths 
      and the like.  It would not allow you to lie-not even as a last 
      resort.308 
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Jackson refers to health care practitioners who are willing to conceal or to deceive as 
‘caring pragmatists’309.  She argues that openness is incompatible with the duties of 
doctors and nurses, particularly in relation to the issue of confidentiality310.  She wonders 
whether increased openness on the part of doctors has led to both deterioration in the 
public trust of doctors and an increase in legal action against them311.  She finally 
engages with the subject of paternalism and with reference to Kant suggests that there are 
times when medical paternalism is still necessary, especially where the circumstances are 
not ideal: 
 
     A tree that was tall and straight but has suffered an injury may 
     need a temporary support if it is to recover and not become 
     permanently misshapen312. 
 
 
 
However, Jackson’s defence of paternalism is problematic.  It assumes an inequality 
between the patient and the health care professional and envisages a situation in which 
the professional is in a superior position to the patient, not only in terms of their 
immediate health problem but also of their long-term interest.  This assumption is 
questionable. Patient’s need their doctor because they are not able to help themselves.  
They do not need the doctor to decide for him them what they are able to know. Hence 
Jackson’s defence of paternalism is problematic. 
 
Deception operates in the medical construction of TS in two ways: in the way that doctors 
sometimes talk about TS and in the way that a transsexual may use his/her suffering. 
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One way in which medicine makes sense of the suffering of transsexuals is to compare 
TS to other diseases.  For example Benjamin compares TS to diabetes and  reasons that 
just as a failure to treat the diabetes can lead to death so to can a failure to treat TS: 
 
      What both treatments (insulin for diabetes and surgery for TS) 
      accomplish is the preservation of the life of the patient.  Otherwise 
      many of these people would commit suicide.  There is no doubt, in 
      my mind, that sex-reassignment surgery can be life saving and 
      frequently is just that.313 
 
 
This demonstrates the faulty reasoning at work in the current TS medical narrative.  In 
both cases Benjamin maintains that death is something that happens to a person because 
of dysfunctional body systems that operates independently of the person.  The person, 
therefore, has no choice or control over whether they live or die as a result.  Having 
drawn a parallel between the two conditions Benjamin then likens the death of a 
transsexual by ‘suicide’ to death resulting from diabetes and argues that in both cases 
treatment has the moral imperative of saving life. 
 
It is, however, false to claim that TS is a life threatening condition like diabetes.  Whilst a 
diabetic may die if insulin is not administered a transsexual will not die if left untreated. 
Rather they will continue to suffer and even though this suffering may be both profound 
and debilitating it is not sufficient to bring about death.  Something further is necessary 
for death to occur and it is disingenuous to regard a suicide as being the result of TS as 
though TS has ‘killed’ them.  By committing suicide, the transsexual chooses death.  
Death is not the result of a disease processes.  Suicide, or even the threat of suicide, is a 
significantly different type of threat of death than that which results from organic causes. 
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      The transsexual cannot die of his disease.  Out of despair like anyone 
      else the transsexual may kill himself; or like anyone else he may 
      threaten suicide to extort something he wants from family, friends or 
      physician.314 
 
 
The threat of death endows action to prevent death with a moral imperative: death is the 
ultimate harm. It is, however, a misuse of this imperative to apply it to TS.  The medical 
profession must find an alternative means of enduing itself with a sense of moral urgency 
in relation to TS. 
 
The knowing adoption of this faulty logic is a form of deception: deception of the public 
about the justification for action. These ‘psychologically reassuring fallacies’, as 
Giordano315 discusses them, enable disease labels to be used to explain human behaviour 
when all they do is to describe them.  She argues that this reasoning is prevalent in 
psychiatric nosology and occurs as a result of seeking to offer explanations that reassure 
without being true explanations.  It is the patient who is the object of such reassurance: 
 
      These sorts of apparent explanations also make it easier for the 
       sufferers to tolerate their own experiences and the scarce control 
       they have over them…they are not real explanations …they are 
       psychologically reassuring fallacies.316 
 
 
Giordano argues that such fallacies are also logical mistakes and as such are an 
insufficient basis for approaching human experience.  What she says about anorexia may 
be equally applicable to this discussion about the way that medicine seeks to make 
parallels between diabetes and TS. 
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The second way that deception operates in the medical model of TS is the claim that a 
transsexual may make about death.  She/he states that death will be inevitable unless 
surgery is granted.  The threat of death, and the existence of suffering are used as tools to 
obtain surgery and in turn becomes a measure of the sincerity of the transsexual.  This 
often occurs in the first meeting between the transsexual and the TS specialist. 
 
Jorgensen, for instance, describes her first meeting with Dr. Angelo as an occasion when 
he sought to put obstacles in her way to transitioning.  These were both technological and 
moral.  His attempts to dissuade her continued in subsequent meetings until in their last 
interview she referred to her sufferings as her reason for wanting surgery.  She writes that 
his attempts to dissuade her by referring to what could go wrong during surgery met with 
this reply: 
 
      Yes I’ve considered that but how could any future life be worse 
      than the past twenty three years.317 
 
 
In relation to the risk of surgery Jorgensen seems to be saying that if anything went 
wrong then she would be no worse off than she has been for twenty three years.  In 
relation to a future without transitioning she implies that suicide is the only option for her 
because life cannot get any worse.  She presents death as something which is the natural 
end point in her experience of TS and only surgery can prevent this from happening.   
 
This view was subsequently adopted by her treating physician and has become the 
standard view since.  Benjamin states: 
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      Some of them (transsexuals) probably languished in mental 
      institutions, some in prisons and the majority as miserable, 
      unhappy members of the community, unless they committed 
      suicide.318 
 
 
This ignores the logical space between the experience of suffering and suicide as a 
response to it.  Suffering alone does not cause the death of the transsexual.  Suicide is but 
one choice and this needs to be recognised.  Recognising suicide as a possible response is 
not to minimize the transsexuals suffering but is important both as a matter of fact and as 
a matter of personal morality and responsibility.   
 
Empty suicide threats are also a form of deception when used as a means of extortion, for 
instance to obtain GReS.   
 
An anonymous correspondent writing to an agony aunt working for an on-line 
transsexual advice journal admitted exaggerating suicide threats when soliciting letters of 
recommendation for surgery: 
 
      My therapist didn’t want me to get Sex Reassignment Surgery (SReS) 
      at that time.  I just went there and told her what she wanted to 
      hear just to try to get letters (of recommendation).319 
 
 
This is a straightforward example of deception.  The correspondent deceived her therapist 
into writing letters of recommendation for surgery on the strength of exaggerated 
suffering claims.  She says that she deliberately overplayed the extent and nature of her 
sufferings because she believed this was the way to obtain what she desired.  Her 
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exaggerated suffering was used as a means to an end and as such as instrumental to her 
purposes.  This does not mean that her suffering was not real: suffering may be both real 
and to be used and exaggerated as a means to an end. 
 
This correspondent subsequently wished to take action against her surgeon as she came to 
believe that she was not a fit subject for surgery and that the surgeon ought to have 
realised this at the time.  What she had previously wanted strongly enough to gain by 
extortion, she now regarded as a mistake for which the surgeon, and not she, was 
responsible.  Put another way, first she lied and then she complained that her surgeon 
should have realised that she was lying.  Now she wants compensation for his failure to 
see through her lies. 
 
To conclude the argument in this section of the chapter, authenticity requires that a 
distinction be made between the claim that TS leads to suicide if left untreated and the 
sincerity of the suicide claim itself.  Suicide is a matter of choice.  However, sincerity of 
belief and sincerity of suffering does not prove the rightness of the belief that suffering 
leads to death.  Deception would occur if this distinction between sincerity and rightness 
were understood and then discounted either by the transsexual or the medical 
practitioners.   
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SELF- DECEPTION 
 
The subject of self-deception is of interest to some philosophers because of its apparently 
paradoxical nature.  It is predicated on the notion that a self is able to deceive itself.  
Deception normally requires both a deceiver and a deceived with the latter being unaware 
of what the former is seeking to do.  If the latter becomes aware of this then she/he is no 
longer deceived.  Self-deception suggests that in order to deceive oneself a single 
consciousness must be both doing the deceiving and being deceived whilst knowing that 
this process is going on.  Philosophical debate focuses on both how this is possible and on 
the apparent rationality of the idea that a consciousness can be divided against itself in 
this way.  It is because of this paradox that some argue that self-deception is not possible. 
 
Philosophers such as Mele320, Barnes321, Haight322, Davidson323, Lazar324, Fingarette325 
and Sartre326 engage with self-deception and offer various explanations for how they 
think that it is possible.  For example Fingarette argues that it is possible because the self-
deceiver develops a skill which he calls ‘spelling-out’327.  This is the ability to tell oneself 
a narrative of what one wants to believe and to keep this uppermost in one’s mind.  
Anything that contradicts this is deliberately not retained in conscious awareness but is 
pushed into the margins of the mind.  Consciousness selects that which accords with the 
personal narrative and Fingarette argues that the Freudian concept of the Ego needs to be 
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restructured into the idea of the Ego proper and the Ego defence with the latter acting as a 
filtering mechanism which does not allow any contradictions to enter into awareness. 
 
By contrast Haight argues that self-deception is nothing more than a matter of 
straightforward lying, not to oneself but to others about oneself and what it is that one 
truly believes.  He maintains that the idea of self-deception is used due to the difficulty of 
calling someone a liar.  It is the apparent sincerity of the liar that makes someone hesitate 
to call her/him a liar and so the less offensive term is used. 
 
Davidson offers a third explanation.  His position is that the mind of the self-deceiver 
must be partitioned rather than fully integrated.  The partition permits no cross traffic.  
The largest portioned area determines the main narrative that is developed and 
maintained with the contradictory elements being consigned to the smaller partitioned 
area.  Lazar talks of beliefs being formed under the influence of emotion and 
contradictory beliefs can be explained by the conflicting nature of a person’s emotional 
life.  Mele makes a distinction between a deceptive belief that can be motivated but not 
intended.  A person, as a result of powerful desires, may be motivated towards a belief 
that is known to be untrue but may not intend to hold such beliefs alongside others that 
are known to be true.  It is the presence of beliefs that a person both intends to hold and 
doesn’t intend to hold that explains the paradoxical nature of self-deception. 
 
For Sartre self-deception is bad faith and is ‘a certain art of forming contradictory 
concepts which unite in themselves both an idea and the negation of an idea’328. 
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Sartre discusses the twin ideas of ‘facticity’329 and ‘transcendence’330 which he argues are 
the double properties of all human beings and ought to be the subject of valid co-
ordination.  By facticity Sartre appears to mean the fact of a particular individual’s 
existence as a definite and objective reality in relation to others who are the same.  
Transcendence is the subjective reality of such an individual.  It is the sum of a person’s 
hopes, beliefs, desires and meanings.  Sartre’s position is that these two features of 
human existence ought to be held together in a way that has integrity and harmony.  Self-
deception or bad faith occurs where there is either not the wish to have co-ordination or 
where there is a failure to achieve something greater as a result of surmounting them: 
“Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity whilst preserving their 
differences”331. 
 
 
To be in a condition of bad faith is a matter of inauthenticity and Sartre maintains that a 
person is required by the claims of authenticity to move out from bad faith into 
knowledge and freedom.  Authentic human experience is held out by Existentialism as 
the ultimate human good and therefore as something to which men and women ought to 
aspire. 
 
Authenticity requires self-deception to be examined wherever it occurs.  Here self-
deception will be explored as it appears to arise within the current construction of TS.  
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Taking Fingarette’s analysis a transsexual may be engaged in the practice of ‘spelling-
out’ in relation to gender awareness.  In M-F TS a male ‘spells-out’ to himself a narrative 
of being female and to maintain this he deselects anything which suggests otherwise.  
This would include the evidence of the sexed body, the idea that gender is a cultural 
construction and is not a fixed identity determined by inheritance and that all claims to 
self-knowledge by means of reflection are problematic.  Anything that would threaten the 
female gender narrative is marginalised in the male transsexual’s consciousness as the 
female identity is kept uppermost in his mind. 
 
Similarly, self-deception may be linked to the presence or absence of desire.  An 
individual may positively desire to belong to one particular gender or may have negative 
desires in relation to the gender in which she/he belongs as a matter of birth.  Desire can 
then give rise to belief as described by Lazar and may exist without relation to any facts 
of bodily or conceptual existence.  Desires function here as both the origins and 
sustainers of belief systems and such systems are not dependent for existence upon 
objective facts.  Truth is subjectively generated and the desires themselves may be related 
to the way in which a person has sought to make sense of early experience. 
 
Alternatively self-deception may be the result of misinterpretation.  A female transsexual 
may have interpreted her discomfort with the way that femininity has been constructed by 
those around her as evidence that she is in fact not female and therefore must be male.  
For her to do may well be a mistake and the self-deceptive aspect is found in the way that 
this mistake is seen to reveal a fundamental truth about her.  This belief is elevated above 
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others.  Counter-beliefs are not considered because they would contradict the narrative of 
masculinity that the F-M transsexual is telling herself. This could be a case of ‘spelling-
out’ in the way that Fingarette describes.  It may also work in terms of attraction.  The 
same M-F may interpret her attraction to male symbolism and culturally identity factors 
as evidence of an inherent masculinity.  This may be based on, or a reaction to, 
discomfort with the cultural symbolisation of femininity. 
 
Linked to this is the idea of selective focussing/attending and selective evidence 
gathering.  This is concerned with the possibility that the transsexual is only focussing on 
those elements or aspects of the self that ‘fit’ the transgender narrative that has been 
established.  A F-M transsexual would fail to give serious attention to anything that 
speaks of her femininity whilst focussing on that which tells her she is male.  Not to 
acknowledge this selectivity may constitute self-deception. 
 
Another possible instance of self-deception is related to future claims.  In mind here are 
those claims that are made in relation to personal happiness.  Happiness is said to be 
dependent upon successful transitioning and is not possible until this has been achieved.  
Present happiness is suspended and only future happiness is a possibility.  Happiness is 
made dependent upon one thing which, when absent, makes happiness impossible and 
when present makes it certain.  Happiness is most often identified as GReS.  Once this 
has been achieved then happiness will be permanent, or so it is believed.  Any other 
opportunity for happiness may be discounted, discarded or ignored. 
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This idea is found in many transsexual narratives where also there is virtually no 
acknowledgement that human happiness is difficult for anyone to achieve, that it is a 
matter of personal endeavour and not a result of what others may or may not do for us, 
and that once achieved it is difficult to hold on to and may easily disappear.  Thoughts 
about future happiness appear to function in the same way as suffering in the exchange 
between a transsexual and his/her medical advisers; as a means to the end of GReS.  Both 
are accepted by both parties. 
 
It is here that suffering can become a matter of self-deception.  The transsexual attributes 
all suffering to the conflict between gender identity and sexed body.  Present suffering is 
caused by this and future happiness is ensured when it is resolved.  Other potential 
sources of unhappiness are discounted.  This process is illustrated by the case of Mr D332.  
He attributed his suffering to his facial disfigurement.  This consisted of an enlarged and 
protruding lower jaw.  His sufferings consisted in experiencing difficulty in forming 
personal relationships and failing to gain promotion at work.  He found it particularly 
difficult to form successful relationships with women.  His sufferings caused him to 
withdraw and to lead a life of increasing isolation.  He came to the conclusion that he 
needed surgery on his jaw both to end his suffering and to ensure his happiness.  Surgery 
was the only answer to his problems.  He sought medical help and was given the surgery. 
 
Following surgery Mr D discovered that his hopes were not fulfilled.  The surgery itself 
was successful but his personal difficulties continued as before.  He was unable to explain 
to himself way this should be the case as he had consistently believed that surgery would 
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prove to be the answer because he believed his jaw was the reason for both his difficulties 
at work and with relationships. 
 
Perhaps Mr D was mistaken in his belief that his suffering was caused by his physical 
deformity and that the reasons for his problems were more complex.  His problems may 
have resulted from the kind of person that he had become and to his lack of personal and 
professional skills.  In attributing his problems to his disfigurement he managed to avoid 
the need for personal reflection and change.  He thought the cause was to be found not in 
himself but in his body.  His difficulties were projected onto his disfigurement which he 
then disassociated from himself.  It was not his responsibility.  His chin became both the 
location for his sufferings as well as its reason.  Therefore it had also to be the focus of 
intervention.  Once this was put right then he would function appropriately and his 
sufferings would end and happiness begin. 
 
This was arguably a form of self-deception. To pin-point his jaw as the reason for his 
sufferings may have been the easier option for Mr D.  Self-examination both in terms of 
work performance and personal relationships may have been too threatening to his sense 
of personal integrity.  What may have happened here is that he chose to believe a 
narrative of disfigurement rather than one of personal inadequacy both at the social and 
professional levels. 
 
Similarly a transsexual may claim that all his/her suffering is the result of gender/sex 
conflict and that this will end and happiness be achieved when this conflict is resolved by 
 262 
 
means of surgery.  Both suffering and happiness are caused by the body of the 
transsexual.  The body is thought of as ‘not’ the person.  Rather the person is 
handicapped and held back by the body.  Were it not for the body then the transsexual 
would be without suffering and be experiencing happiness in the same way as everyone 
else.  An artificial space is created between the person of the transsexual and the body as 
cause of her/his suffering.  This allows for the transsexual to disown the body as it is the 
locus of suffering.  However this space will be closed down once the body has been 
surgically altered and ownership of it then taken up.  Then the body will be thought of as 
belonging to the person in a way that it did not do so before. 
 
This locating of suffering and happiness in the body of the transsexual so that both are 
thought of as not being her/his personal responsibility may be more tolerable than an 
examination of the possibility that the reasons for suffering and the hopes of personal 
happiness are more complex.  To attribute all suffering to one cause and to pin all future 
hopes of happiness on one event may prove to be a matter of self-deception. 
 
Other person deception is discussed at this point in terms of the subject of Passing.  This 
features prominently in current constructions of TS and therefore requires considerable 
and detailed attention in the next section. 
 
3. Authenticity and ‘Passing’ 
 
PRINCIPLE AND LAW 
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Passing, alternatively known as the Real Life Experience (RLE), consists of a lengthy 
period of time in which the transsexual presents him/herself in public as a member of the 
desired gender before GReS.  The transsexual would normally have taken male or female 
hormones so that the body will have taken on some of the characteristics of the desired 
gender.  Help would also have been given in relation to mannerisms, voice production 
and other gender symbols.  Successful passing leads to the decision to proceed to surgery, 
the final stage of gender transition. 
 
Passing is thought to serve at least two purposes.  Medical practitioners consider that it 
provides an experience of what it means to live as a member of the desired gender.  This 
experience is both informative and serves to test the resolve and nature of the gender 
desire.  In the official guidelines of the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria 
Association (HBGDA) the RLE is discussed in the following way: 
 
      Since changing one’s gender presentation has immediate profound, 
      personal and social consequences, the decision to do so should be 
      preceded by an awareness of what the familial, vocational, 
      interpersonal, educational, economic and legal consequences are 
      likely to be. The Real-life experience tests the person’s resolve, the capacity 
      to function in the preferred gender, and the adequacy of social, 
      economic and psychological supports.333 
 
 
The quality and success of the RLE is judged on the transsexual’s ability to do a job of 
work, to form successful relationships and to be able to fit into the community as a 
whole.  Acceptance of the transsexual by others as a member of the preferred gender 
community is crucial.  The RLE functions as a way of measuring this idea of belonging to 
a recognisable gender community.  It is the opportunity for desire and belief to be 
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measured against reality.  Reality may prove to be what the transsexual imagined it to be 
or to reveal things that were not anticipated.  If this is the case then the decision to 
transition generally follows; if not the transsexual may reconsider the option of surgery.  
She/he may then decide against it. 
 
The second purpose of Passing as understood from the perspective of the transsexual 
community itself is; “the act of successfully appearing as a desired definition of a person 
in the world”.334 
 
 
The on-line support organisation www.Transsexuality.org define gender identity as 
determined by two things; one is the sum total of behaviours linked to gender and the 
other is physical appearance.  What is required is that the transsexual ‘fits’ on both counts 
and the aim of Passing is; “to be accepted as the correct sex”.335 
 
The transsexual is, therefore, advised to seek acceptance as a member of the desired 
gender.  All whom the transsexual comes into contact with are to be convinced that 
she/he belongs to the preferred gender.  The support group advise that Passing needs to 
be successful in order for the transsexual to live safely given the human capacity for 
cruelty and ridicule.  The ideal in Passing is to live in conformity to existing ideas of 
masculinity and femininity: 
 
      In every way, it is safer, easier and less filled with suffering to fit 
      neatly within one of the twin accepted poles of the current definition 
      of gender: male or female.336 
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Transsexuality.org appears to be advocating a policy of conformity to gender stereotypes 
as a pragmatic measure.  It does caution against a too rigid adherence to stereotypes but 
nonetheless advises a measure of conformity as the above quote shows. 
 
Two distinct rationales are offered for the activity of Passing.  The medical one is 
therapeutic in aim and orientated towards testing the personal resolve of the transsexual 
whereas the rationale from within the transsexual community appears to be orientated 
towards establishing the likelihood of surviving in society in the chosen gender role.  
Passing is orientated in both cases towards the individual being able to live out 
permanently and visibly in the gender role as a member of the community.  This is the 
stated desire of many transsexuals. 
 
The Gender Recognition Act has set up a Gender Recognition Panel whose responsibility 
it is to oversee in law the recognition of men and women who have transitioned from one 
gender to another337.  This panel has responsibility for all the documentation that is 
necessary in order to establish legal status.  Transsexuals will be placed on a Transsexual 
Person’s Register which will be a means of overseeing the issuing of birth and marriage 
certificates.  The result will be that transsexuals will have the legal rights and entitlements 
of a person of the acquired gender.  This will include the right to marry and to pension 
and property rights.  The Act does away with the Corbett Sex Test (1970) which was used 
to determine the sex of an individual and which laid down legal definitions of sex and 
gender and replaces it with a fourfold inquiry about the experience of the transsexual: 
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1. Has a person taken decisive steps to live in the gender which 
they believe to be more appropriate? (section 1.4b). 
2. Do they intend to live in that gender until they die? (section 1.4c) 
3. Have they had Gender Dysphoria?  (section 2). 
4. Have they undergone medical treatment?  (section 2). 
 
Following this inquiry the transsexual person is responsible for submitting medical 
reports to the panel that substantiate the existence of Gender Dysphoria as well as 
confirming that she/he has lived in the preferred gender role for at least two years.  
Successful application to the panel results in the granting of a Gender Recognition 
Certificate which can either be partial or full and when it is the latter then the Registrar 
General is informed and a new birth certificate can be issued.  Recognition can be refused 
but the person concerned can apply again within six months.   
 
 
Once it has been established that the criteria for gender recognition have been fulfilled 
then gender status is recognised in law.  Evidence of previous gender status is legally 
removed and outstanding matters such as pension contributions and other financial 
matters are adjusted into the new gender role.  In law the transsexual now has the same 
legal gender status as a person born with that gender. 
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PASSING AS DECEPTION 
 
An alternative interpretation of Passing, and its recognition in law, is that it is as a 
straightforward matter of deception.  Deception can be thought of as taking place in at 
least three ways. 
 
First, to appear in public as a member of a particular gender whilst either belonging to, or 
having once belonged to, the other gender is inherently deceptive.  Raymond for instance 
writes: 
 
      to not acknowledge the fact that one is a transsexual in a  
      women’s space is indeed deception.338 
 
 
As seen in my Interim Conclusion, Raymond’s central argument is that inherent in TS are 
men seeking to invade the space of women by means of the deception.  M-F TS is a way 
for patriarchy to continue its dominance of women and is a rearguard action to the 
attempts of women to liberate themselves.  Part of the deceptive nature of M-F TS is 
found in the way that men seek to appear as women without acknowledging their original 
masculinity.  She argues that: 
 
      no man can have the history of being born and located in this 
      culture as a woman.  He can have the history of wishing to be a 
      woman and of acting like a woman but this gender experience is that 
      of a transsexual and not of a woman.339 
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For Raymond the very claim to be a woman as a result of surgery is deceitful and ought 
to be recognised as such by ‘real’ women.  She claims that the whole issue of TS is a 
moral one that centres on the question of when it is right to use medical technologies and 
not on when it is possible to do so because the skills are available: 
 
      The question (of GReS) is a moral one; which asks basically about 
       the rightness of choice and not the possibility of it.340 
 
 
 
Rightness does not consist in the fulfilment of human desire but in the addressing of a 
genuine and recognisable health need.  In Raymond’s opinion medicine has placed a 
therapeutic model on matters that are inherently moral and as a result makes therapy a 
way of life.  To turn moral matters into therapeutic ones is to damage the individual 
concerned and contributes to the continuance in society of classifications and groupings 
that are harmful: 
 
       The present counselling and treatment of transsexuals, based on 
        the medical model I have described, give the transsexual no real 
        moral options.  Failing to analyze our society’s definitions of 
        masculinity and femininity, such therapy offers little encouragement 
        and advice to help the transsexual live beyond both these containers 
        of personhood.341 
 
 
Raymond argues that TS ought to be understood as a quest for transcendence in which the 
individual seeks to go beyond current limits of the self in both bodily and gender 
categorisations.  She appeals to Tillich’s notion in The Courage to Be342 and argues for an 
ethic of integrity that is a rejection of both sex and gender roles into a Being of 
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integrity343.  For Raymond the act of simply appearing as a woman when a person has 
once lived as a man is straightforwardly deceptive. 
 
A second way in which Passing can be understood to be deceptive centres around the way 
in which one term can be understood in two different ways.  This issue is raised by both 
Raymond’s views and the action of the UK Parliament and is concerned with whether or 
not gender identity is subjectively established or objectively determined.  The term 
‘gender’ is used in both senses by different groups within society, with Raymond giving 
it an objective meaning whilst the UK Parliament gives it a subjective one.  Deception 
results when one group gives the term one meaning in the full knowledge that the other 
party is using the other.  Not only this but one group must use the term differently in 
different contexts without acknowledging that this is being done.  So, for instance, one 
group would use the term ‘gender’ objectively whilst another does so subjectively, with 
the first group doing so knowing that the opposite view is held by the second. 
 
An analogy can be made at this point with the way in which the term ‘law’ is used.  Two 
people discuss a theoretical case of an adulterous woman.  One claims that the law 
demands that she be stoned to death and by law he understands the law of the Hebrew 
Scriptures, especially the Book of Leviticus with its code of immoral behaviours and 
punishments344.  The other person hears the word ‘law’ and understands it to mean the 
actual law of the land and thinks that the first person is claiming that the law of the land 
demands that an adulterous woman be stoned to death.  For this to be a matter of 
deception rather than misunderstanding then the first person must be aware of the fact 
 270 
 
that the second person has a contemporary concept of law and not a Biblical one.  
Knowing this he fails to make his own position clear and encourages the second to 
comply with the ‘law’ by participation in the stoning. 
 
The UK Parliament’s view of gender is that it is subjective in nature but needing an 
objective validation.  Raymond views gender as a matter of fact (a fact which is tied to 
the sexed body) but in its form gender is a matter of cultural construction and expression.  
She states: 
 
      masculinity and femininity are social constructs and stereotypes of 
      behaviour that are culturally prescribed for male and female bodies 
      respectively.345 
 
 
Such constructs do not allow for a person with a male sexed body to claim to be a woman 
or vice versa.  Sexed bodies determine gender but its shape is a matter of cultural 
expectation.  These are predicated on particular understandings of the sexed body and can 
vary from culture to culture and from one time to another.  If gender was equated only 
with the body then it would be as fixed as the sex of the body itself and so no variation in 
content would be possible.  The parameters of gender for Raymond are established by the 
sexed body but its content is fluid because the idea of a fixed content is a cultural 
construct. 
 
This examination of both Raymond’s and the UK Parliaments view of gender focuses 
attention on the way that one term can be used in different ways and that deception 
occurs where this is not acknowledged.  Two paradigms of gender exist, the objective and 
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the subjective, with the subjective being the one upon which the definition of TS depends 
and as the one used by both medical professionals and transsexual in any discussion of 
TS between themselves. However the objective definition of gender is used when a 
transsexual seeks to pass before others.  In Passing a transsexual moves from a subjective 
paradigm of gender into an objective one and does so because it is believed that this is the 
view of gender that is held by those before whom she/he is seeking to pass.  The 
transsexual presents him/herself through an objective view of gender whilst he/she 
actually has a subjective view, a view which makes possible his/her gender desire in the 
first place.  He /she knows that he/she is not a member of the desired gender in the same 
way as others are from birth, and that he/she does not regard gender as tied to the sexed 
body as others may do but proceeds to act according to the objective view of gender-as-
sexed-body by behaving like a stereotypical member of that gender. 
 
What is necessary for successful Passing is that a transsexual acts in ways that are 
believed to be in keeping with the mannerisms of a person who belongs to the gender that 
she/he is seeking to convince others that she/he belongs.  She/he both seeks and is 
encouraged to seek to act in ways that conform with what can be understood as cultural 
stereotypes of masculinity and femininity in order to convince others that such 
stereotypes are ideal gender identities linked to a sexed body.  Both the transsexual and 
those who consider that Passing is an important element of the treatment process can be 
thought of as moving between these two paradigms of gender and to fail to acknowledge 
that they are doing so.  Both transsexuals who seek to Pass in this way and doctors and 
others who are involved in Passing process may be employing a construct of gender 
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which is not necessarily the one that would be generally accepted by the audience for this 
Passing. If Passing is successful then the transsexual will live full time in that gender role 
and is then living out an objective paradigm of gender whilst still prioritising a subjective 
one that made the transitioning possible.  Deception can be understood to continue after 
the initial period of Passing and into the transitioned life. 
 
A third way in which Passing can be understood to be deceptive is perhaps the most 
significant.  To knowingly believe in the separation of sex and gender, which as we have 
seen is a pre-requisite for TS to be seen as a rational possibility, and then for a person to 
act as if sex and gender are one and the same thing is deceptive.  This is what seems to be 
happening in Passing in the case of both the transsexual and the professional.  
 
Considerations of authenticity may require that a transsexual openly acknowledges the 
purpose of Passing and that she/he tries not to present a gender identity in such a way as 
to make it appear that this identity is a matter of birth.  It may be thought to be desirable 
to ask openly and freely whether or not they consider the transsexual to present a gender 
identity in such a way that it is consistent with an understanding of how gender is thought 
to relate to the sexed body.  In this way the transsexual is seeking to be as open as 
possible about what it is he/she is seeking to do in Passing and other people are being 
treated not as a means to an end but as ends in themselves and are afforded the respect 
that is due to them as autonomous beings. 
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These three forms of deception may be thought to be inauthentic.  Authenticity requires 
both that the concepts and ideas involved are consistent and clear and that those who are 
taking action do so in a way which is honest and respectful of others.  The former 
requirement means that the current unacknowledged paradigm shifts between 
subjective/objective understandings of gender that occurs in the transsexual narrative be 
acknowledged and replaced with a consistent approach.  The latter requires that openness 
and straightforwardness should characterise the activity of Passing if Passing is to remain 
an intrinsic part of treatment. 
 
Two counter examples may be thought of here.  A person who is a smoker but sincerely 
trying to give up is about to attend a conference where no one knows her and where some 
socialising at the bar is certain to happen.  As this is pre July 07 there is also likely to be 
lots of smoking at the bar.  She wants to make this a real test of her resolve to quit 
smoking.  She therefore acts as if she is a non-smoker.  She behaves like the non-smoker 
she wishes to become.  Can this be thought of as a matter of deception in the same way as 
Passing?  Similarly a trainee learning disabilities nurse, wanting to see what it is like to 
be confined to a wheelchair, pretends to be confided himself.  He visits the local shops 
and receives help from others.  He does not really need the help yet he accepts it.  If 
someone else were to dash in front of a lorry risking death to push him out of the way 
(should the need arise), and he lets them do it, this would be unacceptable, but to receive 
lesser forms of help fits in with his original experiment.  He, too, faces the problem of 
whether he is acting deceptively. 
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Both examples can be answered in terms of authenticity.  In the first example the ex-
smoker is seeking to test the authenticity of her intention to quit smoking.  She knows 
herself well enough to realise the difference between an intention to quit and acting on 
that intention in a pressurised setting.  To test herself she acts in the way described above.  
The trainee nurse seeks to be authentic in his caring for those confined to a wheelchair.  
This is why he conducts his experiment and why he does not tell others what he is doing.  
In order for his experience to be of value then he needs others to respond to him as if he 
were disabled.  For the person who is engaging with his/her sex and gender identities 
authentically the deception involved in Passing is problematic.  This is because it is 
predicated on notions of gender that are out-dated.  Both the non-smoker and the student 
nurse are pursuing goals of authenticity whereas the transsexual is pursuing the goal of 
displaying sex/gender congruence whilst holding to sex/gender dissonance which, as we 
have seen, is the fundamental concept that allows for TS to be a rational possibility. 
 
Authenticity requires that Passing be given up in favour of an open and acknowledged 
activity in which a transsexual does not seek to hide the original gender identity but is 
seeking both to test personal resolve and to gain insight into the actual bodily experience 
of a person with a particular gender.  This activity could be renamed ‘Testing’ or 
‘Resolving’, the aim of which is not to establish gender identity (as this is established 
subjectively as a claim) but to determine whether or not a person wishes to transition to a 
gender identity that is tied to a sexed identity in order to achieve sex/gender congruency.  
This is done for reasons of authentic existence.  ‘Passing’ as a construct seems to be 
inherently deceptive. 
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4. Authenticity and Personal Responsibility 
 
In this fourth and final section of the chapter I want to argue that a post-operative 
transsexual, living authentically, has a duty to disclose the fact that she/he has 
transitioned to any person with whom she/he seeks a relationship of intimacy, particularly 
romantic intimacy for at least three reasons: first, the right to privacy cannot be 
constructed as an absolute right; second, in specific contexts others have a right to know 
and third because of considerations of the duty to oneself.  These three reasons will be 
explored in this section of the Chapter.  Finally, disclosure will be discussed in relation to 
achieving intimacy. 
 
THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
 
I am not arguing that there is a general duty to disclose, as this may undermine the very 
purpose that transitioning serves, rather that it is a specific duty to the person with whom 
the transsexual seeks to establish a life partnership. 
 
The issue of disclosure is explored in a series of rhetorical questions that Mason asks: 
 
      Is it better to conceal the past from potential employers than to ‘tell  
      all’ even if this means evasion or outright lies on an application form? 
      Do they really want to know that I have been in the WRNS and have  
      had a total hysterectomy?  Wouldn’t such disclosures make life 
      difficult all round?  At what point does one tell a girlfriend of the 
      situation?346 
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Such questions highlight what Mason describes as ‘the transsexuals dilemma’.  He is 
reflecting on the tension between a transsexual’s right to privacy and the right that other 
people have in relation to their own interests.  With regard to privacy a transsexual has 
both desired and worked for a considerable time to be the person that she/he now is, and 
has experienced great difficulty in order to do so.  The right to privacy can enable her/him 
to live in the desired gender role.  On the other hand, a transsexual’s right to privacy can 
come into conflict with the rights of those with those she/he is in an intimate relationship.  
Where this occurs I argue that a transsexual has a duty to disclose the fact of her/his 
transitioning.    
 
This is not to diminish the importance of the right to privacy.  This right is well known as 
a good that is valued by most people.  Nyberg comments:347 
 
      Every important right needs a social system to protect it.  The right 
      to privacy is no exception.  It is protected by laws, by ethical codes, 
      skills of concealment and deception…we need privacy to survive just 
      as surely as we need communal civility.348 
 
 
Nyberg argues it is impossible to avoid deception completely but this ought not to be a 
matter of moral concern because such deception is often innocently done.  He argues that 
relationships would not survive the experience of pure truth telling and so innocent or 
non-malicious deception is often necessary.  Absolute honesty may have a negative 
impact on intimacy: 
 
      An atmosphere of pure truth telling is no more fit to sustain  
      relationships than the atmosphere of pure oxygen is fit to 
      support biological life.  Social life without deception to keep it 
      going is a fantasy, and even if it were possible it would be 
      undesirable.349 
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Nyberg’s argument about the right to privacy centres on the need to shield our thoughts 
about ourselves and other people from others; for instance how we think another person 
looks or what we feel about another person’s character or achievements.  If all such 
thoughts were disclosed then relationships may break down and social relationships 
become impossible.  Privacy actually facilitates good relationships and creates social 
cohesion. 
 
Thomson350 argues that no-one has a clear idea of what a right to privacy is.  She thinks 
that it consists of a cluster of rights that are related to other rights such as the right not to 
be harmed.  A right to privacy is related to ‘the right over a person’ and after examining 
various possibilities she argues that a person’s right to privacy may be violated in various 
ways but not as a result of someone else knowing a fact about oneself: 
 
      There is no such thing as violating a man’s right to privacy by 
      simply knowing something about him.351 
 
 
Thomson’s position is that whilst a person has the right not to be coerced to reveal 
something and the right to be protected from other people taking steps to find things out 
about him/her the right to privacy can be undermined by other rights. Harm does occur 
when privacy is invaded, but this has to be explained in terms of other rights. 
 
Lever352 agrees that the right to privacy is a cluster or a bundle of rights amongst which 
are the rights to solitude, intimacy and confidentiality.  Lever is concerned to work out a 
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political justification for the right to privacy and makes a distinction between the private 
and the public realm.  In the former Lever argues that the equality and freedom of 
individuals need to be protected and that the right to privacy has often been a justification 
for the political exclusion of women.  Like Thomson she agrees that the concept of the 
right to privacy is problematic; 
 
      At present there is an unresolved debate amongst moral philosophers 
      about the best way to understand the content and justification of 
      privacy rights..353 
 
 
Her main concern is that equality and freedom between persons is maintained and that as 
long as this is the case then specific matters or concerns are of less significance. 
 
Both agree that an important element of the right to privacy is concealment.  The right 
entitles a person to keep to themselves certain facts that are considered to be of 
importance and that others do not have the right to this information as a matter of course.  
Concealment may be important both in order for an individual to pursue his/her goals and 
to protect him/her from the inquisitiveness and prurience of others. 
 
Nonetheless, whilst acknowledging the importance of the right to privacy, I argue that a 
transsexual has the duty, under some circumstances, to disclose that she/he has 
transitioned for the following three reasons; first, because the right to privacy is not an 
absolute right, second that in certain situations others have a right to know and third that 
the transsexuals duty to disclose can be formulated as a duty to the self.  This third point 
can be broken down into a discussion on respect and pragmatic considerations 
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First, then, the right to privacy is not an absolute right.  Article 8 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 codifies the right to private and family life but states that this is qualified by the 
duty of the State to protect the lives of all its citizens.  Individual rights can be over-
ridden in the interests of the State, as long as those interests represent the interests of the 
general population.  This legislation sets the right to privacy in a public context.  In the 
private realm the right to privacy may also be thought not to be an absolute right.  It 
needs to be weighed against other rights, both of the individual concerned and of those 
around her/him. 
 
On an individual level it may be necessary to weigh the right to privacy against other 
rights, such as the right to health care, the right to education and the rights to public 
services, all of which involve the disclosure of some personal information to those who 
supply the services that ensure that the rights are met.  If an individual values such 
services then she/he waives the right to keep secret personal information, such as the 
nature of a particular illness. 
 
Similarly on the inter-personal level an individual may waive the right to privacy in 
favour of his/her other rights, such as the right to safety.  Barilan and Brusa354 discuss the 
way that the right to privacy is often seen as a: 
     ‘super-master concept, as a trump card even more powerful than 
      other trump cards…the right to privacy…trumps all other moral 
      considerations and rights.355 
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They question why the right to privacy should have such prominence in ethical 
deliberation before concluding that: 
 
      The reign of privacy is more of a legal tyranny threatening to 
      silence interpersonal deliberations on issues that are so much part of 
      human identity and existence.356 
 
 
This conclusion suggests that there is scope for increasing the number of occasions when 
the right to privacy can be trumped by other rights, as an insistence on the right to privacy 
may interfere with more basic human concerns.  One example is the way that national 
interests often over-ride privacy.  In the so-called ‘War on Terror’ governments often 
attempt to justify breaches of personal privacy on the grounds that they are concerned 
with national security.  Attempts are made to access mobile ‘phone conversations and e-
mail traffic in order to police the activities of those whom they suspect of terrorism.   
 
A broader justification for privacy being trumped by interests of national security is that a 
trade in benefits is taking place.  The benefit of privacy is being traded for the benefit of 
security.  Security is considered here to be of greater benefit than privacy.  Without 
security it would be difficult to achieve privacy and therefore security is a means to 
privacy. 
 
It is not just in relation to national security that privacy can be traded for other benefits.  
This can also be the case at a personal level.  An example of this is the ‘fly on the wall’ 
type documentary, where a family invites a film crew into their home to film either the 
way that they bring up their children or cope with poverty and unemployment.  
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Supernanny357 is an example of the former, where a professional Nanny gives advice to 
parents who are in difficulties in relation to their children.  In this programme the 
behaviour of both parents and children are brought under scrutiny.  The right to privacy 
has been traded for advice and help.  Furthermore, the public element of experiencing 
family difficulties broadcast on mainstream television is justified from a didactic 
perspective.  It is thought that parents watching the programme may be experiencing 
similar difficulties and so may benefit form the programme.  Here, the right to privacy 
has been traded for public benefit.  The parents who have agreed to be filmed may value 
this trade-off and incorporate this into their rationale for agreeing to be filmed. 
 
The idea of trading benefits can then be applied to TS, as will be discussed later in this 
section of the chapter (p 279 para 3).   
 
A second reason why a transsexual has a duty to disclose is that there are certain 
situations in which other people have a right to know.  Personal intimacy creates an 
atmosphere in which there exists a duty to disclose certain information.  Baier358  argues 
that it is the nature of a context that gives shape to both duties and expectations: 
 
      a right to get straight answers to questions (that) one has a right in 
      certain circumstances to pose.359  
 
 
 
Baier argues that social contexts both create expectations and place duties upon those 
who are engaged in them.  Both can be thought of as rights.  Contexts can be understood 
either as weak, as when a person enquires about another’s health in a social gathering and 
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strong, as with long standing intimate relationships.  Weak contexts place both a duty and 
an expectation, for example to be asked about one’s health with a positive answer being 
given.  Strong contexts create both a duty and an expectation of high levels of disclosure 
and truthfulness. 
 
In a strong context of intimacy a non-transsexual can be understood to have an interest in 
knowing the history of the transsexual based on other interests, such as the interest in 
founding a family, the interest in enjoying family life and the interest in having an 
informed sexual relationship.   In such a relationship it is unlikely that a non-transsexual 
partner would ask a transsexual about his/her gender history.  Where surgery has been 
successful, there may be no signs which prompt even an intimate partner to question the 
history of their transsexual partner.  The interests out-lined above may then provide 
compelling reasons why the right to privacy can be over-ridden. Further argument may 
help at this point.   
 
Tension exists between the need to take people at face value and the need to be aware 
enough in order to protect oneself.  For instance, both the prevalence of, the prominence 
given to and danger of HIV mean that people need, in general, to protect themselves 
when engaging in sexual intercourse360.  Therefore, anyone engaging in a sexual 
relationship without safeguarding themselves and doing so just on the word of the other 
person, can be thought to be acting irresponsibly.  It is the attention given to HIV, in the 
media and from both governments and health organisations, that creates the conditions in 
which people need to act with awareness.  However, TS does not have the same attention 
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or prominence.  It is less common361, even though evidence presented at the LGBT 
Health summit 2008 shows that the age at which requests for surgery is rising362.  It is 
less reasonable, therefore, to expect people to have an awareness of TS.   
 
An important out-working of this lack of awareness of TS can be seen in the matter of 
what people can expect when meeting others with whom they seek romantic 
relationships.  Meeting a person in a heterosexual context would lead a person to believe 
that she/he is meeting someone of the opposite sex.  Expectations are in play, determined 
both by the desires of the person and the context in which that person operates.  So, both 
desiring and expecting to meet a person of the opposite sex, a person is likely to think 
that this is exactly what has happened when she/he meets someone to whom they are 
attracted.  She/he has no reason to suppose otherwise and cannot be expected to be aware 
that the person to whom they are attracted may be transsexual, because of the general 
lack of awareness that exist in relation to TS. 
 
 
The movie The Crying Game (1992)363 provides an example of someone who ought not 
to have been surprised to find that his partner was a pre-operative transsexual, because 
they met in a LGBT bar.  It could be argued that he has no reason to feel that he has been 
deceived because of the circumstances in which he met his partner.  This demonstrates 
that expectations ought to be linked to contexts and a heterosexual context gives rise to a 
heterosexual expectation. 
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It is not justified to argue, therefore, that an onus is placed on a person to realise that the 
one to whom they are attracted may once have had a different gender.  Often, 
transsexuals desire to meet potential partners in a heterosexual context.  Jorgensen 
thought in terms of heterosexual marriage when thinking about romantic relationships364.  
Her desire was to have a heterosexual relationship.  Her public profile as a transsexual 
made is impossible for her to keep her past gender a secret, and so she was not faced with 
a duty to disclose.  She is being quoted here to demonstrate that a post-operative 
transsexual may have a heterosexual romantic aspiration.  Where this is the case, and the 
past gender identity cannot be expected to have been known, then the onus, is with the 
transsexual to disclose. 
 
Similarly a woman who looks white, but has black ancestry (of which she is aware), is in 
a relationship with a man whom she discovers to be a member of the British National 
Party.  The issue here is not the rightness or wrongness of either belonging to such a 
political party or whether she thinks it is acceptable or not.  Rather it is that he has certain 
beliefs and values which he may assume are not threatened by his relationship with her.  
He cannot know the full facts of the situation because he cannot see them.  What he can 
see seems to affirm what he thinks.  If he wants children then there is a real possibility 
that their black ancestry may be made visible. 
 
These examples are not used in order to argue that the transsexual has a shameful past 
which she/he must confess to a partner.  Rather they are used in order to demonstrate that 
there is a connection between what a person can see and what she/he may then believe.  
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Seeing and believing is associated with evidence.  A person believes on the evidence that 
is available.  Sometimes a person ought not to believe what she/he sees or is told, as in 
the example of HIV where a person claims to be free of the condition and asks for 
unprotected sex.  Here, the other person ought not to just act on this claim because she/he 
knows that the risk of HIV infection is real and that using condoms is the safest thing to 
do.  At other times a person cannot be expected to doubt what he/she sees (as in the case 
of the white woman) because knowledge to the contrary is not available. 
 
Lerner365 argues that a distinction ought to be made between truth telling, which is 
beneficial for relationships, and the need to deceive.  For example, a women needs to 
pretend to have a virtue because this can be the route to acquiring it.  In terms of 
relationships, however, truth telling is an occasion for joy and authenticity.  Her 
distinction seems to be between good secrets and bad.  A good secret would be 
pretending to have a virtue and a bad secret would be hiding something that has the 
potential to harm another.  This harm exists where the other person has an interest in 
knowing the secret.  Where such an interest is legitimate then a duty exists to disclose. 
 
TS, in a context of heterosexuality, is an occasion where such a duty is found.  The non-
transsexual has an interest in knowing about the past gender identity because he/she 
assumes that what she/he sees has always been the case.  This seems to be a reasonable 
assumption because of the heterosexual context.  The transsexual has a duty to disclose 
because of the same heterosexual context. 
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The third reason for a duty to disclose can be formulated in terms of a duty to oneself; 
first in terms of respect and second from a pragmatic point of view. 
 
First, then, the right to privacy needs to be offset against the duty the transsexual owes to 
him/herself in terms of self-respect. The duty is not to harm oneself and this is achieved 
by being respectful of oneself.  This duty would not in and of itself preclude surgery as 
surgery is a means to and end. 
 
 Kant366 argues that every human being has a duty of respect to the self.  Amongst other 
things this duty demands that a person ought not to lie or to deceive others as this harms 
oneself.  A transsexual sees the post-operative gender as the truth about him/herself so the 
lie does not consist in the present presentation of gender but in the unspoken or 
unacknowledged claim that this gender is the gender that has always been presented. 
 
Kant argues that lying or deceiving is: 
 
      more a violation of duty to oneself than of one’s duty to others.367 [for] 
 
      by a lie a man throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity  
      as a man.368 
 
 
From a Kantian perspective, then, it is possible to view a transsexual who does not 
disclose the fact of transitioning, in the specific context being explored in this Chapter, as 
someone who may be actively harming themselves.  Harm consists in disrespecting ones 
rationality.  It is not primarily a matter of the consequences that may follow acts of 
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concealment but of a failure to act rationally, which Kant formulates as the highest 
human good.  To afford primacy to the right to privacy may involve the transsexual 
failing to act rationally. 
 
Second, a transsexual has a duty to disclose as this may be in her/his own best interest.  
To fail to do so may lead to problems in the future such as other people picking up on 
gaps in her/his personal history, chance encounters with people from the pre-GReS past, 
the need to draw on knowledge and experience gained from life lived in the previous 
gender and which cannot be explained without reference to that life, and the desire to 
relate to others in a way that would reveal the past gender life.  Such circumstances may 
lead to forced disclosure, exposure or to the possibility of either being misunderstood or 
loosing access to valuable past knowledge and experience. 
 
A partner who discovers a transsexual’s transitioning by means other than personal 
disclosure may believe that the transsexual has been both duplicitous and untrustworthy.  
This may then threaten the relationship itself with a partner experiencing a sense of being 
let down or lied to.  To avoid this possibility then it may be in the best interests of the 
transsexual to be open about her/his transitioning.  A partner may think that she/he had 
not been considered trustworthy enough by her/his transsexual partner to be entrusted 
with the knowledge about her/his past life. 
 
Such pragmatic considerations may not give a transsexual a moral duty to disclose but is 
concerned with what works and what does not.  A judgement needs to be made about the 
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tension between the desire for privacy and considerations about the consequences of 
someone finding out.  A transsexual may come to the conclusion that though she/he has a 
strong desire to keep the fact of transitioning secret in order to live in the desired gender 
role, or it may be both more valuable and beneficial to tell her/his partner. 
 
Not to disclose runs the risk of being found out.  To prevent this, a transsexual may need 
to develop skills of concealment in order not to give away the fact that he/she was once 
differently sexed.  Linked to this he/she may have to offer reasons that are not strictly true 
to explain his/her infertility, for example.  Skills of concealment focus on not giving 
oneself away; not feeling uncomfortable when giving false reasons for something and not 
feeling uncomfortable when causing others to believe something that is not strictly true.  
A certain amount of concealment has already been seen to be necessary in order to pursue 
private goals such as ambition in work, but in the context of intimacy concealment at the 
level of not revealing transitioning may prove to be detrimental.  A transsexual may also 
be harmed to the extent that concealment may be the result of fear or prejudice and by 
keeping transitioning secret she/he is either confirming fear or prejudice to him/herself or 
in society as a whole. 
 
In a similar way a social climber from a poor background may regard himself as a 
socially superior person, and therefore as someone who is better than others.  He may try 
to achieve this by means of accent, mannerisms, and false claims and by constructing a 
false past of public schools and domestic servants.  He assumes that the possession of a 
posh accent means certain things in terms of status, education and wealth and when this 
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assumption is shared then he may successfully pass himself off as socially superior.  His 
ability to convince others about his/her social status does not make the claim itself true.  
What he is doing is conforming behaviour to social stereotypes, which may be inherently 
harmful.  He is concealing his past in order to be the sort of person that he desires.  
However, for this to be achieved both concealment is necessary and socially harmful 
stereotypes are being maintained.  Both can be understood to be harmful. 
 
Authenticity would require that both the transsexual and the social climber seek to relate 
their present lives to their past selves in a way that emphasizes continuity and wholeness 
as well as challenging social stereotypes.  Present and past selves are integrated so that 
the whole of a person’s life is owned in the recognition that all his/her life has been a 
unique event.  To disconnect from a past life is to disvalue past experience and to act as if 
it never was.  This may be an example of bad faith.  Authenticity would require that all 
people respond in this way.  
DISCLOSURE AND INTIMACY 
 
 
A final consideration about disclosure can be thought about in the context of creating 
intimacy.  A relationship with a partner is by definition a relationship of intimacy.  
Intimacy is both achieved and maintained by disclosure.  Derlega and Chaikin ask:  
 
      What is probably the most important function of disclosure?  The  
      creation of an intimate, caring relationship with another person.369  
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They offer a supplementary reason for disclosure which is that it aids personal insight and 
can relieve neurosis.  Nevertheless, they argue that what must be recognised is that the 
primary function of disclosure is the establishment of intimacy.  Both authors state that 
they agree with the position of the psychologist Mowrer which is that: 
 
      concealment of self occurs out of fear of the consequences of self- 
      disclosure, from a person’s belief that if people knew his real self they 
      would find it ugly and unworthy of love and respect.370 
 
 
 
Jourard371 refers to the reciprocal nature of disclosure as the ‘dyadic effect’, which is 
crucial in creating intimacy.  Intimacy begins when one person ‘risks’ disclosure.  Risk 
consists in the possibility of the other person either misunderstanding or disliking the 
discloser’s comments or becoming suspicion of his/her motivation.  If a negative 
response follows disclosure then the relationship itself may be threatened.  However, 
when there is a positive response to disclosure there is often an accompanying deepening 
of intimacy.  A dynamic of mutual disclosure can be created with the relationship 
deepening as a result.  When a relationship begins it is usual for relatively safe matters to 
be disclosed and as the relationship continues for disclosures that are more revealing to 
be shared.  Often a point of climax is reached when a person has fully (or as fully as 
she/he is conscious of) revealed him/herself to another.  This is often thought to be the 
moment when deepest intimacy has been achieved. 
 
Derlega and Chaikin discuss the way that candour can increase closeness between people 
and conclude: 
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      The aspects of ourselves that we hide may actually improve the 
      chances of a successful relationship if we reveal them.372 
 
 
Goffman373 offers a set of guidelines for people who are seeking to achieve intimacy by 
means of disclosure.  He advises that disclosure is appropriate if it is in the context of an 
on-going relationship; it is not an isolated or random act; it develops out of the good 
experience of the person involved; it is mutual; the discloser monitors the effects of each 
revelation on the other and each act is appropriate to the current state of the relationship. 
 
It is Goffman’s contention that for intimacy to be achieved the discloser needs to be more 
concerned about intimacy than she/he is about privacy, secrecy, personal anxiety and 
self-protection.  Such a person would both need to value intimacy above other values 
such as privacy in order to be willing to risk disclosure and realise that disclosure is a 
means by which intimacy is achieved. 
 
Derlega and Chaikin argue that disclosure leading to intimacy needs to be done on a basis 
of equality.  Some types of disclosure are inappropriate, if they cross the boundaries that 
are traditionally thought to exist between people.  For example, doctors disclosing to 
patients or priests to members of the congregation: 
 
      disclosure by a low status individual (for example an elevator  
      operator) to a high status individual (such as a business executive) 
      is more appropriate than disclosure in the reverse direction.374 
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The importance of this observation lies in their recognition of mutuality.  There are 
exceptions to this rule and times when one-off disclosures that ignore normal social 
conventions may be beneficial (disclosing to a stranger on a train, for example).  Derlega 
and Chaikin are pointing out that intimacy is usually understood to be between people 
who share a measure of equality and that disclosure is a means of achieving this. 
 
In terms of TS this suggests that if a transsexual wants intimacy she/he may need to begin 
a relationship of self-disclosure.  As stated above, this would begin at a relatively safe yet 
significant level with someone with whom she/he desires intimacy.  As the relationship 
develops further disclosures take place in a risk/being well received dynamic.  Greater 
disclosure leads to deeper intimacy.  Ultimate intimacy may be achieved by the 
disclosing of the fact of transitioning.  It is also the case that the greatest risk may attend 
disclosing this but along with this is the greatest potential for intimacy. 
 
The consideration of intimacy does not give a transsexual an imperative to disclose but is 
part of a wider prudential mechanism.  The benefits that a transsexual gains from 
disclosure may outweigh both the attendant risks and other considerations such as privacy 
in the context of intimacy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to establish that the model of authenticity developed in Chapter 
Four requires a number of things.  Firstly that the existing models be examined because 
 293 
 
of the conceptual confusion that appears to be inherent in them and that they be replaced 
with the new model of authenticity.  Secondly that TS be seen part of the original or early 
inheritance of the transsexual but not as something which is a matter of personal essence 
which cannot be changed or thought of as something for which the transsexual is not 
responsible.  Thirdly that a transsexual may or may not decide to move from this 
inheritance towards the establishment of gender/sex harmony if this forms part of the 
larger autonomously chosen goals of the individual. 
 
If this choice is made then the medical profession can be thought to have a duty to assist 
in the process of reassignment.  This duty flows from the position of respect for 
autonomy.  GReS ought not to be considered as a form of cosmetic surgery as sex/gender 
harmony is related in a fundamental sense to the matter of personal identity and therefore 
of individual functioning.  If harmony is pursued then a transsexual would need to be 
made aware of the difficulties inherent in Passing and so may decide to either forgo this 
activity completely or to conduct it in an open a way as possible.  This may prove to be a 
difficult thing to do but it has already been acknowledged that authenticity is a difficult 
thing to achieve. 
 
Different transsexuals may decide to pursue authenticity differently.  Some may choose 
to live with sex/gender dichotomy and to do so in order to challenge the traditional binary 
notions of masculinity and femininity.  It may be that some would think of themselves as 
gender non-conformists and so see their own sex/gender incongruence as a means of 
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embodying a challenge to the way that society constructs gender identities.  The 
Authenticity model permits a variety of responses to TS 
 
Fourthly that for a post-operative transsexual authenticity requires that disclosure takes 
place in a context of intimacy.  An intimate context can be that of the family, friendships 
or especially where a long-term sexual or romantic relationship is being experienced.  
Disclosure is owed both for the sake of the partner, the relationship and for the 
transsexual.  There is no duty to disclose to others with whom she/he has a non-intimate 
relationship, such as an employer, casual friends or new neighbours or colleagues that 
have been made post-operatively.   
 
Fifthly and lastly the medical profession needs to recognise the conceptual confusion 
inherent in the current models employed in transsexual narrative and so be willing to 
replace them with more coherent models.  The duty of medicine is then to rend assistance 
to a transsexual who is seeking to achieve autonomous goals in order to establish 
personal identity.  One result of this may be that those who perform surgery are viewed as 
practitioners standing outside of traditional medicine, in a way that is analogous to 
cosmetic surgery, operating within a context of commercial medicine. 
 
Sullivan offers a sociological analysis of the commercialisation of medicine in the USA, 
particularly in relation to cosmetic surgery375.  She likens cosmetic surgery to attempts in 
other cultures to achieve personal identity by means of altering the body, such as the 
binding of feet in Chinese culture and the marking of the face in Maori culture.  She is 
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critical of the fact that beauty has become a concern of medicine and worries about the 
implication of commercialism within medicine, such as advertising services (which she 
refers to as promotion) and the possible consequences of deregulation. 
Shepherd376 reviews Sullivan and argues that cosmetic surgery is an example of medicine 
seeking to improve the quality of life.  She argues that not all medicine needs to save life, 
as improving the quality of life is a legitimate medical goal.  She compares cosmetic 
surgery with hormone replacement therapy.  The latter is seen as a legitimate function of 
medicine, yet is not a matter of saving life but of improving quality of life.  Shepherd 
further argues that what Sullivan regards as promotion may be a matter of patient 
education. 
 
In relation to TS practitioners would operate in a context similar to surgeons performing 
cosmetic surgery.  Concerns around the safety of both patients and practitioners and the 
need to guard against the dangers of commercialism in relation to the latter can then be 
applied to the former. 
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CONCLUSION TO THESIS 
 
 
In this thesis I had two aims. First I aimed to demonstrate the conceptual incoherence and 
logical contradiction that lies at the heart of the current medical model of transsexuality 
and the provision of gender reassignment surgery. This aim was achieved in chapters 1-3.  
My second was to develop an alternative model that avoided these inconsistencies and 
incoherence. In Chapter 4 I proposed a model based on authenticity and in Chapter 5 I 
discussed how this model could be made to work in practice in order to demonstrate that 
the model was more than merely theoretical.   
 
To understand the conceptual incoherence and logical contradiction of the current model 
it is necessary to understand the current therapeutic guidelines.  These were examined in 
the Introduction.  In Section One of Chapter One TS was located within current 
constructions of sex/sexuality and gender before, in Section Two, its conceptual 
incoherence and logical contradiction was outlined.  Here I argued that the contradiction 
arises because the model sex/gender distinction dissolves into sex/gender alignment, by 
means of GReS. If sex and gender are to be regarded distinct constructs, and this I argued 
is the proper way to understand them, then this distinction must have some place in the 
justification for surgery and for the post-surgical understanding of what the transsexual 
has achieved.  Instead, what I showed was that the rational for GReS is that sex and 
gender are dependent: to be ‘truly’ female one must have female sex organs and to be 
‘truly’ male one must have male ones. 
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Further problems with TS were uncovered in Chapter Two.  In the first Section the 
models of gender, medicine and body-image were applied to TS.  These were critically 
examined.  In relation to gender TS was seen to start out with the intra-personal model 
before dissolving into an inter-personal model.  But this collapse is not acknowledged.   
The medical model depends upon accommodating TS within disease models, specifically 
psychiatric disease models, but at the same time avoiding regarding the transsexual as 
mentally ill.  This is necessary because if the transsexual is reporting a mental illness 
rather than some dysfunction of the brain this would cast doubt on the capacity of the 
transsexual to be reporting accurately or being able to consent to – or even insist upon - 
surgery.   
 
The application of a body image model raised fewer problems. Here it was seen that the 
model had potential to be of benefit in the understanding of TS, particularly if the way 
that a transsexual ‘sees’ her/himself is explored.  Yet the body image model is not used to 
understand transsexuality. I therefore concluded that further research is needed into the 
potential benefit of the relationship between body image development and TS. 
 
Having established the conceptual incoherence and logical contradiction of the current 
medical model of transsexuality, and having argued for the potential benefit of 
substituting a body-image model in its place,  I then offered a number of reasons why, to 
date, there has not been a great deal of critical attention given to the conceptual 
underpinning of TS.  These were that first; there has been a pre-occupation in popular 
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discourse with sex; second, there seems to be a reluctance for those who are not 
transsexual to comment upon TS and third there is also a reluctance to critically engage 
with the suffering of others.  
 
I then turned to the view that the alleviation of suffering is the best and most appropriate 
response to the experience of transsexuals.  The argument turns on the belief that 
suffering should be addressed wherever possible. Given that surgery and hormonal drugs 
will alleviate this suffering, and granted that both fall into the remit of medicine, clearly 
clinicians have an obligation to address the needs of those suffering from transsexuality. 
In Chapter Three I argue that the first premise of this argument from suffering is flawed – 
namely that there is no absolute duty to relieve every kind of suffering just because one 
can. I first sought to define what I understood suffering to mean. I offered a specific 
definition of suffering: suffering was differentiated from other forms of human misery in 
order to be clear about what kind of human misery merited a surgical response of the 
nature of GReS.  Suffering was defined as: something that impacts on a person 
physically, psychologically and socially; causes significant frustration to a person’s goals 
and desires with the result that the self is threatened. If it is undeserved, intense and 
prolonged and is considered to be suffering by the person concerned then the criteria are 
met. 
 
I then argued that suffering can be of benefit. For instance it can be of value both to the 
sufferer and to others who are connected to him.  Accordingly, the duty to alleviate 
suffering cannot be an absolute one.  This is not to say that there is no duty: the duty 
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remains important but the automatic response shouldn’t be one of seeking to remove it.  
Suffering per se cannot, therefore, provide a sufficient justification for GReS because we 
can imagine an individual who values such suffering, not for its own sake but because of 
what it may lead to, or the way that it is engaged with.   
 
This conclusion left the way clear for me to propose a new way of understanding – or 
model of -  TS and possible justifications for a surgical response: the model of 
authenticity. 
 
 In Chapter Four I show that this model must be articulated from within an existentialist 
framework.  Authenticity recognises personal freedom and responsibility and as such 
does not regard TS as a medical condition. It seeks to empower the person both to regard 
all aspects of his/her experience as that which can be owned and to be  free to construct 
an identity according to her/his own goals and desires.  The precepts of this model echo 
and address concerns from within the transsexual community, where there is growing 
dissatisfaction with the medical model, and particularly its psychiatric classification.  At 
the same time there is recognition that medicine has a gate-keeping role in relation to 
surgery, which is only accessible from within a therapeutic framework.   
 
My model of authenticity provides an alternative justification for surgery that avoids both 
a medical under-pinning and a psychiatric diagnosis and therefore addresses the 
discomfort of this group.  The justification is that a transsexual needs medical help to 
enable him/her to pursue an authentic existence.  A doctor (or other kind of helper) is 
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putting his/her skills at the service of the transsexual in much the same way as those with 
body dysmorphia seeking the amputation of healthy limbs are (a condition discussed in 
Chapter Two).  The transsexual is an autonomous individual and as such is best placed to 
know what his/her best interests are.  On my model those who offer help recognise this 
autonomy, and that TS and the response to it are in large measure based on personal 
choice rather an illness or condition that leaves the afflicted helpless, with no choice but 
to seek surgery or continue to suffer. 
 
My final Chapter demonstrates the advantages of this model over the medical model and 
also discusses the implication of authenticity for both the individual and for those who 
offer help. The advantages are that a transsexual is no longer viewed as someone with a 
mental illness, and that his/her autonomy is respected in keeping with authenticity.  These 
choices, however, bring with them responsibilities particularly related to the avoidance of 
deception and in relation to disclosure.  I argue that the usual practice of transitioning is 
inherently deceptive and also reintroduces some of the incoherencies of the old medical 
model. For this reason I suggest a more open and, I argue, honest process of  ‘Resolving’ 
or ‘Testing’, I also argue that the transsexual has obligations to disclose his/her history to 
those who have a legitimate interest in knowing. I argue that whilst the right to privacy 
offers some scope for concealment, this right can be outweighed by others’ interests. This 
duty is both principled and pragmatic. It is pragmatic because it will better facilitate the 
circumstances of intimacy which it is prudent for those seeking intimate relationships to 
cultivate. 
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The model of authenticity frees an individual to think of her/himself not as ill or as 
deviant in any way but as a person who is in a position to challenge still further the 
concepts of masculinity and femininity that are already being challenged from within 
feminism.   
 
In the model of authenticity sex and gender remain distinct, so both logical and coherent 
inconsistency is avoided, yet GReS remain an option, not for reasons of cure or treatment 
but for reasons of authentic living.  Where GReS is chosen sex and gender remain 
distinct, separate and vital elements of the person- not necessarily held in tension (though 
this could be the case if a person chooses to live in tension). 
 
The model of authenticity has value on the conceptual level and on the personal level.  It 
is conceptually clearer and more coherent because it retains the sex and gender distinction 
that is vital for transsexuality to be conceived of at all.  At a personal level it avoids the 
use of labels and frees a transsexual to think of her/himself in ways that avoid the stigma 
of mental illness and psychiatric treatment.   
 
The model requires both transsexuals and those who seek to help them to think in 
different ways.  The model has personal responsibility at its core.  The transsexual must, 
therefore, accept responsibility both for the initial experience of sex/gender dissonance. 
The individual is also responsible for deciding how to respond to their experiences.  In 
current transsexual narratives the notion of responsibility is avoided by focussing on 
suffering, which – it is believed - must be addressed so urgently that the individual has no 
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choice but to seek surgery.  Authenticity is based on the notion that a transsexual, like 
everyone else, is a person who is responsible for his/her own existence (all things being 
equal). 
 
In this thesis I challenge the medical model of TS. My conclusion does not, however, 
challenge the provision of GReS, though it is radical, expensive and time consuming. Nor 
is GReS always effective. The case of Samantha Kane illustrates the lengths to which 
individuals are prepared to go to get their surgery reversed.  Instead, I argue that surgery 
is an option; one option amongst others.  Its provision is neither justified with reference 
to the proper function of medicine in response to a disease, nor by the suffering 
experienced by the transsexual.  Rather it is justified as a response to the value of 
authenticity, and proper respect for the autonomous choices of those who aim to live 
authentically.  
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